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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the impact of Private Equity (PE) investment on Chinese portfolio 
firms. The sample used in this thesis contains all non-financial PE-backed listed firms in 
mainland stock markets from 2000 to 2011. Three empirical chapters are included. First, 
we investigate the factors that motivate firms to receive PE investment in China. We find 
financing and signaling as motivation for PE investment in China are not accepted. 
Instead, firms with a largest shareholder or a concentrated ownership have higher 
motivation in receiving PE investment, which is consistent with the minority shareholder 
role of most PE investors. Second, we examine how PE investment affects Chinese 
portfolio firms. From regression model results, we confirm that the inflow of PE 
investment leads to better post-investment performance in the short run but PE investors’ 
have less incentive in evolving into corporate government because their roles as minority 
shareholders. PE investment shows no significant impact on profitability in the long run. 
The evidence suggests that most PE investors are short-term-profit driven and their roles 
are mostly related to the help with IPO listing. Third, we examine which aspect of PE 
investment can explain IPO underpricing. We find that PE-backed IPOs tend to set higher 
offering prices (hence lower underpricing) than non-PE backed IPOs, which provides PE 
investors with higher exit profits via IPO. We finally attribute the lower underpricing to 
the speculation behaviour of PE investors in Chinese stock markets. This thesis applies 
the standard theories to a transition economy such as China, and contributes to the general 
PE literature by adding in the updated Chinese evidence. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Being the world’s fastest-growing economy over the past 30 years, China has now 
become the world’s second largest economy with an average GDP growth rate over 7%. 
Thanks to the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the political and socioeconomic aspects of 
the capitalist economic system were introduced to the socialist market economy and 
China began to make major reforms since 1978. The Chinese economy is interesting and 
important because of its successful pattern which is different from other mature and/or 
developing economy in a lot of ways, including the political structure, legal system and 
economic development. Scholars and researchers are trying to understand the reasons for 
Chinese success and explore whether the Chinese experience can be learned and applied 
to other economies. 
 
The fast growing economy has inevitably left a number of issues behind. One of the most 
significant problems is the structure of the Chinese financial system. Traditional financing 
channels refer to banks and financial markets (stock markets and bond markets) (Allen et 
al., 2012). The Chinese financial system is dominated by a large banking system, and 
bank loans are the major formal financing channels in China. The Chinese banking sector 
is controlled by four state-owned banks1 and a large number of disproportionate bank 
loans are allocated to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and large enterprises (Wei and 
Wang, 1997). SMEs in their early 2  stages of development face higher asymmetric 
                                                             
1 The four state-owned banks are Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
2 According to EVCA (2004) report, early stage is defined as the stage for product development and initial marketing, 
manufacturing and sales activities.  
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information due to the lack of transparency and access. This problem can be more severe 
for young technology-based firms since the owners are less reluctant to provide full 
information about their knowledge and core technology. For those reasons, the banking 
institutions face higher costs in obtaining information and they have less incentive to 
conduct loans to the SMEs. Hence, firms in the private sector have restricted and limited 
access to bank loans. In contrast to China’s superb banking system which is among the 
biggest and most profitable in the world (see ‘Too big to fall’, the Economist), its equity 
and bond markets are underdevelopment and much smaller than those in other countries. 
The Chinese stock markets were established as a vehicle for privatization by the 
government rather than a capital-raising market for firms with growth opportunities 
(Wang et al., 2001). The IPO listing process is tightly controlled by the Chinese Securities 
Regularity Commission (CSRC) with a preference of financing large mature firms and 
state-backed firms. It was not until 2004 when the SME stock board was set up to help 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) listing in China. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
stock market is also regarded as one of the poorest functioning stock markets (Durnev et 
al., 2003). The Chinese corporate bond market is suffering from a shortage of institutional 
investors and credit rating agencies to help price the debt accurately (Ayyagari et al., 
2010). Consequently, there is a lack of formal financing channels for Chinese private 
firms, especially for SMEs. As reported by the National Bureau of Statistics, SMEs 
contributed 58.5% of GDP by the end of 2012. In sharp contrast to their large contribution 
to the Chinese economy and the concentrated loans offered to SOEs, SMEs use only 20% 
of China’s formal financial resources. Under such situation, SMEs have switched to 
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alternative informal financing channels3. The emergence of the private equity investment 
represents the most suitable channel in providing financing for SMEs.  
 
Private equity is finance provided to high potential growth companies in return for an 
equity transformed to the investors (BVCA, 2011).  PE firms raise funds from institutional 
investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and high net worth individuals 
(BVCA, 2011).  PE investors use these funds, sometimes along with PE manager’s own 
money, to invest in firms with growth potential and to take an active role in monitoring 
and advising portfolio firms (Fenn et al., 1998). 
 
PE investors are normally labeled as financial sponsors, who acquire large ownership 
stakes and take an active role in monitoring and advising portfolio firms (Fenn et al., 
1998). Following the definition submitted by EVCA (2004), the term private equity 
comprises all types of venture investment, buyout and mezzanine investment (to be 
discussed in chapter 2). PE investors aim to finance young entrepreneurs and high-tech 
firms, which are characterized as a lack of sufficient funds to drive innovation and growth.  
 
PE industry has experienced an impressive global growth in the US and the Europe at the 
beginning of the 21st century (Sommer, 2013). Accordingly, a large number of academic 
literature has largely focused on these mature markets, given the information available 
                                                             
3 Informal financing channels in China are defined as everything that is not bank financing, since the banking sector is 
the largest component of the formal financial sector (Allen et al., 2005). According to Tsai (2004), informal financing 
includes, but is not restricted to, trade credit, interpersonal borrowing (money from friends or families), private money 
houses, pawnshops and community cooperatives. Allen et al (2005) argue that Chinese firms rely on informal financing 
channels rather than formal external financing due to weaker legal protection and poorer access to formal financing 
channels. Among the different types of informal financing channels, private equity investment is regarded as one of the 
most popular informal financing channels (BVCA, 2012). 
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for both PE investors and PE portfolio firms (Stromberg, 2009). Moreover, these studies 
focus either on early stage venture capital investment or on late stage buyout investment. 
It seems reasonable to assume that not all results found in the US and Europe countries 
can be true for emerging markets such as China. Especially given that the Chinese PE 
market has the following characteristics: (1) The majority of private SMEs have limited 
access to formal financing channels and therefore they have to rely on informal financing 
channels. This suggests that the demand for PE investment can be extreme. (2) The 
Chinese PE market was driven by the booming stock market after the setting up of SME 
board and ChiNext board in 2004 and 2009 respectively. As a result, pre-IPO and growth 
capital are the two most commonly found PE types in China. (3) Chinese corporations 
have their own characteristics, which are summarized by Bai et al (2004) as follows: (a) 
The executive compensation system is not well designed and normally contains 
undisclosed information. (b) Financial transparency is poor and local accounting firms 
cannot always be trusted. (c) Corporate control is found to be almost missing in China. 
(d) A concentrated ownership structure is found in most Chinese firms. A large percentage 
of non-tradable shares and state-owned shares are shown to have negative impact on 
corporate governance before 2005. (e) The external legal infrastructure is inefficient and 
offers little protection for minority shareholders, thus accelerating the conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders. Firms from mature market economies normally have 
a well-dispersed ownership structure before receiving PE investment. In contrast, Chinese 
firms are normally accompanied with a concentrated ownership and sometimes even a 
single largest shareholder. In many cases, this largest shareholder has some relationships 
with the state or a state related agency. This feature of Chinese corporate governance 
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implies that the entry and the impact of PE investment on portfolio firms’ corporate 
governance can be different from mature market observations. For example, a 
consequence of focusing on pre-IPO and growth capital is that, investors normally 
become minority shareholders rather than the controlling shareholder in the portfolio 
firms from mature markets. Therefore these PE investors have less influence on corporate 
governance and transfer fewer value-added activities to the portfolio firm. (4) PE 
investment in China mainly uses IPO as an exit channel, especially after the setting up of 
two new stock boards in 2004, which is in sharp contrast to the trade sales exit channel in 
western countries. (5) The majority of PE investment in China is made by domestic 
investors but each deal size is relatively small. In contrast, foreign PE investors make a 
small amount of large investments. These background information suggests that PE 
investment may perform differently in their Chinese portfolio firms. Therefore, it is very 
important for both academics and practitioners to understand the differences between the 
Chinese PE market and PE market in more mature financial systems. 
 
In recent years, several studies have focused on this fast-growing PE market and provided 
different opinions on it. These studies mainly focus on PE-backed IPOs (Zhang and Li, 
2012; Tan et al., 2013 and Jiang et al., 2014). Surprisingly, these three studies provide 
contradictory results regarding the effect of PE/VC investment on IPO underpricing in 
Chinese portfolio firms (to be discussed in chapter 6). Apart from focusing on stock 
market performance, Guo and Jiang (2013) compare VC-backed firms to non-VC-backed 
firms and find that VC investment leads to better profitability performance and increased 
labour productivity. One of their explanations for better post-investment performance is 
15 
 
VCs’ better selection skills in identifying firms with substantial development potential. 
Although these studies have provided different explanations on Chinese portfolio firms, 
there remain some unanswered questions on the Chinese market, such as: (1) These 
studies do not differentiate PE and VC investment (the differences between PE and VC 
will be discussed in details in chapter 2). In our opinion, VCs tend to invest at an early 
stage of their portfolio firms and most of the IPO related PE investment should not be 
categorized as VC investment, but rather, as growth capital. Hence, using the definition 
PE instead of VC is more accurate and can include more PE types. (2) Due to the 
limitations of the disclosed information, most sample size in existing studies is relatively 
small and does not cover a long sample period. For example, these studies focus on the 
sample firms before 2007 (which is regarded as the start of a booming PE market in 
China), such as Guo and Jiang (2013), or focus only on new board listed firms, such as 
Zhang and Li (2012), Tan et al (2013), Cao et al (2014) and Jiang et al (2014). (3) It is 
still unclear how the different types of PE approach affect the ex-post performance of 
their portfolio firms, especially in the long run. (4) There are some inconsistent results on 
how PE affects IPO performance and a lack of convincing explanation of the role PE 
investors during the IPO process. (5) The motivation for Chinese firms to receiving PE 
investment remains unveiled.   
 
This study intends to add further insights into complement recent developments of the 
Chinese PE market and our study differs from the existing studies in the following ways. 
First of all, we take into account the dynamics of the Chinese PE market and focus on the 
PE-backed listed firms. The reason for focusing on listed firms is that listed firms offer 
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more accurate accounting information and allow us to access more details on shareholder 
and corporate governance operation. Secondly, the three empirical chapters, including the 
motivation for receiving PE investment, the accounting and stock market performance 
affected by the inflow of PE investment, will enable us to get a comprehensive 
understanding on how PE investment helps to change the operation and behaviour of these 
PE-backed listed firms. These steps help to add Chinese evidence into the general PE 
studies. In the subsequent sections, we will introduce the objective of this study in more 
details and explain what is new in our studies in comparison to the existing ones.  
 
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to provide an overall picture of PE market in China by 
investigating both the accounting and stock market performance of the PE-backed 
Chinese mainland list firms and argue whether they perform differently from the existing 
literature. In chapter 3, the theoretical framework of the study is provided based on an 
extensive literature review, leading to several hypotheses to be tested in the following 
empirical chapters. In chapter 4, we examine the motivations for Chinese portfolio firms 
in receiving PE investment. We try to understand why these portfolio firms tend to receive 
PE investment and whether their motivations are different from the existing literature. In 
chapter 5, we analyze how PE affects their portfolio firms’ performance in both short and 
long term. More precisely, we focus on how the post-investment changes can be explained 
by general theories and whether the effects vary according to factors such as stock boards, 
state-background and PE investors. In chapter 6, we compare IPO underpricing and 
underperformance between PE-backed IPOs and non-PE-backed IPOs. We are 
17 
 
particularly interested in the role of PE investment during the IPO process and compare 
it to general findings.  
 
1.3 Contributions 
In this thesis, we add some new evidence by revealing Chinese characteristics to the 
standard PE literature based on mature markets. We also make an explicit connection 
between the Chinese IPO market and the Chinese PE market. First of all, chapter 4 seeks 
to develop a deep understanding of the reasons and the factors that motivate firms to 
receive PE investment in China. In particular, this chapter finds that explanations from 
the existing studies may not be true to explain the Chinese case. Our findings indicate 
that financing for investment and growth and signaling effect are not the main reasons for 
receiving PE investment. Unlike studies from western countries highlight the entry of PE 
investment with the ability to reduce the principal-agency conflict, we raise the issue that 
PE entry as a minority shareholder does not have a significant impact on corporate 
governance which motivates firms with a concentrated ownership to undertake PE 
investment. Our analyses in this chapter contribute to existing literature in comparing the 
motivation factors from western countries and providing a different insight from the 
perspective of agency theory showing a different role of agency theory in motivating PE 
investment in China. Secondly, chapter 5 examines the real effect of PE investment on 
portfolio firms’ operation performance. The findings indicate that PE investment in 
Chinese listed firms is short term profit-oriented rather than improving firm performance 
for portfolio firms in the long run. Our analyses in this chapter contribute to the literature 
by showing a different role of PE investment in a fast growing economy like China and 
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provide new explanations by extending the present US and European focused literature. 
Thirdly, chapter 6 compares the underpricing performance between PE-backed and non-
PE-backed IPOs. After rejecting other possible explanations, we attribute the lower-
underpricing of PE investment to the speculation behaviour of PE investors. This chapter 
not only develops a deeper understanding on PE investment in different stock markets, 
but also complements chapter 4 and 5 in developing a comprehensive understanding on 
Chinese PE market. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
In chapter 2, an overview of the PE investment in China is provided, including a general 
introduction to PE investment, the evolution of PE industry in China; an overview of the 
Chinese PE market and a comparison of Chinese PE market and the West. The purpose 
of chapter 2 is to provide preliminary but useful background information on Chinese PE 
market which helps to pave the way for the following empirical chapters.  
 
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework for this study based on an extensive 
literature review. Financial theories have been taken into account from the aggregate level 
to the industry level. There are five starting points to reveal the drivers of PE investment 
and the impact of PE investment on portfolio firms, including: the neoclassical theory, 
the financing for development and growth theory, the asymmetric information theory, the 
agency theory and the institutional theory. At the end of each theory, we propose the 
hypotheses to be tested in the following empirical chapters.  
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In chapter 4, we investigate the factors that motivate firms to receive PE investment in 
China. Using the Propensity Score Methods, we compare similar firms with and without 
PE investment and test the motivation proxies constructed from the general literature, 
including 195 PE-backed firms and 318 non-PE-backed firms from 2000-2011. Results 
from both Logit and Probit model show that, among the three possible types of motivation 
for undertaking PE investment, financing and signaling as motivation for PE investment 
in China are not accepted. As for agency theory, firms with a dominant largest shareholder 
become highly motivated to receive PE investment because PE investors normally 
become minority shareholders in the portfolio firms and play a limited role on corporate 
governance. To check robustness, we verify our findings by focusing on new board listed 
firms. The results confirm that the largest shareholder plays a positive role in receiving 
PE investment. In another robustness check, the stock market event study provides 
evidence that the announcement of PE investment does not lead to significant stock 
market returns for PE-backed listed firms. This chapter provides some new insights into 
the motivation for receiving PE investment by taking into account the corporate 
government structure of Chinese firms and the characteristics of Chinese PE market. A 
good understanding of the motivation for firms to receive PE investment helps understand 
PE impacts in the next two chapters.  
 
In chapter 5, we examine how PE investment affects Chinese portfolio firms during the 
period from 2000 to 2011 using regression models, including 364 PE deals from 307 PE-
backed listed firms. We confirm that the inflow of PE investment leads to better post-
investment performance in the short run, although the PE amount is relatively small 
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compared to firm size. Because PE investors’ role as minority shareholders, they have 
less incentive in evolving into corporate government, which is consistent with the 
insignificant or even negative relationship between PE deal stake and firm performance. 
The prior finding is consistent with the general literature while the latter highlights the 
issue of lack of incentives in management for PE investors in China. Moreover, we notice 
that PE investment before IPO leads to an immediate profit increase for portfolio firms, 
confirming the advantage of PE investment in providing quick financial support and 
boosting firm’s accounting performance. Our robustness check is based on different types 
of PE portfolio firms and different PE investors. Firstly, the result shows that PE 
investment has higher impact on new board listed firms than on main board listed firms 
due to the smaller size and risky nature of new board listed firms. In addition, the short-
term profit orientation of PE investment may create conflict between PE investors and 
recipient firms, which is observed as a negative relationship of PE deal stake for new 
board group. Secondly, the entry PE investors do not have a significant impact on the 
performance of PE portfolio firms with state-ownership, suggesting that financing 
purpose is not a necessary reason for undertaking PE investment. Thirdly, domestic PE 
investors and non-syndicated PE investors have greater impacts on portfolio firms than 
their counterparts, suggesting a better market understanding and a stronger single investor 
monitoring effect from both types of PE investors. Consistent with the fact that Chinese 
PE market is driven by IPO, PE investment shows no significant impact on profitability 
in the long run. The evidence obtained from the long run suggests that most PE investors 
are short-term-profit driven and their roles are mostly related to help with IPO listing. By 
using a large sample of firms in the 2000-2011 period, we provide a clear understanding 
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regarding the impact of PE investment on its portfolio firms and the difference role 
between groups and over time. Our results suggest that the Chinese PE market has been 
IPO driven especially after the setting up of two new stock boards in 2004. In conclusion, 
Chinese IPOs have been used as speculation channels by PE investors to get returns in 
short period. These results help to provide updated evidence for both general PE literature 
and Chinese PE literature.  
 
In chapter 6, we evaluate the role of PE investment during the initial public offering 
process by comparing 295 PE-backed and 1005 non-PE-backed listed firms from 2001-
2011. From the Heckman model results, we notice that PE-backed IPOs experience lower 
underpricing than non PE-backed IPOs. To verify the underlying reason for the lower IPO 
underpricing, we narrow down our sample to PE-backed IPOs only and find that the 
amount of PE investment has a negatively significant relationship with the underpricing 
ratio, which may be due to PE investors with large amount of PE investments are more 
willing to set up high offering price in the hope of benefitting from the initial IPO returns. 
After denying the generally acknowledged underpricing factors like PE reputation factor 
and the corporate governance role of PE investment, we finally attribute the lower 
underpricing to the speculation behaviour of PE investors in Chinese stock markets. From 
robustness test results, new boards’ listed firms experience higher speculation than their 
main board peers, while Chinese domestic PE investors lead to lower underpricing than 
non-domestic PE investors. Based on these findings, we expand our sample period to 12-
months and 24-months and we find that PE investment has no impact in these periods. 
The results further confirm the speculative behaviour of PE investors from the previous 
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chapter. In sum, this chapter provides similar observations to mature market evidence by 
showing PE-backed IPOs experience lower underpricing but using a different explanation. 
Instead of focusing solely on VC-backed IPOs, our PE-backed IPO sample is much larger 
and covers the major development period of PE industry in China. Our results also 
provide new insights by excluding other possible channels that may cause lower 
underpricing and indicate the speculation behaviour of PE investors in China. The 
findings from this chapter are also consistent with our observations from the previous two 
empirical chapters in confirming PE investors are short-term profit oriented.  
 
1.5 Data 
The data information used in this dataset is a combination of firms’ accounting-based 
information, stock market information and PE investment information. Two main data 
sources are used. The first is from the GTA Research Service Centre in Shenzhen (GTA 
Information Technology Company Limited)4 . In this dataset, the China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database provides the balance sheet and the cash flow statement 
information for chapters 4, 5 and 6; in which the China Listed Firms Corporate 
Governance Research Database provides the data information for variables used in 
chapter 4; its China Stock Market Trading Database also provides variables for use in 
chapter 6. The other main dataset in use is the Asian Venture Capital Journal Database 
(Asian Venture Capital Journal database)5 . AVCJ helps to provide the PE investment 
                                                             
4 The CSMAR Database is the most widely used dataset providing China financial data. It has seven major database 
series, with more than 60 datasets covering stock market, corporate, bond, funds, industry and economy. 
5 The AVCJ Database provides Asian private equity, venture capital and M&A industries’ information to advisory, 
financial, legal and technological services. AVCJ has been on the ground in the Asian market for more than 20 years 
and possesses the longest and deepest track record in Asia. This dataset provides users with access to more than 113800 
companies along with facts and figures on over 84000 transactions. 
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related information that is used in chapters 5 and 6. Besides, some of the PE investor 
information is hand collected from the investors’ individual websites.  
 
The sample period for all three empirical chapters runs from 2000 to 2011. All of the 
firms in our sample are currently listed on the Chinese mainland stock markets. The PE-
backed financial firms are excluded as well as firms without sufficient accounting and 
corporate governance information. As indicated previously, the reason for using only 
listed firms in our sample is that these firms provide more accessible and reliable public 
information. Moreover, we can get accurate corporate governance, shareholder 
information (used in chapter 4) and stock market information (used in chapter 6) from 
these listed firms. PE transaction information and PE investor information used in 
chapters 4 and 6 are collected in the year of investment. For chapter 4, the variables used 
are yearly accounting information, including PE investment year and the first and second 
year after PE investment information. For chapter 5, the variables used are yearly 
accounting and governance information before the PE investment year. For chapter 6, the 
IPO day share information is used for short-run underpricing testing. The monthly stock 
information for 12-month and 24-month periods are collected (excluding the IPO month) 
for long-run underperformance testing.  
 
Besides the use of firm and PE information from the two datasets mentioned above, we 
also make use of PE investors’ self-reported information which is available from their 
own websites. Such information is mainly used for explaining the types of PE investors 
in China in chapter 2. We also use some of the PE investors’ information, such as firm 
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age in chapter 4 when differentiating PE investor characteristics.  
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Chapter 2 PE in China 
An in-depth analysis of the Chinese PE market requires a comprehensive understanding 
of PE investment field. The operation of PE investment in China began in the early 1980s. 
In the past three decades, there have been many examples of successful as well as failed 
PE deals from both domestic investor and foreign investors in China. During this period, 
the Chinese government endorsed an aggressive investment strategy and great support in 
this industry’s deregulation, providing new PE exit channels and in rebalancing supply 
and demand of PE capital. The structure and development of the Chinese PE market has 
been introduced by a number of scholars, including Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006), Bruton 
and Ahlstrom (2003), Batjargal and Liu (2004), Wright et al (2011), Zhang and Li (2012) 
and Tan et al (2012), Zhang and Li (2012), Guo and Jiang (2013), Jiang et al (2014), Cao 
et al. (2014). In light of the recent development of the Chinese PE market, this chapter 
updates these early studies in the following ways. Firstly, we provide a detailed 
explanation on private equity investment. Secondly, we provide an overview of the 
Chinese PE market, including the 4 stages of PE6 market development, PE related laws 
and regulations and a classification of PE investors in China. Lastly, we compare the 
Chinese PE market and other mature PE markets by indicating the differences between 
the two types of market.  
 
 
                                                             
6 While the whole thesis has a clear focus on PE investment only (that is the investment targets of established firms), 
the venture capital investment is taken into account in this chapter in particular. This is because we aim to provide a 
full picture of the development of PE industry in China since the early 1980s and VC investment is an important 
component at the beginning of this period. As a result, in this chapter, the definition of PE covers both venture capital 
and private equity investment.   
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2.1 An overview of PE investment  
2.1.1 What is PE? 
PE is a type of financing provided medium to long-term finance, in return for an equity 
stake in an underperformance firms or firms with high potential of growth (EVCA, 2004). 
PE target firms range from business start-ups to large, mature quoted companies, 
including firms at different development stages. PE fund is operated under a PE fund 
manager who is also responsible for managing the portfolio firms (Gilligan and Wright, 
2010). PE investment is structured with an exit purpose. PE funds are normally raised 
from external investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies, endowments and 
high net wealth individuals. The investment period ranges from 3 to 10 years depending 
on the PE type (Meuleman et al., 2009; Jelic et al., 2005; Gilligan and Wright, 2010). PE 
investment was historically made in non-listed firms, but nowadays PE also make 
investment in publicly held firms.  PE revenue is created through active management of 
PE managers, who used to be an expert from a certain field and become a board member 
during the investment period. PE investor provides not only financial support but also 
human capital investment through managerial, operational and technical expertise 
(Bultler, 2011). 
 
PE investment can be divided into different types according to the timing of PE entry. 
Early studies roughly categorize PE investment into venture capital and buyout. The 
category also depends on different country of origin. In Europe, PE represents both 
venture capital and management buy-outs and buy-ins. On the contrary, PE (mainly refers 
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to buy-outs) and VC are treated as separate types of investment in the US. In academic 
studies, Lerner et al (2012) categorize private equity into venture capital, leveraged 
buyouts and mezzanine investments. Venture capital refers to equity investments target 
early stage and expanding companies, including seed, start-up (within three years of firms’ 
establishment) and early stages of development. Whilst buyouts refer to investments 
made into more mature firms (Sommer, 2013). Buyout investment aims to reduce 
inefficiencies, driving firms’ future growth through new margins and/or new sources 
EVCA (2004).   
With the development of the PE market, PE types can now be classified into more 
precisely specified subgroups. According to the financing stage, PE investment can be 
divided into early stage investment, expansion stage investment, mezzanine stage 
investment, buyout stage investment and late stage investment, according to the AVCJ 
dataset.  
- The early stage investment is the financing provided to start-up companies with 
financing difficulties, including two PE types: (1) Seed PE type, which is designed 
to research, access and develop an idea or financing that allows a business concept 
to be developed. Business angels are the main investors at this stage. (2) Start-up 
PE type refers to financing provided to companies in product development and 
initial marketing. At this stage, the capital is mainly required for product research 
and development and personnel training.  
- The expansion stage investment, also called ‘development stage’, refers to funds 
provided for firms at their growth and expansion stage. In this period, the inflow 
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of capital is mainly used to increase production capacity and sales power, to 
develop new products, finance acquisitions and/or increase the working capital of 
the business. This expansion stage investment includes three PE types: (1) Growth 
capital type which provides financing for growth and expansion of an operating 
company with trading profitably. (2) Bridge loan type, financing made available 
to a company in the period of transition from being privately owned to being 
publicly quoted. (3) Franchise funding type, in which financing is provided to a 
company with franchise in a particular area for further development.  
- In the mezzanine stage, a hybrid of debt and equity financing is typically used to 
finance the expansion of existing companies. This stage includes three types of 
investment. (1) Pre-IPO type, financing provided to help a company to go public. 
(2) Private investment in public companies (PIPE) type, financing provided to 
entrepreneur-driven listed companies for rapid growth.  
- The buyout stage is reached when the current management team (in the case of a 
managerial buyout, MBO) or a new team (in the case of a managerial buyin, MBI), 
together with PE investors, invests into the mature portfolio firms and acquire an 
existing product line or business. There exists another type of buyout called the 
‘secondary buyout’, in which a PE investor sells its investment to another PE firm 
or financial sponsor thereby ending its involvement in the current investment. 
Secondary buyout is commonly used for PE exit.  
- The late stage PE investment provides funds for firms at their business turning 
point and includes the turnaround type. The turnaround PE type is financing 
provided to re-establish a business which has encountered performance 
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difficulties. A table of PE types is summarized in Appendix 2.1. 
In some studies, PE also covers ‘angel capital’ as well as ‘informal financing market’, but 
neither is included in this thesis. 
The definition and classification of PE investment used in this thesis mainly follows 
categorization from the AVCJ database, the source of our PE information, which contains 
both mezzanine investments and leveraged buyouts PE types. 
We also summarize both academic and non-academic PE sources and report them in 
Appendix 2.2. 
 
2.1.2 PE fund structure, process, performance and exit 
PE funds are raised from investors internationally, including funds from institutions (such 
as public pension funds, insurance companies, securities companies, corporations, state 
owned enterprises, government and banks) and high-net-worth individuals. These 
investors are generally liable for the amount of capital they invest as limited partners 
(LPs). The fund manager, also called the general partner (GP), is responsible for fund 
performance and helps with fundraising and fund management (Meuleman et al., 2009; 
Jelic et al., 2005; Gilligan and Wright, 2010).  
A PE fund manager has the following four principal roles:  
- PE fund managers raise funds from limited partners both domestically and 
30 
 
internationally. The limited partners are usually institutions such as pension funds, 
endowments, banks, insurance companies and wealthy individuals (Fenn et al., 
1998).  In many cases, PE fund managers even invest their own money into the 
fund for the purpose of insuring other limited partners and to raise more funds 
from these investors, especially in the case of buyouts;  
- PE fund managers search investment opportunities and make investments. PE 
managers, who used to be investment bankers, accountants, consultants, have 
accumulated experience relating to a specific industry. The role of PE managers 
includes finding the right portfolio firms and ensuring a successful exit with high 
returns for LPs. The screening and evaluation of investments process are time 
consuming and often follows a structured and standardized approach (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2001). After the initial offer is accepted by the portfolio firm or the 
selling party, PE firm or the bidders have the opportunities to conduct their due 
diligence, in which they have access to the firm’s financial information (Povaly, 
2007). Two methods are commonly used in selecting a PE portfolio firm7. After 
the due diligence process, the two parties start negotiating the investment 
agreement which includes purchase price and governance aspects relating to the 
investment (Sommer, 2013). Once the transaction is set up, the proportion of 
ownership will be transformed to PE investors and they will start their 
                                                             
7 The first method is to compare the potential portfolio firms to a firm from the same industry with similar characteristics, 
which helps to control for economic and other external factors that influence the firm’s valuation. This procedure helps 
provide a quick and easy way to get a rough evaluation. However, this method can be inaccurate in lots of ways. For 
example, it is hard to find a comparable private firm, especially for unlisted and start-up firms. It is also difficult to 
calculate cash flow for a private firm if there is undisclosed accounting information. There is a second method which 
focuses on using Discounted Cash Flow Analysis (DCF). The concept for DCF analysis is that the value of a given 
business equals the sum of all future cash flows of the business discounted to reflect the current value, i.e., using a 
discount rate equivalent to the cost of equity and/or cost of debt and/or cost of capital. However, the problem of DCF 
is that a DCF valuation is only valid when the assumptions on discount rate, cash flow, life span and growth rate are 
not off-target. 
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management in the portfolio firms (Fenn et al., 1998). 
- PE fund managers play an active management role in portfolio firms. Once the 
PE transaction has been set up, PE managers evolve into actual management of 
the business, including intensive monitoring of their portfolio firms, obtaining 
regular reports on performance, visiting the firm and regularly attending board 
meetings. PE managers do not normally exercise day-to-day managerial activities 
(Gilligan and Wright, 2010). In some cases, PE managers only become board 
members, help provide advises on decision making and serve as the advisory 
board (Povaly, 2007). One of the core advantages of receiving PE investment is 
the value-added activities transformed from PE investors, which contains industry 
experience transferred from similar investment experience, better use of financial 
discipline and better contracts offered by suppliers or customers (Gilligan and 
Wright, 2010; Povaly, 2007).  
- PE managers are responsible for PE exit. PE transactions are structured with an 
exit purpose from 3 to 10 years specified in contract details. The right exit option 
should ensure positive profitability for LPs. The generally used exit channels 
include: flotation, trading sales and liquidation 8  (Gilligan and Wright, 2010; 
                                                             
8 Flotation means listing on a stock market. A number of countries have created secondary stock markets for the purpose 
of helping young firms achieve listing under relaxed listing rules. For example, NASDAQ in the US, AIM in the UK, 
GEM board in Hong Kong and ChiNext board in Mainland China. Most of the PE portfolio firms regard listing on 
these stock boards as a PE exit route. When the lock-up period ends after one year of IPO listing, PE investors are 
allowed to sell the shares they are holding in the secondary market to cash out PE funds. Trading sales means PE 
investors sell the company to another firm or to the current management team, or even to another PE investor (in the 
case of secondary buyout). The acquiring company, in many cases, is from the same industry, seeking to buy a 
competitor for the purpose of decreasing competition and gaining access to innovative technology. Due to the buyers’ 
existing detailed knowledge of the industry and the firm, the portfolio firm has a reduced chance of overvaluing its 
business. Therefore, trading sales will generate a smaller profit than stock market floatation. For the buyout PE type, 
there is a growing trend of secondary buyout, i.e., PE investors sell the investment in the portfolio firm to another PE 
firm. The attraction of a secondary buyout is the instant liquidity it offers. The liquidation option is used in the case of 
severely distressed investment. 
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Povaly, 2007).  
The PE managers’ compensation is made up of two parts: management fees and carried 
interest. The management fee is meant to cover the cost of managing the fund, which is 
normally calculated as a percentage of funds raised. The prevailing pattern for 
management fee is 2% per annum. The larger the fund, the greater the management fee. 
The carried interest is a share of profits paid to the fund manager as a compensation. This 
type of compensation aims to motivate the fund manager to work towards improving the 
fund’s performance. The amount of carried interest is normally around 20-25% depending 
on fund performance (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010; Gompers and Lerner, 2000, Robinson 
and Sensoy, 2013). 
PE firm’s reputation can largely affect the selection of portfolio firms. A number of 
indicators have been illustrated as reputation indicators, such as managers’ experience 
(Lerner, 1998; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Janney and Folta, 2006) and the number of 
portfolio firms under management (Bernile et al., 2007; Keuschnigg, 2004). In addition, 
Balboa and Marti (2007) indicate that when PE investor is related to a national level 
association, such as a member of the national venture capital and private equity 
association, a higher signaling effect is expected. According to a report from EVCA 
(2004), the largest amount of PE investors choose to locate their headquarters in the 
capital of the country to ensure the quality of portfolio firms.   
PE fund performance can be measured by using Cumulative Net Cash Flow (CNCF), 
Interim Return on Investment (ROI), Interim Internal Rate of Return IRR and Investment 
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Multiple9 (Goldman Sachs, 2006). IRR and Multiple are popular in academic studies 
regarding PE performance. More commonly, both measurements are used to illustrate the 
original returns. For example, a higher Multiple combined with a lower IRR would 
indicate that the returns have been achieved over a longer period. Conversely, a higher 
IRR over a shorter period may be based on a small absolute gain. The PE fund 
performance is often described as the ‘J-Curve Effect’, which commonly refers to the 
negative cash flow and poor performance observed in the early stage of a PE investment 
but increase in the long run (Goldman Sachs, 2006). The decline in performance in the 
early years of the fund is caused by the impact of management fees and the build-up of 
the investment and the performance is seen to become positive after some turning points.   
 
2.2 Evolution of PE industry in China 
This section contains an introduction of the Chinese PE market. We summarize four 
stages of PE market developed in China from the early 1980s until the end of 201110.  
 
2.2.1 Four stages of PE market trends and developments in China 
Historically, the evolution of Chinese private equity industry can be divided into four 
stages. The first stage was signaled by the set-up of the first venture capital firm in the 
                                                             
9 The Cumulative Net Cash Flow (CNCF), is the sum of total cash flows to and from an investment. The Interim Return 
on Investment (ROI) is all the directly attributable net cash flow benefit arising from the interim assignment/Cost of 
the interim management assignment. IRR is the discount rate that ensures that the net present value (NPV) of a series 
of (positive and negative) cash flows is equal to zero. The investment multiple is calculated by dividing the fund's 
cumulative distributions and residual value by the paid-in capital.  
10 The introduction includes the development of Chinese PE market until the end of 2011, which is consistent with our 
sample period. The development of Chinese PE market after 2011 can be found in the conclusion in Chapter 7, where 
we provide an overview of the latest PE market development and future work.  
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early 1980s. The second stage was accompanied with the dot-com boom in the early 2000. 
And the third stage is signaled by the setting up of SME board in 2004, in which PE exit 
channel has been provided. The last stage is the phase correction of PE market in China 
after 2011 (Licai, 2012; Noah, 2010). 
 
The first stage of PE investment in China was regarded as the exploration stage, meaning 
the initial entry and set up of VC firms in China is influenced by the fast development in 
mature markets (Licai, 2012; Noah, 2010). The initial stage resulted from the successful 
economic reform introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and early 1980s opened 
the door to private ownership for PE investors with the purpose of solving financing 
issues and to foster innovation (White et al., 2005; Kim, 2014). To describe the 
development process of PE industry, we illustrate the notable events as follows:  
- The first private equity fund company, ChinaVest (ZhongChuang), was established in 
1986 and funded by the central government. The main purpose was to support the 
development of high-tech companies in the country, in which the majority of the 
portfolio firms are subordinate enterprises from the central and local ministries. 
However, due to the heavy administrative intervention and a lack of formalized 
operation structural and legal protection framework, the collaborations between VC 
investors and the portfolio firms did not go on well. The problems existed not only in 
finding good investment projects but also in the scarcity of exit channels – at that time 
the domestic stock market was at its infant stage and listing abroad was difficult 
(White et al., 2005; Kim, 2014). 
- International VC investors also made their first move to the Chinese market in this 
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first stage. In 1993, IDG was the pioneer firm to set up a subsidiary funding firm 
called IDGVC Partners which focuses on small and medium sized high-tech firms in 
China. After IDG, a small number of other international VC firms, including Walden 
International, H&Q Asia Pacific and WI Harper Group entered the Chinese market11. 
Nevertheless, the majority of these international VC investors took a wait-and-see 
attitude for setting up investment funding in China at that moment. According to them, 
‘the related investment environment in China has not been significantly improved’ 
(Noah, 2010). In the initial years of its entry (1992-1997), IDG has only undertaken 
very few VC cases and the deal size for each case is relatively small (Noah, 2010).  
- Although the first stage of PE development was sketched as ‘to find their ways in 
the dark tunnel’ for both domestic and overseas VC investors, the number of VC 
investors has increased from 53 to 266 and VC funds increased from 5.3 billion to 40 
billion (RMB) (Zhu, 2010).  
 
The second stage started in the early 2000s, which was regarded as the fast growing period 
of PE industry in China but it ended up with a failure due to the worldwide Dotcom bubble 
burst (Licai, 2012; Noah, 2010).  
- In this stage, the government adopted several political measures to enhance further 
development of the PE market. The first significance case at this stage was signaled 
by the approval of Procedures for the Management of China's Industrial Investment 
Funds from Abroad (expired) in 1995, which helped further standardize foreign VCs 
to invest in China. Under this regulation, foreign VC firms either set up China-
                                                             
11 Information available from IDGVC website: http://www.idgvc.com/en  
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focused VC fund (for example, Sequoia), or adopted the form of joint-venture (for 
example, DFJ Dragon Fund China), and a large amount of VC firms chose to hire 
local people for establishing local subsidiaries (such as NEA, DCM and Redpoint). 
In the environment of the Global Internet Boom, most of the VC investors focused 
on internet related companies (such as Sina, Sohu and Alibaba) and most of these 
investments were a great success. China’s four biggest web portals, Sohu, Sina, 
Tencent and Netease, all went public in the US stock markets in the early 2000s (Liu, 
2014).  
- Inspired by these successful investments, the government issued the Decision of the 
CPC Central Committee and State Council on Strengthening Technical Innovation, 
Development of High-tech and Realization and Its Industrialization, aiming to 
motivate innovation and the development of new and high-tech enterprises. 
Following this trend, local governments set up their own venture capital firms to 
boost the development of local firms. One of the most representative local venture 
capital firms is the Shenzhen Capital Group Co. Ltd., 12  founded in 1999 with 
registered capital of 1.6 billion RMB. The shareholders of this company include the 
Shenzhen government, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) and several other state-owned firms. Over the next 12 years 
(1999-2011), Shenzhen Capital Group made 478 PE investments worth 13.2 billion 
RMB and is regarded as one of the most successful domestic VC firms (Hannas, et 
al., 2013).  
- In November 1999, the State Development Planning Commission issued Establishing 
                                                             
12 Information generated from Shenzhen Capital Group Co. Ltd website: http://www.szvc.com.cn/  
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a Venture Investment Mechanism - Several Opinions, which was regarded as the first 
strategic document for VC industry in China. This document stated the basic 
principles for establishing the venture investment mechanism in China. One of the 
key declaration was to ‘foster a capital market to conduct the development of high 
and new technology industries and to establish a venture investment mechanism 
progressively’. This document has helped to formalize the setting up of VC funds as 
well as encouraging the entry of VC investors (Yu, 2007).  
- While motivating the establishment of VC firms, the central government also started 
to work on providing efficient PE exit routes since the early 2000. For example, the 
plan for setting up the Small and Median Enterprises (SME) board in the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange was regarded as an efficient PE exit channel and it improved the 
development of PE industry in China in subsequent years (Clark, 2008).  
- In 2005, the 18th session of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China adopted revised Company Law and 
Securities Law. The amended Company Law reduced the requirements on the ratio of 
non-patented technology investment in establishing a joint stock limited company and 
canceled the restrictions for domestic firms in making foreign investment13 . The 
Securities Law lowered the requirements for start-up capital and initial IPO, facilitated 
the establishment and listing of SMEs, and thus provided more favorable conditions 
for PE investment in China. In 2006, the revised Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Partnership Enterprises established that a legal person can join partnership 
enterprises (Duan & Duan, 2006). In addition, the amended law indicates that the 
                                                             
13 Information is collected from the Ministry of Commerce website.  
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number partners of a limited partnership enterprise should be no more than 50 and the 
tax for partnership enterprise is paid by individual partners. The new law enriches the 
PE organizational models by bringing international operation mechanisms and 
considerably reduces the investment risk for current and future investors. The revision 
of related laws has provided a better legal basis and promoted a good environment for 
China’s PE investment.  
- Nevertheless, the worldwide Dotcom crash in 2000 blocked further development of 
the Chinese PE market and most investors exited with failure (Jingu and Kamiyama, 
2008).  
 
The third stage of PE development was the fast growing period of PE industry in China. 
This stage is signaled by approval of the SME board in 2004.  
- The year 2005 is regarded as a milestone for the PE industry in China. After 2005, the 
narrow sense PE investment14 flooded into the Chinese market and replaced VC 
investment to become the main-stream investment type. In 2006, Coship Electronics 
Co. Ltd. became the first domestic venture capital-backed technology company to go 
public on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
- The goal for setting up the SME board was to provide an easier access channel for 
small and medium sized firms since they have difficulty in meeting listing 
requirements on the main boards. On 30 December, 2011, there were 646 companies 
listed on the SME Board with a total market capitalization of RMB 2.7 trillion (USD 
                                                             
14 The narrow sense of PE investment found in China normally refers to Pre-IPO and growth capital type. (source: 
http://www.saepeg.com/)  
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428.6 billion), in which more than one third of the IPOs are backed with PE 
investment and the total IPO proceeds were worth RMB 558.8 billion (USD 88.7 
billion)15. The launch of the SME Board was a major step towards the establishment 
of a multi-tier capital market system and helped to pave the way for a second board 
market. Following the setting up of the SME board, the ChiNext board for high-
growth and high-tech firms was launched in October 2009. A number of changes have 
been implemented to offer lower market entry requirements for ChiNext listed firms. 
Table 2.1 presents a comparison on the listing requirements for different stock boards 
in detail. ChiNext has a lower listing requirement than Main board and SME board in 
terms of profitability, size of asset and share capital. For ChiNext listing, firms are 
required to have accumulated net profits of over RMB 10 million (US$1.6 million) in 
the past two financial years, compared to accumulated net profits of RMB 30 million 
(US$4.8 million) over the past three years for Main board and SME board listed firms. 
Moreover, the listing requirement for Main board and SME board of having ‘a 
maximum of 20% intangible assets of new assets without accumulated losses in the latest 
year’ was cancelled for ChiNext listed firms. In addition, ChiNext requires the issuer 
to have a certain level of innovative capability and ChiNext requires IPO firms with 
the following preferable background: high technology, fast growth, new economy, 
new service, new agriculture, new energy, new material and new business mode. For 
PE investors, the setting up of two new stock boards provides them with the best exit 
channel. The advantage of using IPO as exit channel will be further discussed in the 
following sections.  
                                                             
15 Information is taken from: http://www.szse.cn/main/en/SMEBoard/  
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- One of the most representative cases in the third stage is shown by the US PE investor 
Newbridge Capital to become the first foreign shareholder in the Shenzhen 
Development Bank with 18% (worth $150 million) ownership control in 2004. The 
Shenzhen Development Bank become the first foreign-controlled commercial bank in 
China after this transaction. Inspired by this successful transaction, a number of 
international PE investors made their first move to the Chinese PE market, including 
some of the biggest investors such as: the Carlyle Group, the Blackstone Group, 
Kohlberg Kravis Rovers, TPG and Goldman Sachs Capital Partners. These 
international investors are more willing to target SOE firms because they realize their 
SOE partners can fulfill some important functions to meet the challenge of investing 
in China (EY, 2015). For example, regulators are pushing SOEs to spin off 
underperforming assets to strategic investors or private equity funds. SOEs are also 
seeking to cooperate with big international companies with PE (EY, 2015). 
- From the regulator side, in 2005, the regulation ‘Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Start-up Investment Enterprises’ was released to encourage 
investments in high-tech SMEs. In 2006, ‘Law of People’s Republic of China on 
Partnerships’ was amended. Under the new law, the government approves PE joint 
venture investment type, which is helpful in transforming experience from foreign PE 
firms to domestic PE firms. These positive signals from the government encourage 
the development of a Chinese PE market. In 2009, the NDRC (National Development 
and Reform Commission16) submitted Administration of Private Equity Provisions to 
                                                             
16 The NDRC is responsible for state planning and macroeconomic policies in China. The role of NDRC will be further 
discussed in the next section. 
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the State Council for approval, which is regarded as the basic supervisory framework 
for PE industry in China. Further, on January 11, 2011, the Shanghai Municipal 
Government released its Implementation Measures on Trial Projects of Foreign-
Invested Equity Investment Enterprises in Shanghai (the ‘Shanghai RMB Fund 
Regulation’). This regulation is believed to be the first of many regulations designed 
to help large international institutional investors invest in Shanghai-based private 
equity funds (Shoesmith et al., 2011). 
- In sum, the setting up of these two boards have greatly enhanced the PE market in 
China by providing the IPO exit channel and attracting more outside PE investors. 
The Chinese government also works as an accelerator during the whole process. 
 
The fourth stage is regarded as the adjustment period of PE industry in China, which 
started late 2011 (Licai, 2012; Noah, 2010). A massive upsurge in the IPO-driven PE 
market was observed after the setting up of two new stock boards and IPO market soon 
became saturated and most IPOs fell in debut (meaning the IPO price is lower than the 
offering price). Consequently, PE industry in China cooled down and entered an ongoing 
adjustment period. Because our sample period runs from 2000-2011, we will not explain 
the fourth period in detail in this section. Instead, the current and latest development of 
PE industry in China will be further discussed in Chapter 7.  
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Table 2.1 Comparison of listing requirements between ChiNext board and other boards. 
To illustrate how the setting up of new stock boards helped to provide an efficient exit channel 
for PE investment in China, we compare the listing requirements of ChiNext board and SME and 
Main board in the following table.  
 ChiNext board SME board, Main boards 
Target Innovative and growing start-ups Mature SMEs 
Large and mature  
firms 
Operating 
history  
(at least) 
3 consecutive years 3 consecutive years 
Profit  1. Consecutive profit over the past 
two years, cumulative net profit 
from the latest two years of not 
less than RMB 10 million  
(US$1.6m) and continued 
growth; or  
2. Profitable past year and net profit 
of not less than RMB 5 million 
(US$0.8m), the revenue of the 
past year of not less than RMB 50 
million (US$8.0m), or revenue 
growth rate over the past two 
years of not less than 30%. 
(These criteria are selective.)  
1. Past three fiscal years positive 
and cumulative profit of over 
RMB 30 million (US$4.8m);  
2. The net cash flows generated 
from operating activities over 
past three fiscal years of more 
than RMB 50 million 
(US$8.0m) in total; or over 
recent three fiscal years the 
operating revenues totaled more 
than RMB 30 million 
(US$4.8m);  
3. In the latest year there is no 
accumulated loss.  
Public held 
shares 
25% of issued capital; 
OR 
10% of issued capital if market capitalization is larger than RMB 400m 
(US$61M) 
Share capital The total share capital after issuing no 
less than RMB30 million 
The total share capital before 
issuing no less than RMB30 million 
Asset  Net assets not less than RMB 20 
million (US$3.2million). 
The intangible assets not more than 
20% of the net assets. 
Core business Over past two years core business has 
not changed.  
Over past three years core business 
has not changed. 
Directors, 
Management 
and actual 
controller 
Over past two years directors, senior 
managers and actual controller have 
not changed.  
Over past three years directors, 
senior managers and actual 
controller have not changed.  
Growth and 
innovation 
capability 
ChiNext board prefers companies 
with the following features: high 
technology, fast growth, new 
economy, new service, new 
agriculture, new energy, new material 
and new business mode.  
 
Review  The issuer’s application documents 
are reviewed by ChiNext public 
offering review committee which is 
composed of 35 members. 
The issuer’s application documents 
are reviewed by Main Board public 
offering review committee which is 
composed of 25 members. 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange official website and Shenzhen Stock Exchange official website. 
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2.2.1 PE related laws and regulations in China 
In the previous section, we have mentioned some laws and regulations that affect PE 
investment in China, including Company Law, Securities Law and the revised Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Partnership Enterprises (Wang and Huang, 2008). In this 
section, we will expand the above discussions by adding in the regulatory body and the 
related law and regulations in China in details. 
 
Under the Provisional Measures on Administration of Venture Capital Investment 
Enterprises promulgated in 2005, National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) is authorized as the regulatory supervisor for VC industry in China17. Started 
from June 2008, NDRC designated six pilot regions, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu Province, Zhejiang Province and Hubei Province, to test the operation of private 
equity funds with the approval of the State Council. In these Pilot Regions, private equity 
investment enterprises (“EIE”) and equity investment management enterprises (“EIME”) 
are permitted to establish and operate under the supervision of NDRC18 (Yong, 2012). 
  
Both RMB-denominated funds and dollar-denominated funds are permitted in China, 
including the following types: foreign-owned USD private equity funds (FOPE), foreign-
owned RMB private equity funds (FOPE-RMB), Chinese-owned USD private equity 
funds (COPE-USD), Chinese-owned RMB private equity funds (COPE), State-owned 
industrial RMB private equity funds (SOPE) and hybrid foreign/Chinese USD & RMB 
                                                             
17 In 2013, central government has clarified VC/PE industry is under the supervision of CSRC.  
18 Later in 2014, the Measures for the Registration and Archival Filing Regarding Private Equity Fund Managers (for 
Trial Implementation) is issued in which all VC/PE institutes are asked to register with CSRC. 
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private equity funds (HOPE) (Yong, 2012). In Table 2.2, a summary of the laws and 
regulations related to PE funds in China are provided between 2001 and 201119. This table 
contains information related to fund raising, fund establishment, types of investment and 
taxation of PE, which can reveal the gradual legal development process of the Chinese 
VC/PE market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 Information source: Laws and Regulations of VC/PE Funds in China 2013, by China Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Association. 
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Table 2.2 A summary of Chinese VC/PE related laws and regulations 2001-2011 
Type  Title  Code 
Fund raising Interim Provisions on the Administration of 
Investment by the National Social Security Fund 
Order No. 12 [2001] of the 
National Council for Social 
Security Funds 
Circular of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Science and Technology on Printing and Issuing 
the Provisional Measures for the Administration on 
the Guiding Funds for the Venture Capital 
Investment by the Small and Medium-sized 
Technology-based Enterprises 
Order No. 128 [2007] of the 
Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on 
Issuing the Guidelines for Trust Companies to 
Operate the Trust Private Equity Investment 
Business 
Order No.45 [2008] of the 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 
Circular of the General Office of the State Council 
on Forwarding the Guiding Opinions of the 
National Development and Reform Commission, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce 
on Standardized Establishment and Operation of 
Venture Capital Guiding Fund 
Order No. 116 [2008] of the 
General Office of the State 
Council 
Notice of the General Office of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission on Further Regulating the 
Administration of the Reporting of the Personal 
Financial Management Business of Commercial 
Banks 
Order No.172 [2009] of the 
General Office of the China 
Banking Regulatory 
Commission 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of 
Several Issues on the Specific Application of Law in 
the Handling of Criminal Cases about Illegal Fund-
raising 
Order No.18 [2010] of the 
Supreme People's Court 
Circular on Printing and Distributing the Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Participation in 
the Venture Capital Fund by the New Industry 
Venture Capital Program 
Order No. 668 [2011] of the 
Ministry of Finance and the 
National Development and 
Reform Commission 
Notice of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission on Relevant Issues concerning 
Regulating the Investment Operation of Wealth 
Management Business of Commercial Banks 
Order No. 8 [2013] of the 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 
Fund 
establishment 
Provisions Concerning the Administration of 
Foreign-funded Business-starting Investment 
Enterprises 
Order No. 2 [2003] of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation, 
the Ministry of Science & 
Technology, the State 
Administration for Industry 
and Commerce, the State 
Administration of Taxation 
and the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange 
Interim Measures for the Administration of Startup 
Investment Enterprises 
Order No. 39 [2005] of the 
National Development and 
Reform Commission 
Notice of the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce on Implementing the Implementation 
Opinions on Some Issues concerning Law 
Application for the Administration of Examination 
and Approval and Registration of Foreign-funded 
Companies 
Order No.102 [2006] of the 
State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce 
Measures for the Administration of Registration of 
Partnership Businesses of the People's Republic of 
China 
Order No. 236 [2007] of the 
State Council 
Notice of the Ministry of Commerce on Matters Order No. 9 [2009] of the 
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Concerning the Examination and Approval of 
Foreign-funded Startup Investment Enterprises and 
Foreign-funded Startup Investment Management 
Enterprises 
Ministry of Commerce 
Administrative Measures for the Establishment of 
Partnership Enterprises within China by Foreign 
Enterprises or Individuals 
Order No. 567 [2010] of the 
State Council 
Fund 
Investment 
Notice of the Ministry of Commerce on 
Decentralizing the Examination and Approval 
Power for Foreign Investment 
Order No.209 [2010] of the 
Ministry of Commerce 
Notice of the Ministry of Commerce on Foreign 
Investment Management 
Order No.72 [2011] of the 
Ministry of Commerce 
Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign 
Investment (2011 Revision) 
Order No. 12 [2011] of the 
National Development and 
Reform Commission and the 
Ministry of Commerce 
Fund Exit Provisional Regulations on the Establishment of 
Foreign-Funded Joint Stock Companies Limited 
Order No. 1 [1995] of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation 
Notice of the Ministry of Finance, the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission and 
the National Council for Social Security Fund on 
Exempting State-owned Venture Investment 
Institutions and State-owned Venture Investment 
Guidance Funds from the State-owned Share 
Transfer Obligation 
Order No.278 [2010] of the 
Ministry of Finance, the 
State-owned Assets 
Supervision and 
Administration 
Commission, the China 
Securities Regulatory 
Commission and the 
National Council for Social 
Security Fund 
Circular on Releasing the Listing Rules of Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (Revised in 2012) 
Order No.214 [2012] of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Circular on Promulgating the Listing Rules of 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (Revised in 2012) 
Order No.34 [2012] of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Interim Measures for the Administration of National 
SME Share Transfer System Co., Ltd 
Order No. 89 [2013] of the 
China Securities Regulatory 
Commission 
Taxation Notice of the Ministry of Finance and State 
Administration of Taxation on the Relevant Tax 
Policies on the Development of Startup Investment 
Enterprises 
Order No. 031 [2007] of the 
Ministry of Finance 
Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation on Several Issues 
Concerning the Enterprise Income Tax Treatment on 
Enterprise Reorganization 
Order No.59 [2009] of the 
Ministry of Finance 
Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on 
Income Tax Preferences for Startup Investment 
Enterprises 
Order No.87 [2009] of the 
State Administration of 
Taxation 
Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on 
Some Tax Issues Concerning the Implementation of 
the Enterprise Income Tax Law 
Order No.79 [2010] of the 
State Administration of 
Taxation 
Circular on Printing and Distributing the Interim 
Measures for the Collection of the Equity Investment 
Income of Venture Capital Guidance Fund for Small 
and Medium-Sized High-Tech Enterprises   
Order No. 361 [2010] of the 
Ministry of Finance 
Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation on Policies for the Pilot 
Project of Enterprise Income Tax for Corporate 
Partners of Limited Partnership Venture Capital 
Investment Enterprises in Suzhou Industrial Park 
Order No.67 [2012] of the 
Ministry of Finance and the 
State Administration of 
Taxation 
Supervision Circular of the General Office of the National 
Development and Reform Commission on 
Order No. 2864 [2011] of 
the National Development 
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Promoting the Standardized Development of Equity 
Investment Enterprises 
and Reform Commission 
Law of The People's Republic of China on Securities 
Investment Fund 
Order No. 71 [2012] of the 
President 
Notice of the General Office of the National 
Development and Reform Commission on Further 
Regulating the Development and Filing 
Management of Equity Investment Enterprises in 
Pilot Areas 
Order No.253 [2011] of the 
General Office of the 
National Development and 
Reform Commission 
Circular of the Ministry of Commerce on Improving 
the Regulation of the Record-filing of Foreign-
invested Venture Capital Enterprises 
Order No.269 [2012] of the 
Ministry of Commerce 
Source: Laws and Regulations of VC/PE Funds in China 2013, by China Venture Capital and 
Private Equity Association. 
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2.2.2 PE investors in China 
From a theoretical perspective, PE investors can be divided into three categories: 
independent PE fund firms, captive PE fund firms and semi-captive PE firms (EVCA, 
2007; Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). The independent PE firms are defined as investors 
who use third parties as the main source of capital, including governments, large 
corporations, wealthy individuals, pension funds and banks. For example, the Texas 
Pacific Group, Bain Capital and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts are independent PE firms. The 
captive PE firms raise funds and capital from their primary shareholders (including 
insurance companies, investment banks, financial institutions and industry companies) 
and/or a parent company. The parent organization allocates money to the fund from its 
own internal sources. These funds are supposed to be invested into sectors relevant to 
their core activities and to identify technologies for new business. Some of the 
representative captive PE firms include Hony Capital under Legend Capital Ltd, Morgan 
Stanley Capital Partners and Goldman Sachs Group Principal investment Asia. Semi-
captive PE firms combine the previous two types of PE firms and raise capital from both 
outside investors and their parent companies. The semi-captive PE firms can be 
subsidiaries of a financial institution, an insurance company or an industrial company that 
operates as an independent company. EQT is an example of a semi-captive private equity 
firm, which raises capital from its primary shareholder, the Wallenberg family, as well as 
from other external investors (EVCA, 2007; Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). 
 
In the Chinese case, we realize that it can be difficult to categorize PE investors following 
the above definitions due to the different background of PE investors. After referring to 
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several different Chinese sources (Licai, 2012; Noah, 2010) and adapting some characters 
of the Chinese PE market, we divide Chinese PE investors into the following three 
categories: (1) Government affiliated PE firms, i.e., firms set up by government agencies, 
such as Shenzhen Capital Group Co.Ltd.. (2) Financial institutions-affiliated PE firms, 
i.e., firms set up by securities companies and large banks, such as GoldStone Investment 
Co., Ltd. under CITIC Securities Co. Ltd., and GF Xinde Investment Management Co., 
Ltd. under GF Securities, BOC (Bank of China International) International and CCB 
(China Construction Bank) International. (3) The rest of the domestic PE firms includes 
firms with university background, for example Tsinghua University Education 
Foundation; and firms set up by large listed corporations, for example Hony Capital Ltd 
held by the Legend Group. 
 
- Government-affiliated PE firms 
Government-affiliated PE firms are firms with Central government and/or local 
government background (EVCA, 2011). The first domestic PE firm, China New 
Technology Startup Investment Company (Zhongchuang or Chinavest), was set up by 
central government in 1985 with a venture capital orientation and focus on high-tech firms. 
Chinavest was under the supervision of both National Science and Technology 
Commission (holding 40% of shares) and the Ministry of Finance (holding 23% of shares). 
Later, Chinavest, together with Standard Chartered Bank (HongKong) and Asian 
Development Bank, set up a joint firm called China Asset Holding Ltd. In 1991, China 
Asset Holding became the first overseas domestic venture capital company listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Board. Even though Chinavest did not perform well during the Asian 
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Crises and finally went bankrupt in 1997. The establishment of Chinavest set up a 
milestone for government-supported venture activities.  
 
Not only did central government set up PE firms, such as: National Council for Social 
Security Fund, SDIC Innovation (Beijing) Investment Fund Management Co. Ltd., but 
also local governments have set up their own government-backed VC/PE firms to support 
local SMEs and high-tech firms. These VC/PE-backed are mostly concentrated in the 
coastal and southeast developed regions. Some of the famous VC/PE firm includes: Hefei 
Hi-Tech Venture Capital Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Capital Group Co., Ltd., Shandong High-
Tech Investment Corp., Guangdong Technology Venture Capital Co. Ltd., Shenzhen 
Capital Group Co., Ltd., to name a few. These local government-backed VC/PE firms 
mainly focus on the dynamic growth companies in their own provinces, only exceptional 
investment opportunities in other regions will be considered. Compared to other VC/PE 
investors, the government-backed VC/PE firms have more stable funding sources and 
technology support. As a result, these PE investors have preference in high tech firms and 
their funding amounts are normally within a set scope. For example, Guangdong 
Technology Venture Capital Co. Ltd has set its first round investment between RMB 10 
million and RMB 20 million. In addition, the tight connection with government can help 
to provide more investment opportunities, especially in monopoly industries. The 
downside of receiving this type of PE funds is that the investors normally demand priority 
rights over other investors (BVCA, 2011). For example, the PE investors require 
receiving distributions ahead of other investors and even rank their claim above other 
investors at the time of liquidation (BVCA, 2011). 
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- Financial institution-affiliated PE firms 
Chinese brokers have made their first move into the PE industry since 1990 by making 
direct VC/PE investment. These investors include some of the biggest securities firms at 
that time, like NanFang Securities and Dapeng Securities. However, due to the large 
amount of non-performing assets in these securities firms and a lack of exit routes, most 
of their VC/PE investments ended up with heavy losses. The China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) hence prohibited securities firms to make VC/PE investments. This 
prohibition was valid until 2006, when the State Council authorized securities firms to 
carry out venture capital and private equity business using self-owned capital to make 
direct investments. Under this restriction, securities firms either make investment through 
a non-fully controlled PE firm or invest in its own direct investment subsidiary firm with 
100 percent ownership control (Licai, 2012). Further, in July 2011, CSRC issued 
Guidelines on Supervision and Administration of Direct Investment Business of Securities 
Companies. This new guideline restates CSRC’s specific requirements from different 
perspectives, including business scope, and risk control for brokers. More importantly, 
the new regulation allowed brokers to set up direct investment companies and fundraising 
from third party investors. The Guidelines also broke the limitation by stating that any 
brokers’ direct investments should not exceed 10% of their total assets and allowed the 
transform of securities-backed PE firms into professional PE fund management 
institutions. Following the new guidelines, big securities have set up their own direct 
investment subsidiaries. For example, Goldstone Investment under CITIC Securities, 
Haitong Capital under Haitong Securities and Guosen H&S investment company under 
Guosen Securities. The investment scale of these direct investment subsidiaries are 
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largely affected by the net capital of their parent companies.  
 
In recent years, some of the large State-owned banks have also set up their own direct PE 
investment firms, such as BOC (Bank of China International), CCB (China Construction 
Bank) International and ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) International. 
In September 2010, Chinese insurance companies were granted permission to invest up 
to $33bn into the local private equity market (BVCA, 2011), which is another important 
step to the expansion of the PE market. 
 
Compared to other PE domestic investors, the financial institution-affiliated PE investors 
can make the best use of their financing advantages and the research resources from their 
parent financial institutions, i.e., securities firms and banks. For example, the securities-
backed PE firms can benefit from their parent companies’ own research teams and 
accumulated market experience in making direct investment. Moreover, when the 
securities firms are working with other firms, they have the advantage of screening high 
potential growth firms and passing on such investment opportunities to their investment 
subsidiaries, which help to improve the efficiency of PE investment. The establishment 
of an independent firm can also separate risk from parent company to the subsidiary. The 
separation plays a positive role in convincing LPs regarding the independence of the PE 
firm as well.  
  
- Other domestic PE firms 
Apart from the above mentions two types of PE investors, there are some other featured 
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domestic PE firms in the Chinese market. 
 
The first type is university–backed PE firms, which is normally set up by a university 
spin-out and a VC/PE firms. The university spin-out is normally an idea or concept raised 
by a university and then transformed into a practical product to the market, especially in 
the area of biotechnology, life sciences and high-tech products (BVCA, 2011). 
Universities usually devote resources through external partnerships, particularly with 
VC/PE investors (BVCA, 2011). The type of collaborations started in China since 2000. 
This type of university-backed PE firms can take the advantages from both academics 
and VC funding sources. For example, these PE investors have the advantages in 
accessing and capturing first-hand information on certain research projects undertaken by 
the university and discovering the potential portfolio firms (BVCA, 2011). One 
outstanding example comes from Tsinghua University, where two spin-out venture capital 
firms are in operation: the TusPark Capital Co., Ltd. (TusPark Ventures) and the Shenzhen 
Tsinghua Leaguer Venture Capital Co., Ltd. Both firms focus on Bio-Tech, Clean-Tech 
and other green technology sectors. Following the success of Tsinghua University, 
Zhejiang University has also set up a subsidiary company, Zhejiang University Venture 
Capital Co., Ltd. The advantage of these types of PE investors is to integrate the resource 
of top universities, research institutes, enterprises, talents, capital and information and 
help to accelerate the growth of high-tech enterprises.  
 
The second type is the corporate PE funds. Some of the large domestic firms have set up 
their own PE subsidiaries under the trend of the booming PE market. These affiliated PE 
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firms normally make investment outside their parent firm’s sectors, which is regarded as 
a type of risk-sharing strategy. For example, Hony Capital, sponsored by leading PC 
company Legend Holding, focuses on sectors such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare, 
media and entertainment, financial services, construction materials etc. Some of the other 
pioneer corporation-backed PE firms include: Xiamen Torch Venture Capital Co., Ltd 
under Xiamen Torch Group Ltd.; and Fosun Venture Capital under Shanghai Fosun Group. 
 
- Overseas PE firms 
As discussed previously, the entry of overseas PE investors to the Chinese markets began 
in early 2000. Compare to domestic investors, foreign investors are more capable in 
transforming their experience into value-added services to portfolio firms based on their 
much longer experience in managing PE funds. While the global economy is still 
recovering, China remains one of the most compelling growth stories and overseas 
investors continue to be attracted by China’s fast developing PE market. For example, 
until 2010, the Chinese market took up 10% of TPG’s total investment and annual 
revenue20. In the same year, China became the second largest market for TPG. The other 
major overseas PE investors in China were Blackstone, KKR, Carlyle, Bain Capital and 
Goldman Sachs PIA, etc.  
 
A summary of PE investors on China by different types can be found in Appendix 2.3. 
 
 
                                                             
20 Information available from: http://www.iceo.com.cn/renwu/35/2010/0925/200670.shtml 
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2.3 An overview of the Chinese PE market 
The Chinese PE market has a history of over three decades and has made its major 
development since 2000. After years of development, total investment value in China has 
increased from $7 billion in 2009 to $20 billion in 2011, ranking third behind the $112 
billion and $30 billion investment values of US and UK businesses respectively (Table 
2.3). Compared to other developed countries, China has a much higher ratio of new funds 
raised to total investment value, indicating an increased interest and confidence in the 
Chinese market. According to Thomson Reuters’ report, China-focused funds have grown 
from 1% in 2007 to more than 9% of the global funds raised in 2009 (see ‘Global private-
equity firms are seduced by the China dream’, The Economist). A report from Adveq has 
also indicated that China received over 80% of Asian private equity investment volume 
in 200921 . Although there was a 46% decline ($11.4 billion) in PE deals across Asia 
Pacific (excluding Japan) in 2013, Chinese firms have taken up 39% of the market share, 
followed by India with 27% of market share (see ‘Private equity in China: heating up, but 
veiled in uncertainty’, Wharton Business School online business journal). Despite the 
high market ratio, the operation of firms and the financial market in China are different 
from those of mature market economies. In this section, we will introduce the features of 
Chinese PE market which can help to understand the operation of PE investment in the 
following empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                             
21 Adveq is a leading independent global private equity investment management firm. 
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Table 2.3 Private equity investment/funds raised by country 
 2009 
Investment  
value ($bn) 
 
New funds 
raised 
2010 
Investment  
value ($bn) 
 
New funds 
raised 
2011 
Investment  
value ($bn) 
 
New funds 
raised 
US 51 88 119 152 112 146 
UK 20 5 26 12 30 23 
China 7 7 15 32 20 29 
France 5 3 9 6 13 8 
Australia 1 1 8 6 N/A N/A 
India 3 4 7 2 10 2 
Germany 3 1 6 2 6 4 
Japan 3 2 2 2 N/A N/A 
Others  17 31 79 69 58 56 
Total  110 142 261 275 246 268 
Data source: TheCityUK estimates 
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2.3.1 An overview of PE practice in China 
In order to present the features and the development of the Chinese PE market, we collect 
all of the PE-backed firms that are listed22 on mainland stock markets before the end of 
2011. Our data comes from two sources: Asian Venture Capital Journal dataset (AVCJ) 
and China Securities Market and Accounting Research dataset (CSMAR). The data 
selection follows three criteria. Firstly, we exclude two PE cases which took place before 
2000 to avoid heteroscedasticity problems caused by outliers. We then identify 476 PE-
backed listed firms from the AVCJ dataset by the end of 2011, excluding a group of 25 
PE-backed listed financial firms. We map the necessary financial information for these 
sample firms from the CSMAR dataset. In the mapping step, firms without available 
accounting information at the time of PE investment23 are eliminated from the dataset. 
Following the above procedures, a sample of 364 PE investments from 307 PE-backed 
firms is listed on the Chinese mainland stock markets by the end of 2011. This sample 
covers PE-backed portfolio firms from 2000-2011. 
 
In this section, we report the firms’ characteristics in Table 2.4, including yearly PE 
investment amounts from 1994-2011, PE investment by different stock exchanges, by 
different PE types and by different industries. The aim is to introduce the development of 
PE industry in China from different angles.  
 
                                                             
22 We focus only on listed firms in this study because we can get enough firm information from these listed firms. 
23 Firms willing to be listed on the Chinese stock markets are required to provide financial information for the past 
three years. Some of our sample portfolio firms received PE investments before IPO. If the PE investment was made 
up to three years before IPO, we can still find available accounting information from the CSMAR dataset. If this cannot 
be done, we exclude the firm from our sample.  
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Panel 1 reports the number of investments and the value of investments on a yearly basis. 
There are 467 PE deals found in mainland listed firms24 and these investments are worth 
204.05 billion RMB in total.  
 
We observe a small amount of PE investment before 2000 and from 2000 onwards, PE 
investment in Chinese firms kept an increasing trend and peaked in 2007. There were 107 
PE investment deals in 2007 worth 12.94 billion RMB. During and after the financial 
crisis, there was a sharp decrease in the number of deals but an increase in PE investment 
volume. In 2010, PE investment reached a maximum volume of 62.29 billion RMB with 
only 41 deals and in 2011 with 10 deals worth 51.44 billion RMB. In sum, this table 
indicates the growing interest in PE investment in China over the past decade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
24 These PE investments took place either before or after IPO. If the PE investment was made before IPO, then the 
investment happened within three years before IPO in which the transaction records were published during the IPO 
application process.  
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Table 2.4 Summary of PE investments in mainland listed firms, 1994-2011. 
Panel 1. Summary of PE investment by year.  
  No. of deals  % of PE deals Value of PE 
investment  
(bn RMB) 
% of PE investment 
1994 2 0.43  0.03 0.01  
1995 1 0.21  0.05 0.02  
1996 2 0.43  0.07 0.03  
1997 0 0.00  0 0.00  
1998 1 0.21  n/a 0.00  
1999 3 0.64  0.03 0.01  
2000 13 2.78  0.51 0.25  
2001 24 5.14  2.02 0.99  
2002 11 2.36  0.32 0.16  
2003 12 2.57  0.62 0.30  
2004 25 5.35  14.69 7.20  
2005 16 3.43  2.58 1.26  
2006 40 8.57  8.62 4.22  
2007 107 22.91  12.94 6.34  
2008 76 16.27  5.54 2.72  
2009 83 17.77  42.3 20.73  
2010 41 8.78  62.29 30.53  
2011 10 2.14  51.44 25.21  
Total 467  204.05  
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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In Panel 2, we summarize our PE-backed firms by their listing stock boards. There are 
two stock exchanges in China, namely, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. Apart from the two main stock boards in each stock exchange, two new stock 
boards have been established recently in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SME) board was established in 2005 followed by the ChiNext board 
in 2009. The initial purpose of establishing these new boards was to provide financing for 
SMEs and to encourage the development of high-tech industry. After their establishment, 
firms listed on SME board and ChiNext board received the majority mount of the PE-
backed IPO firms. As shown in Panel II, SME board and ChiNext board has received 214 
and 145 deals respectively, which took up 45.82% and 31.04% of the total investments. 
When comparing the number of PE investment in different stock boards, we observe that 
new boards contain a larger size of PE-backed firms but each firm has a smaller amount 
of PE. On the contrary, although the Shanghai Stock Exchange has a smaller number of 
listed PE backed firms, the volume of each deal is large. As a result, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange retains a total amount of PE investment worth 177.03 billion RMB compared 
to the 27.02 billion RMB investment made in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This 
observation is consistent with the nature of firms listed on different stock boards, i.e., 
mature firms are listed on main boards while young and high-tech SMEs go public on 
new boards.  
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Panel 2. Summary of PE investment by stock exchange 
 1994-
2006 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Numbe
r of PE 
deals 
% of 
the 
total 
PE 
deals 
Size of 
PE 
investme
nt 
% of the 
total PE 
investm
ent 
SZSEa 11 4 1 0 3 2 21 4.49 7.5 3.67 
SMEb 88 61 28 22 13 2 214 45.82 13.51 6.62 
ChiNextc 17 32 38 45 12 1 145 31.04 6.01 2.94 
SHSEd 34 10 9 16 13 5 87 18.63 177.03 86.76 
Total 150 107 76 83 41 10 467  204.05  
a, b, c, d represents Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Small and Medium 
Enterprises board, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Growth Enterprises board and Shanghai Stock Exchange 
mainboard respectively 
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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One distinct difference between the Chinese PE market and mature PE markets is the 
stage of PE investment and PE types.  To illustrate such difference, panel 3 illustrates PE 
deals by their types. In this table, we find 305 out of the total 467 deals are Growth Capital, 
51 of them are PE PIPE deals and 73 Pre-IPO deals. Only 4 of them are buyout-backed 
firms and 30 Start-up backed firms. This reveals the features of the Chinese PE market 
that the majority of the PE types are located between VC and buyout, which can be 
regarded as late stage VC investment. This table also shows the potential possibility that 
Chinese PE investment is operating differently from existing literature. Although the 
amount of Pre-IPO type is small, most of the growth capital defines their role as Pre-IPO 
to capture the high IPO market returns which will be discussed in the following sections. 
Our evidence is consistent with EVCA (2011) report. In the report, it is stated that ‘a  
striking difference between the Chinese market and more mature PE/VC arenas is that 
private equity is almost synonymous with growth capital in China. 
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Panel 3. Summary of PE investment by PE investment type 
  Number 
of  
PE deals 
% of the total PE 
deals 
Size of PE investment (bn 
RMB) 
% of total PE 
investment 
Buyouts 8 1.713 2.17 1.063 
Pre-IPO 73 15.632 59.54 29.179 
Start-up 30 6.424 1.19 0.583 
PIPEs 51 10.921 124.43 60.98 
Growth Capital 305 65.310 16.72 8.194 
Summary 467  204.05  
Data source: Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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We are also interested in whether domestic and non-domestic PE investors have different 
investment behaviour and preference in the Chinese market. Therefore, we present our 
PE sample by their investors’ country of origin in Panel 4. The results indicate that most 
of the sample PE investments were made by Chinese domestic investors, which is 386 
out of the total 467 transactions. For the rest of the transactions made by non-domestic 
investors, 25 of them came from Hong Kong, 18 PE funds came from Singapore, 19 PE 
funds came from the US, 3 PE funds came from Germany and Switzerland respectively 
and 2 came from Canada. Also, there are 11 deals with undisclosed investors. Comparing 
investments made by domestic and non-domestic investors, it turns out that, although 
Chinese domestic investors  account for the largest proportion of investments, each deal 
size is relatively small: the 386 investments made by domestic investors is worth 80.18 
billion RMB while non-domestic investors contribute 123.87 billion RMB from 81 deals.  
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Panel 4. Summary of PE investment by investor’s country of origin 
Country of origin 
 
Number of 
PE deals 
% of the total 
PE deals 
Size of PE 
investment  
(bn RMB) 
% of total PE 
investment 
China 386 82.65 80.18 39.29 
HongKong 25 5.35 8.38 4.11 
Singapore 18 3.85 107.83 52.84 
US 19 4.06 6.16 3.02 
Germany 3 0.64 0.32 0.16 
Switzerland 3 0.64 0.16 0.08 
Canada 2 0.43 0.03 0.01 
Undisclosed Investor(s) 11 2.35 0.99 0.48 
Summary 467  204.05  
Data source: Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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To provide further evidence on the investment differences between domestic and non-
domestic investors, we summarize the firm information of both domestic and non-
domestic PE investors. Due to the information availability from the AVCJ database, we 
can report PE firm age and previous experience information for 131 domestic PE 
investors and 24 non-domestic PE investors, reported in Panel 5. By comparing the two 
types of PE investors, we notice domestic investors are younger (with average age of 6.06 
years at the time of PE investment) than non-domestic investors (with average age of 12 
years at the time of PE investment). Regarding the experience of previous PE investment, 
domestic investors have made an average of 10.6 PE deals, far fewer than the 21.11 
average PE deals made by non-domestic PE investors. Although our sample size is small, 
we can still say this sample unveils some characteristics of PE investors in China, i.e., 
Chinese domestic PE investors are young and lack past experience compared to their non-
domestic competitors. At the end of the table, we also report the PE deal stake information 
between domestic and non-domestic investors. It shows that, even though the investments 
undertake by domestic investors are worth six times as much as non-domestic investors, 
the PE deal stake held by domestic investors are smaller on average (on average 9.52% 
for domestic investors and 15.68% for non-domestic investors). There are several reasons 
that can help to explain why the PE investors become minority shareholders 25 (Cao et al., 
2014). PE investors may decide to undertake the position of minority shareholder because 
they do not have strong incentives to be more influential in the portfolio firm or because 
of cost saving considerations; PE investors may also undertake the minority shareholder 
                                                             
25 The statement that PE investors normally become minority shareholders is also found in several non-academic reports 
and world-leading news outlets. Including the Private Equity Review by Radke (2012), China Private Equity Chilled 
by ’Old Days’ Asking Prices  from Bloomberg (2013). 
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position as a strategy to reduce their risk, for example, because they lack experience in 
the corresponding industries; the role of minority shareholder may represent a way of 
diversifying PE investors’ investments. Alternatively, we regard the limited shareholding 
passed on the PE investors as a self-protection mechanism for most Chinese portfolio 
firms, which we will explain in detail in Chapter 3. The minority shareholder position in 
portfolio firms is resulted from the concentration on growth capital PE type and PE 
investors are therefore less influenced on the strategic direction of business in portfolio 
firms (BVCA, 2011). 
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Panel 5. Summary of PE investor characteristics by investor’s country of origin 
 Mean  Medium  Min  Max  Obs 
PE age      
Domestic 
Non-domestic 
Summary  
6.06 
12 
7.03 
6 
5.5 
6 
1 
1 
1 
26 
45 
45 
131 
27 
Previous experience      
Domestic 
Non-domestic 
Summary  
10.6 
21.11 
12.53 
3 
11.5 
4.5 
0 
0 
0 
134 
78 
134 
131 
27 
158 
PE deal stake (%)      
Domestic 
Non-domestic 
Summary  
9.52 
15.68 
10.50 
7.25 
10 
7.41 
0.34 
0.12 
0.12 
100 
100 
100 
290 
55 
345 
Data source: Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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Lastly, we are also interested in the industries that PE investors are preferred. Following 
the Guidelines for Classification of Listed Companies issued by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), we summarize the CSRC two-digit industry 
classification of PE investment during the sample period, shown in Panel 6. The table 
shows that manufacturing industry received the majority of PE investment, with 345 deals 
worth 48.23 billion RMB. This is followed by the information transmission, software and 
information technology service industry, with 30 deals worth 1.36 billion RMB. Despite 
the small number of investments in the financial industry, the total 24 deals are worth 
113.55 billion RMB. We also observe that PE investments have targeted all the industries 
in China apart from hotel and catering industry and education industry. China's 
competitive strength is in manufacturing and PE investment is concentrated in this sector, 
explaining the development potential in this sector.  
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Panel 6. Summary of PE investment by investee industry 
 CSRC industry classification Number 
of PE 
deals 
% of 
total PE 
deals 
Amount of  PE 
investments  (bn 
RMB) 
% of total 
PE 
investment 
A Agriculture, forestry, livestock 
farming, fishing 
7 1.50  0.17 0.08  
B Mining 9 1.93  4.06 1.99  
C Manufacturing 345 73.88  48.23 23.64  
D Comprehensive 1 0.21  0.16 0.08  
E Construction 9 1.93  0.32 0.16  
F Wholesale and retail 15 3.21  33.48 16.41  
G Transportation 6 1.28  0.97 0.48  
H hotel and Catering industry 0 0.00  0 0.00  
I Information transmission, software 
and information technology service 
30 
 
6.42  
 
1.26 
 
0.62  
 
J Finance 24 5.14  113.55 55.65  
K Real estate 4 0.86  0.97 0.48  
L Leasing and commerce service 2 0.43  0.08 0.04  
M scientific research and technology 
service 
2 0.43  0.05 0.02  
N water conservancy, environment and 
Public facilities management 
8 1.71  0.29 0.14  
O Utilities 1 0.21  0.24 0.12  
P Education 0 0.00  0 0.00  
Q Health and social work 1 0.21  0.02 0.01  
R Culture, sports and entertainment 3 0.64  0.20 0.10  
 Total 467  204.05  
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
(3) CSRC industry classification 
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2.4 A comparison between Chinese PE market and the West 
In this section, we provide an analysis of the differences between the Chinese PE market 
and other mature PE markets. PE investment in China varies in several ways such as PE 
size, PE type and PE investors’ ownership control. 
 
The biggest difference between the Chinese market and mature PE markets is in PE types. 
The buyout PE type which is commonly found in mature markets is rare in China (shown 
in Panel 3, Table 2.4). PE investment is almost synonymous with Pre-IPO and growth 
capital in China (BVCA, 2011; also see Panel 3, Table 2.4). Both PE types focus on 
providing capital for companies that are already established and to fulfill the growth 
potential of these firms (BVCA, 2011). In particular, most of the investments target firms 
with listing potential, aiming for higher exit returns (to be discussed in Chapter 4). The 
lack of buyout investment also results in a low leverage ratio.  
 
A consequence of focusing on pre-IPO and growth capital in China is that PE investors 
normally take a minority stake and have less control over their portfolio firms. This 
observation is in sharp contrast to PE transactions in mature markets, especially in the 
form of buyout, where PE investors perform as the majority shareholder and play an 
active role in managing the portfolio firms. As a result, rather than implementing 
significant strategic changes, the value-added activities provided by PE investors to 
Chinese portfolio firms are mostly attributed to IPO preparation (BVCA, 2011; Zhang 
and Li, 2012). The monitoring role of PE investors is hampered in Chinese firms where a 
disproportionate ownership structure is found (Cao et al., 2014). 
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Regarding the selection criteria of PE target firms, western PE firms normally pick their 
portfolio firms based the firm’s business plan (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). On the 
contrary, due to the existence of high asymmetric information, a firm’s business plan does 
not provide enough information for Chinese investors. PE investors in China typically 
collect and analyze information from various other sources before an investment decision 
is made (Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2007). Due to the weak legal protection for minority 
shareholders in China, PE investors try to reduce their investment risk by selecting 
companies based on a good track record of profitability. Unlike in the US, where most PE 
investments focus on high-tech industries such as communications and computer-related 
industries (Gompers, 1995), PE investors make most of their investment in traditional 
industrious such as manufacturing (see Panel 6 Table 2.4) and locate their offices in 
Beijing, Shanghai, or Shenzhen (China Venture Capital Research Institute's report, 2008). 
 
Another key difference between domestic and non-domestic investors is their different 
investment behaviour. Among our sample firms, it is observed that overseas investors 
tend to focus more on creating a small number of large PE deals which is in sharp contrast 
to the large number of small deals made by domestic PE investors (Table 2.4, Panel IV). 
In contrast, domestic investors are more interested in generating short-term benefits. This 
distinct difference can be observed from the ratio of PE-backed IPOs in both types of PE 
investors, almost 90% of the PE-backed IPOs are from domestic investors. 
 
To sum up, the above analysis of the characteristics of the Chinese PE market implies that 
PE investment in China may have different investment motivation as well as different 
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impact on portfolio firms. In the following empirical chapters, we will address such 
differences in detail.   
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework 
Along with the dramatic development of PE industry after the 1990s (Fenn et al., 1998), 
a number of studies have examined how portfolio firm performance has been improved 
after PE investment (Kaplan, 1989; Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Davila et al., 2003; Guo 
et al., 2011; Bruton et al, 2010). The performance improvement has been attributed to the 
following reasons: PE investors’ reputation factors (Demeroglu and James, 2010), the 
level of PE evolvement (Florin, 2005) and PE inflow on R&D (Brown and Floros, 2011). 
Other explanations include the improvement of corporate governance, which refers to the 
explanations such as more concentrated boards (Gertner and Kaplan, 1996), better 
strategic leadership, more focus on value creation activities (Rogers et al., 2002) and 
steadfastly resistance on managerial disciplines (Acharya et al., 2008). Different theories 
have been addressed to explain how PE affects firm performance. However, there are few 
theoretical frameworks that explain how PE works in emerging markets, such as China. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Chinese PE market is different from mature 
markets in a lot of ways and therefore it is not wise to explain the Chinese PE market by 
applying western theories directly. In this chapter, classic theories in explaining PE 
investments will be illustrated. By including PE practice in China, we will propose 
different hypotheses for testing in the following three empirical chapters.  
 
To tackle the theoretical foundation for PE investment, five theories will be mentioned: 
the neoclassical theory, the financing for investment and growth theory, the asymmetric 
information theory, the agency theory and the institutional theory.  
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The neoclassical theory provides a foundation for economic activities based on the notion 
of rational, fully informed and wealth-maximizing individuals (Weintraub, 1993). From 
demand side it explains capital claim, which complements the demand of capital PE 
portfolio firms and the purpose comes from financing for investment and growth. 
However, in reality, the strong efficient market assumptions can be violated. To start with 
the asymmetric information theory, which weakens the market transparency hypothesis 
by stating the incomplete information about the target firm. Additionally, the neoclassical 
theory does not explain how conflicts of interest between the firm’s various parties – the 
shareholders, managers – are solved, or, more importantly, how profit-maximization goal 
can be achieved. Agency theory states the separation of ownership fails to engage profit 
maximizing between shareholders and managers. The emergence of private equity 
investment, has presented a positive role in solving the agency problems by associating 
the separated ownership and control, resulting in the realignment of managerial incentives 
towards the value maximization (Wright et al., 2009). Lastly, institutional theory has 
never ceased to raise the critical arguments on the rational action of investors (Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1999). Institutional theory suggests that there exist differences on the operation 
of PE investment around the world. It is necessary to take institutional factors into account 
when discussing PE investment in China (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). 
 
3.1 Neoclassical theory for PE investment 
According to Weintraub (1993), neoclassical economics is called a metatheory, meaning 
that it is a set of principles that form the basis of economic theories. Neoclassical theory 
is based on three fundamental assumptions: firstly, individuals have rational references 
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between outcomes and values. Secondly, individuals seek to maximize utility and firms 
maximize profits. Thirdly, individuals act independently on the basis of full information 
(Weintraub, 1993). Based on these assumptions, a number of financial theories have been 
developed within various areas of economic activity. For example, profit maximization 
rests on the neoclassical theory of the firms, while the demand curve leads to an 
understanding of consumer goods and the supply curve examines the elements of 
production. Utility maximization explains the neoclassical theory of consumption, which 
is useful for the derivation of labor demand curves and supply curves. Another economic 
activity based on the assumptions of neoclassical economies indicates that the equilibrium 
output and prices is determined by the aggregate demand across firms and individuals 
(Dymond, 2015).  
 
By applying the existing rules and theoretical concepts to PE investment, it has been 
noticed that the high demand of PE occurs at the time when the level of capital demand 
and supply are simultaneously high (Sommer, 2013). The demand side analysis embraces 
firms’ requirement for financing, while the supply side indicates that wealthy and 
institutional investors chase high return investment opportunities on the one hand, and 
the low returns from assets like stocks and bonds stimulate the booming of PE market on 
the other hand. However, we do not expand the supply side explanations because the 
supply side information mainly comes from PE investors which is not the main focus of 
this thesis. 
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3.1.1 Capital demand  
The theory of capital market imperfection indicates that a lack of external financing 
sources is the biggest problem for most non-financial firms (Greenwald et al., 1984; 
Fazzari et al., 1988). As firms grow, their desire for financing tends to increase. There 
comes a point at which reliance on internal financing will restrict a firm’s growth and 
external financing is required to accelerate it.  
 
From capital demand side, the requirement of capital arises when positive NPV projects 
are available. A growing economy provides more attractive investment opportunities for 
firms leading to requirements for more capital to finance business establishment and 
expansion (Sommer, 2013). However, growth opportunities have been indicated to put 
firms under risk. The higher potential risk may also bring higher uncertainty to firms’ 
future cash flow. As indicated by Greenwald et al (1984) and Fazzari et al (1988), a lack 
of external financing sources is the biggest problem for most non-financial firms. In 
addition, Myers (1977) argues that firms with potential high growth rate prefer equity 
over debt because they fear passing on control rights from shareholders to debt holders. 
Also, growth opportunities have been indicated to induce moral hazard problems and put 
firms under risk (Anderson et al., 2016). The higher potential risk also brings higher 
uncertainty to firms’ future cash flow. In order to mitigate this problem, firms with excess 
growth opportunities should be financed by equity instead of debt as a buffer against 
possible financial constraints arising from debt financing. Taken together, gaining access 
to a source of financing alternative to traditional external financing channels such as bank 
loans and equity financing is probably the most fundamental reason for demanding PE 
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investment. 
 
The emergence of a hot PE market is normally accompanied by a liquid debt market and 
the availability of cheap credit (Acharya et al., 2007; Axelson et al., 2009). According to 
Acharya et al (2007), the global booming PE market from 2003 to 2007 contributes to the 
abundant liquidity in the credit market and the unparalleled leverage supply, especially 
the enormous government surpluses from Asia as well as pension funds and private 
wealth. According to the model introduced by Axelson et al (2009), the cheap debt 
financing and the availability of excess capital provides the conditions for PE financing.  
 
3.1.2 The application of capital demand in the Chinese market 
In the Chinese case, due to the strict capital controls and limited domestic investment 
options, for domestic firms, especially the SMEs, the demand for getting external 
financing channel turns out to be the fundamental reason for receiving PE investment (Bo 
et al., 2011). Bank loans, equity issue in the stock market and bond issue are the most 
commonly used external channels. Subject to political influences and monetary policy 
restrictions, banks in China have high sovereign ownership and make their lending 
decisions based on credit records. In China, bank loans are the major financing source for 
Chinese SMEs of which 66.7% of them rely on loans from banks, according to a survey 
conducted by Ba (2013). In the same report, the author indicates that more than 1/3 of the 
SMEs have problems getting loans from banks due to the absence of sufficient collateral 
in which banks make their lending decisions based on credit records. According to the 
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report, Chinese SMEs highly rely on short term debts, as 61% of the enterprises report 
that the majority of their financial concerns are related to short-term liquidity. In addition, 
the Chinese stock market is unable to provide enough seats for firms to go to listing and 
the corporate bond market is under construction26.  
 
We treat the demand of alternative funding channels as an explanation for PE investment 
and the inflow of PE funds is meant to have a positive impact on firm performance. In 
China, SMEs contribute 58.5% of GDP but only use 20% of China’s financial resources 
(Xinhua, 2012). The lack of financing is a common problem faced by SMEs because the 
large amount of disproportionate loans are allocated to State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
and large enterprises (Shi, 2013). SMEs normally lack finance sources due to their short 
operating history and the high-risk nature of their investment projects. When bank lending 
becomes difficult for SMEs, SMEs are obliged to switch to alternative financing channels, 
in which the emergence of PE investment serves the needs of those firms and helps with 
SMEs’ future development. The emergence of PE investment also helps to solve funding 
difficulties by providing newly established, high growth and high-tech firms with fast 
funding opportunities than traditional debt financing channels.  
 
All together, we regard the demand for capital helps to explain the receiving of PE 
investment for Chinese firms. For empirical testing, we use sales growth rate as our 
                                                             
26 There are 1400 companies and 1050 companies listed on Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange 
respectively, which accounts for only 0.02% of the total number of Chinese SOEs and private companies. As a result, 
the Chinese stock market is unable to provide enough seats for firms to go to listing. Furthermore, the corporate bond 
market in China is under construction. In spite of the fact that China’s bond market is now the third largest in the world 
at about RMB 35.89 trillion (USD 4.24 trillion) by the end of 2014, only RMB 757 billion comes from corporate bonds 
(Goldman Sachs, 2014). 
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proposed testing variable (Bo et al., 2010). It is common wisdom that high growth 
companies require extra funding to finance their fast growth and PE investors are also 
more willing to support business with high growth potential (Capizzi et al., 2011). Our 
hypothesis is as following:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between firm’s growth rate (sales growth) 
and the demand of receiving PE investment. This hypothesis will be tested in chapter 4.  
 
3.2 Financing for investment and growth and PE investment  
The fundamental reason why firms go for private equity investment is to get financing 
for growth and development, especially in the case where intangible assets are the core 
business (Capizzi et al., 2011).  
 
The economic impact of PE investment has been widely discussed. By evaluating the 
performance of PE portfolio firms using different measurements, these studies can be 
summarized in two categories: a) comparison of performance changes before and after 
private equity investment (Meuleman et al., 2009; Guo et al., 2011; Bruton et al., 2010; 
Kaplan, 1989); b) comparison of PE portfolio firm performance with a matched sample 
(Wilson et al., 2012). The benefits from PE investors can be summarized as operating 
performance improvement, increased sales and R&D expenditure, and higher 
employment growth.  
 
Kaplan (1989) indicates that buyout investment leads to operating income increases, 
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capital expenditure decreases and net cash flow increases in the three years after the 
buyout transaction by studying a sample of 76 listed buyout firms in the US. The author 
attributes the operating changes to the improved incentives of shareholders through inside 
information. Studies from both Davila et al (2003) and Alemany and Marti (2005) indicate 
that VC-backed firms experience significant revenue and employment growth rate 
increase compared to non-VC-backed firms. Especially, the engagement of VC funds 
leads to an increased growth rate for young start-ups. In a more recent study, Paglia and 
Harjoto (2014) compare post-PE and post-VC investment performance to their non-PE 
and non-VC peers. The authors confirm that PE investment increases portfolio firms’ 
sales and employment growth rates in the three consecutive years after the investment. In 
contrast, VC financing leads to an immediately increase in sales and employment growth 
but the increase is not steady in the following years. In their paper, Gompers and 
Lerner (2000) collect over 4000 PE-backed firms from 1987 to 1995 and find that the 
inflows of private equity funds increase the valuation of the funds’ new investment and 
have a substantial impact on the improvement of environment for young firms. From the 
success of PE-backed firms, the impact from capital inflow is the greatest among PE 
activities. Following their study, researchers have provided similar evidence across 
countries. New evidence from the US shows operating performance of VC portfolio firms 
is either the same or slightly higher than the benchmark firms (Guo et al., 2011). Similar 
evidence from the UK shows PE-backed buyout firms experienced high profitability 
compared to non-PE backed firms during the 2008 global recession (Wilson et al., 2012).  
In the recent Chinese case, Guo and Jiang (2013) find VC-backed firms performed better 
than the other group in terms of ROS, ROE and labour productivity by comparing 258 
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VC-backed firms with their non-VC-backed counterparts during the period 1998 to 2007. 
However, no outperformance is significant on sales growth rate and R&D investment for 
VC-backed firms. Nevertheless, instead of attributing the better performance to the 
financing role of investors, the authors explain the results by indicating that VCs can 
attract good firms and firms are more likely to be targeted by VCs if they show higher 
profitability, growth rate and labour productivity.   
 
In this study, we regard the inflow of PE investment can largely improve firm’s 
profitability performance. As discussed previously, PE investment has a preference of 
targeting pre-IPO firms in China, meaning that the PE investment is made before IPO. 
The inflow of PE funds should therefore has a positive impact on portfolio firm’s balance 
sheet which leads to a higher stock board IPO passing rate (Zhang and Li, 2012). 
Accordingly, we set up the following hypothesis and will be examined in chapter 4: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between PE investment and firm’s 
profitability performance.  
 
3.3 Asymmetric information view for PE investment 
PE investment is normally subject to the high level asymmetric information problem 
between PE investors and the existing management and shareholders of the portfolio 
firms (Sommer, 2013). On the one hand, the adverse selection problem is associated with 
high transaction costs and a lower ratio of successful PE deals. On the other hand, 
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signaling theory has proved that the adaption of PE investment can be regarded as a useful 
tool to unveil potential growth capabilities in PE portfolio firms.  
 
3.3.1 Adverse selection view and PE investment  
In contrast to neo-classical economics which assumes perfect information, in the financial 
markets, information is often observably asymmetric between firms and financiers. The 
theoretical literature shows that equity attracts firms with lower expected returns (lemons) 
while debt finance attracts firms with high variability in returns (nuts) (Cumming, 2006). 
PE investors confront a significant adverse selection problem associated with identifying 
a qualified portfolio firm to provide external finance and the investors normally spend a 
large amount of time on evaluating the target firm (Amit et al., 1990; Fenn et al., 1997). 
In general, investors are less informed than the firm owners about the true value of the 
firm. When information asymmetry exists, the Modigliani-Miller theory (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958), which is based on the assumption of perfect capital markets, concludes that 
the source of financing is irrelevant to investment decisions, collapsed. Asymmetric 
information increases the cost of capital needed for firms to raise external financing, thus 
affecting future investments (Myers and Majluf, 1984). As a result, informational 
asymmetry adversely affects the funding channels for these firms or these firms are asked 
to provide more collaterals to get loans. This phenomenon is more severe for young and 
small firms and firms in high-tech industries, which exhibits shorter track records and 
lower visibility than large mature companies. The degree of asymmetric information is 
also likely to be higher in firms whose assets are difficult to evaluate, because they have 
large intangible assets but lack of assets to offer as collaterals. According to Janney and 
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Folta (2003), the asymmetric information in newly established and high-tech firms is due 
to the desire for core technology and intellectual property protection and inability to 
specify the ‘value’ of the firm in the short run. If more details are shared about their 
research projects, especially for high-tech firms, they have increased concern about 
expropriation of their research benefits and protecting their intellectual property 
advantage (Deeds et al., 1999). Similar studies from Gomes and Phillips (2012), Twite 
and Ellis (2012) have shown that firms with high asymmetric information are forced to 
choose private equity rather than public offering or issuing new equity. These firms are 
commonly under higher research and development expenses therefore have worse 
operating performance.  
 
In general, PE investors hold more information about the issuing company’s projects than 
their counterparts, i.e., the public investors (Floros and Billett, 2012). Based on their 
accumulated experiences in the industry and their screening methods such as due 
diligence reviews, PE investors can identify firms with potential growth opportunities 
more easily and thus leading to a lower adverse selection cost. Empirical study from 
Cumming (2006) has confirmed that start-ups and high-tech firms are better characterized 
as nuts instead of lemons.  
 
In this thesis, our main focus is on PE portfolio firms rather than the operation of PE 
funds, i.e., how PE investors pick out their portfolio firms. As a result, we do not propose 
any hypothesis for testing in this section.  
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3.3.2 Signaling view and PE investment  
Theory of market signaling suggests that certain variables or indicators provide 
information to potential investors about the capabilities of the target firms, allowing them 
to distinguish high-quality investment from the low-quality ones (Spence, 1973). Teece 
(1996) points out that signaling can help to reduce information asymmetry without 
divulging the source of a firm’s competitive advantage. Stuart et al (1999) also indicate 
that firms which are able to signal their quality have a better chance of raising a higher 
amount of capital via IPO. Generally, it is suggested that specialized financial 
intermediaries like private equity funds are able to reduce some of the asymmetric 
information problems between entrepreneurs and external investors by signaling portfolio 
firm value through the PE investments. The adaptation of PE investment shows the 
potential growth opportunities in these portfolio firms and signals the firm’s value to 
uninformed third parties, such as banks, suppliers and customers (Engel and Stiebale, 
2009).  
 
Signaling theory has been widely adapted in explaining PE investment. The dilemma for 
young firms and SMEs is that potential investors have problems in valuing the firm, which 
leads to undervaluation (Teece, 1996; Williamson, 1985). One possible reason for such 
difficult evaluation is that new firms have no performance track records and firms from 
new technology industry are backed with higher risks and uncertainties. External 
investors may also find it difficult to evaluate firms because of the information asymmetry 
– they cannot obtain useful information about the firm from the market or, sometimes, 
even from the managers. This problem is more obvious in high-tech industry firms since 
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the firm owners are less willing and less able to convey full information about the growth 
opportunities, due to their desire for core technology protection and their inability to 
specify the ‘value’ of the firm in the short run (Janney and Folta, 2003). While for PE 
investors, their experience of detecting high potential firms and their willingness to invest 
in the portfolio firms can be seen as a positive signal to the market and to other investors 
about the firm’s future perspectives. 
 
In academic studies, one popular method to evaluate the signaling effect of PE investment 
is the event study method raised by Wruck (1989). By comparing the stock market prices 
before and after PE announcement, the author confirms signaling through PE 
placements27 has a positive impact on the valuation of firms. The stock market return after 
the announcement of PE placement is accompanied by a 4.5% average abnormal return, 
which is in contrast to the negative average abnormal returns from the announcement of 
a public placement. Similar stock market performance study from Janney and Folta (2003) 
confirms that, when private equity placement is set up, the information asymmetry in 
undervalued firms is found to be reduced in biotechnology firms. Moreover, by adapting 
private equity, these firms are able to transmit stronger signals and, in return, attract future 
resources more steadily.  
 
Another indicator that is commonly used in empirical studies for signaling effect is the 
                                                             
27 Many studies do not differentiate private equity investment and private placement. But in our study, we do not count 
private placement as private equity investment. This is because in the AVCJ dataset, it defines an investment as private 
equity investment only when the investment is made from a named private equity investor. As a result, we exclude 
private placement samples in our study. However, since the investment principal of private equity and private placement 
is similar, we can still borrow the commonly used event study on private placement in PE motivation testing. 
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R&D expenses. Because asymmetric information exists in firms with high R&D costs, 
firms with high R&D expenses wish to receive PE investment. Empirical finding shows 
that a large proportion of PE inflow capital is directed to R&D costs, especially for firms 
operating in high-tech sectors (Janney and Folta, 2003). As a result, the high R&D 
expenses can be used by portfolio firms to signal their willingness for PE investment. 
However, in this study, we do not regard R&D information as a good indicator for 
signaling effect for the following reasons: (1) R&D information can be problematic in the 
Chinese market. R&D information is not often reported in a firm’s financial statement, as 
we have observed from the CSMAR dataset. Unreported R&D information, especially in 
high-tech firms, results from the reluctance of firm owners to risk future growth 
opportunities. (2) R&D information is affected by lots of other factors in China, such as 
guanxi and government support. The Chinese government has played a significant role in 
supporting the R&D expenses, but most of the financial support were found in SOEs 
(Zhang et al., 2003). Although SMEs contribute 82% of new product output and 66% of 
new patent registrations (Newman et al., 2015), they are characterized with much lower 
R&D expenditure from government support (Zhang and Xia, 2014). When a mixed 
sample of both SOEs and SMEs is being used, the R&D expenditure as a measurement is 
not very representative. (3) PE investors tend to bundle PE investment with R&D research 
agreement (Janney and Folta, 2003), where in China most R&D research is fully or partly 
supported by the government. It can be difficult for us to tell whether the increased R&D 
expenses come from PE investment or not. Taken together, we think the R&D index is 
not appropriate in examining PE motivation in this study.  
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As mentioned in chapter 2, one of the key characteristics of the Chinese PE market is that 
a large amount of the PE portfolio firms received PE investment prior to IPO. With the 
help of PE investors, who normally have industry experiences and some relationships 
with underwriters or even with CSRC, the portfolio firms have a higher passing rate for 
IPO listing (Zhang and Li, 2012). The approval of IPO is tightly controlled under an 
administrative control system run by CRSC and the approval process for issuing securities 
is strict and highly competitive in China28. Ever since the setting up of two new stock 
boards, which contains the majority of our sample firms, the competition has become 
more severe. Information from CSRC (Grant Thornton report, 2014) shows 1574 firms 
applied for IPO between 2006 and 2011, the actual IPO approval rate is 66.77% for 
application and 1051 firms are listed or to be listed. Almost half of the rejections are 
caused by concerns about the lack of sustainable profitability in the application firms. 
Guo and Jiang (2013) have indicated that the PE investment’s assessment process is very 
selective. In order to obtain PE investment before IPO, a firm needs to signal its 
willingness for IPO issuing to PE investors. These firms need to present their abilities in 
competition with other firms during the IPO application. More importantly, the firm 
should try to avoid the factors that might lead to rejection, such as a bad financial 
performance. Ideally, we should have a proxy that represents willingness for IPO listing. 
Considering that such information is difficult to evaluate, we adopt alternative approach 
                                                             
28 The Chinese initial public offering process is under the control of CSRC. A standard IPO procedure is as follows: 
firstly, the issuer completes the application documents under the direction of the underwriter, sending it to CSRC with 
a guarantee from two qualified sponsors. Secondly, the CSRC decides whether or not to accept the application in 5 
working days after receiving the documents. Thirdly, if they accept the application documents, the relevant department 
will carry out a preliminary examination of the application documents after which a committee of 5-7 specialist experts 
arranged by CSRC takes charge of approval. Finally, CSRC presents the decision, and provides the relevant official 
documents. The approval of main board, SME board and ChiNext board listing is awarded by different review 
committees. For main board and SME board, the issuer’s application documents are reviewed by Main Board public 
offering review committee which is composed of 25 members. While for ChiNext board, the issuer’s application 
documents are reviewed by ChiNext public offering review committee which is composed of 35 members. 
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to represent the signaling effect.  
 
Based on the discussions above, we regard the following two variables as indicators of 
signaling effect to PE investment. The first variable is the firm’s profitability in the past 
3 years before IPO. A firm with better profitability performance has the advantage in 
getting its IPO approved and so these firms are less motivated to signal themselves for 
PE investment than poor performance firms. The second variable is whether the firm is 
backed with state ownership. According to Saxenian (2005), the administration agency 
tends to favour state-backed firms. Hence, state-backed firms may have easy access to 
the IPO listing yet to have lower motivation for receiving PE investment. Both hypotheses 
will be examined in chapter 4.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative relationship between firm’s profitability (in the past 3 
years before IPO29) and the motivation of signaling themselves to PE investors. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: There is a negative relationship between firm with state-background and 
the motivation of signaling themselves to PE investors. 
 
3.4 Agency theory and PE investment  
In their well-known book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and 
Means (1932) started an early discussion of the consequences of the separation of 
                                                             
29 The CSRC requires the financial information disclosure 3 years before the IPO application.  
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ownership and control for modern corporations. Because of the separation, managers 
have different interests and motivations from those of shareholders. The main concern of 
shareholders focuses on share prices and dividend pay-outs, whereas managers’ concerns 
focus on their own power, security, organization size as well as their own wealth. 
Dividend payments to shareholders reduce the size of assets under managers’ control and 
the security of managers. Therefore, the separation of ownership from control and 
management creates agency costs that reduce shareholder’s wealth. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract between one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) and another person (the agent) to perform on behalf of their services 
such as decision making. They define the concept of agency costs as the monitoring of 
expenditure by principal, the bonding expenditure by agent and the residual loss. The 
authors have pointed out that the agency costs are inevitable when there is a separation of 
ownership and control. If both shareholders and managers are “utility maximizers”, there 
is a good reason to believe why managers carry out projects that maximize their private 
benefits instead of serving the interests of shareholders. The authors conclude that only if 
the manager owns 100% of the firm, he will then have the intention to maximize the 
firm’s benefits. In other words, a higher ownership concentration helps to reduce the 
conflict between principles and agent. Jensen (1989, 1993) indicates that there will be a 
relatively new organizational structure in which manager performs as an “active investor” 
for the publicly held corporation. In this new structure, it is more likely to solve the 
agency problem with emphasis on restricting corporate assets, controlling and 
incentivizing managers’ behaviour to improve the performance and to align the interests 
of shareholder and management team by maximizing profit for both sides. Similar 
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conclusions are supported by Fox and Marcus (1992) and they show that shareholders 
can limit excessive managerial discretion by establishing appropriate incentives for the 
managers when connecting their compensation to shareholder returns. These benchmark 
results pave the way for the emergence of private equity.  
For firms with a diluted ownership, agency conflict emergences when each owner has 
lower incentive to monitor the management due to the high costs of management and the 
low ratio of returns (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Existing 
studies prove that the entry of PE investors can help to reduce agency conflict by 
associating the separate ownership and control, resulting in the realignment of managerial 
incentives towards value maximization through a concentrated ownership structure 
(Wright et al., 2009) through the motivation of good corporate governance (Bruton et al., 
2010). In a typical PE transaction, outside investors acquire shares and become 
shareholders of the firm during the transaction period. After setting up the transaction, PE 
fund managers monitor portfolio firms through their ownership of the firm. Especially in 
buyout transactions, PE investors typically become the largest shareholder and are 
responsible for management services (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). Since fund managers 
are now shareholders of the firm and their compensation depends largely on fund 
performance, there is no reason for them to abuse managerial rights. Moreover, these 
experienced fund managers have better understanding on the markets. Their knowledge 
and network can help with value-added activities in improving firm performance. One of 
the key areas of interaction between private equity firms and investees is through 
participation on investee company boards’ activities. Firstly, the board is less diverse than 
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before after the entry of PE investors (Gertner and Kaplan, 1996). PE shareholders have 
the ability to manage key shareholders, thus helping to provide a stable management and 
performance (Rogers et al., 2002). Secondly, PE portfolio firm boards (referred to as PE 
boards hereafter) provide better strategic leadership and perform more effectively in 
management. Compared to their public competitors, PE portfolio firms’ boards monitor 
the firm much more actively and intensively, reviewing the progress of key initiatives in 
greater detail and diving more deeply into underperformance situations. PE investors have 
the right to condition their investment contract and they can shape firm structure by using 
their board right to replace a poorly performing management team (Acharya et al., 2008). 
Lastly, a PE manager acts as ‘consultant’ by transforming value added skills and bringing 
social network influence into the portfolio firms (Stuart and Yim, 2010). In sum, reduced 
agency cost problem is found from post-investment (moral hazard) performance (De 
Clerq and Sapienza, 2006). 
The above evidence is usually found in western PE-backed buyouts firms where agency 
problem is between the manager and shareholders. However, the mature market based 
evidence may not be true in an emerging market, in which the agency problem is referred 
to as the principal-principal conflict (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000).  
Principal-principal results from the existence of a concentrated ownership structure of the 
firm, the absence of an effective external governance mechanism and the lack of legal 
mechanism protection on owners’ interests (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). In such a firm 
structure, the majority shareholders are in a better position than the minority shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 1999). Although ownership concentration can lead to effective 
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management monitoring due to the high gains returned to the owners (Chen et al., 2009), 
general issues raised by the higher degree of ownership concentration lead to the problem 
that the majority shareholders are encouraged to pursue their own interests rather than 
promote value-enhancing strategic decisions at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Maury and Pajuste, 2004; Allen et al., 2005; Gompers et al., 
2010; Lin et al., 2011). The problems from a concentrated ownership structure can be 
summarized as tunnelling and expropriation of minority shareholders by majority 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck et al., 2005; Lin and Chuang, 2011), hiring 
unqualified management team members who are related to the controlling shareholders 
(Su et al., 2008; Young et al., 2008), and less focus on firm’s profitability performance 
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). These inappropriate behaviour is observed especially in 
countries with less-effective minority investor protection, like SMEs in China (Nenova, 
2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  
 
The features of Chinese SME firms are summarized as the existence of a concentrated 
ownership (Xu and Wang, 1999), restricted access to external financing (which has been 
discussed earlier in chapter 2) and weak institutional protection30. In a typical Chinese 
SME, ownership is tightly controlled by the founder of the firm who has absolute control 
with over 30% of total ownership. In some cases, the ownership controlled by the largest 
owner can be as high as over 60% (Qin et al., 2012). The management team members are 
commonly selected within the range of family members and/or close friends. Few 
                                                             
30 Because the majority of our sample firms are SMEs rather than large private firms, our discussions are based on 
SMEs in this section. 
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professional managers are employed by Chinese SMEs because the SME owners think 
outsiders are less trustworthy. In this kind of business structure, coordination and control 
are highly personal and there is tight control of financial and production management 
(Tsang, 2001).  
 
A number of empirical studies have taken the principal-principal conflicts into account 
and most of them focus on the agency conflict between different PE investors. The idea 
of syndication as a business alliance is to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each 
investor, to mitigate funding pressures, to control the risk for each firm and to evolve into 
more investment opportunities. The syndicated PE investors have different competitive 
advantages which may lead to more effective managements and value-added activities. 
For example, Hochberg et al (2007) indicate that VC co-investment (i.e., VC syndication) 
can result in principal-principal conflict of interest and objective on portfolio firm 
performance, such as the additional value of syndication networks to the portfolio firms. 
However, a number of studies hold the opposite opinion due to the enrolment of 
syndicated investors leading to a principal-principal conflict between different investors. 
Hoskisson et al (2002) refer to this type of agency cost as ‘conflicting voices’. These 
authors suggest that the diversity of VC investors’ interest and decision-making may lead 
to a negative impact on portfolio firms. By comparing portfolio firms in the UK and the 
US, Chahine et al (2012) confirm that different interests among syndicate VC investors 
are likely to amplify the principal-principal problem. The impact of VC syndicate 
diversity leads to lower reputation factors, which positively affects the earnings 
management but results in a negative impact on portfolio performance. The authors also 
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find that the syndicate diversity problem is severe in the US rather than in the UK. 
Moreover, the syndication may result in less concentrated ownership and thus lower the 
incentives of individual syndicate members. According to Cumming and Johan (2013), a 
potential free-riding problem may be caused by syndicated investors. In the Chinese case, 
both Guo and Jiang (2013) and Hua et al (2016) suggest that instead of accelerating the 
principal-principal conflict between different VC investors firms, the syndicated VC 
investors have an advantage in monitoring and providing more value-added assistance to 
the portfolio firms (Guo and Jiang, 2013) or the syndicated VC investors help to create 
value for VC-backed firms (Hua et al., 2016). Following their findings, we set up our 
hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Syndicated PE investors have significant impact portfolio firms than 
single PE investor.  
 
Another agency problem in Chinese PE portfolio firms is between the majority 
shareholder and the PE investor. In chapter 2 we have indicated that PE investor normally 
becomes a minority shareholder in Chinese portfolio firms. We regard the existence of a 
concentrated ownership as a motivation for receiving PE investment in China for the 
following reasons: PE investment has a finite life and PE investors exist by selling their 
shares and/or floating on the IPO market (Gilligan and Wright, 2010). In addition, PE 
investors normally become minority rather than majority shareholders in their portfolio 
firms in developing countries and so play a limited monitoring role (Cao et al., 2014). 
Consequently, rather than weaken the dominant status of the dominant shareholders, the 
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PE investors exit the firm at the end of the deal period and all firm rights are returned to 
the owners. After studying the monitoring role of VC investors in Chinese SME firms, 
Cao et al (2014) conclude that the monitoring role of VC investors is exploited by the 
disproportionate ownership structure in the portfolio firms. But at the same time, these 
VC investors are compensated by lower investment cost and shorter investment duration 
for their investment in these newly listed portfolio firms. The above arguments suggest a 
positive relationship between the concentrated ownership and the motivation to receive 
PE investment. To further prove the above results, two concentrated ownership indicators 
are constructed for testing the motivation for receiving PE investment in this thesis. The 
first proxy variable is the Herfindahl Index (HI), which measures ownership 
concentration (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hovey et al., 2003). The second is the proportion 
of shares hold by the largest shareholder. Unlike Xu and Wang (1999), who use the 
proportion of top 10 shareholders to represent the concentrate ownership structure, we 
focus only on the largest shareholder because the largest shareholder in our sample firms 
normally controls over 30% of the total shares and this ratio is much higher than top 2 to 
top 4 shareholders31. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: There is a positive relationship between firm’s concentrated ownership 
and the motivation of receiving PE investment.  
 
Hypothesis 4c: There is a positive relationship between shares controlled by the largest 
                                                             
31 It is observed that the average ownership controlled by top 1 to top 4 shareholders is 31.68%, 12.12%, 5.58% and 
3.38% for our sample PE-backed firms.  
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shareholder and the motivation of receiving PE investment.  
 
Although firms with a concentrated ownership is more likely to receive PE investment, 
the minority role of PE investors suggests that PE investors are less willing or have limited 
role in engaging into corporate governance affairs. Thus we expect the ownership 
transformed to PE investors is positively related to portfolio firm’s portability:  
 
Hypothesis 4d: There is a positive relationship between ownership transformed to PE 
investor and portfolio firm’s profitability.  
 
3.5 Institutional theory and PE investment 
In the previous sections, we have discussed how PE affects Chinese portfolio firms using 
different finance theories. Above all these discussions, one cannot neglect the fact that all 
the differences are based on the institutional background of Chinese firms, including the 
political structure, the legal system and economic issues. In this section, we focus on 
explaining how the institutional setting can play a vital role in explaining PE investment 
in Chinese firms. 
In their early work, Davis and North (1971) defined the institutional environment as “the 
set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for 
production, exchange and distribution. Roles governing elections, property rights, and the 
right of contract are examples of the type of ground rules that make up the economic 
environment”. In different works, institutions have been stated as: a structure that helps 
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to coordinate political, economic and social relationship which is essential for economic 
development (North, 1991); institutions improve market efficiency by reducing the 
uncertainty from the asymmetric information among different economic players (North, 
1993). In general, institutional theory emphasized on how the different beliefs, goals, and 
actions of individuals and groups are strongly affected by the environmental institutions 
they sit in (Scott, 1987).  
The institutional theory has been used to explain a number of significant operation and 
managerial differences in different parts of the world. In the case of PE studies, 
institutional theory suggests that there exists differences on how PE operates around the 
world. In the West, it is believed that institutions have an impact on the goals and 
processes of PE firms (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). However, little supporting evidence 
has been found outside the US and west European PE markets so far. For example, prior 
research has shown many similarities in institutional settings between the US and 
European PE industries (Sapienza et al., 1996). By comparing VC and angel investor 
performance between the UK and France PE-backed IPO, another study has shown the 
two types of PE investor impact differently on investee firm performance and this impact 
is mediated by the legal institutions in the given country (Bruton et al., 2010). 
Considering that the nature of Chinese financial market setting is very different from the 
West, it is worth asking how institution settings in this country help to shape the PE 
industry. To answer this question, Bruton and Ahlstrom’s study (2003) interviewed PE 
investor who were investing in China between 1998 and 2000. The authors find that 
China’s institutional environment creates a number of significant different from the West, 
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including: (a) The portfolio firm selection process lacks regulatory protection, normative 
institutions and reliable accounting information. (b) Profit maximization cannot be 
regarded as a motivation for portfolio firms. (c) Structuring of relationships with firms 
and governments largely depends on guanxi. (d) Exit opportunities through IPO are 
limited than the purchase by strategic investor. Since this paper is written in the early 
2000s, lots of changes and developments have been processed in the past 10 years. For 
example, the last point is found to be invalid in the Chinese PE market anymore and IPO 
has become the most welcomed PE exit route. 
Based on our observations of on the characteristics of Chinese PE market from chapter 2, 
we have developed the following hypothesis to be tested in chapter 4: 
Hypothesis 4a: PE investors have significant impact on new board listed firms than main 
board listed firms.  
Hypothesis 4b: Domestic PE investors have significant impact on portfolio firms than 
their non-domestic competitors. 
Hypothesis 4c: PE investors have significant impact on non-state-backed portfolio firms 
than on firms with state ownership.  
In addition, due to the nature of the Chinese IPO market (to be introduced in chapter 5), 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4d: PE investment on IPO firms are for speculation purpose rather than 
improving firm performance in the long-run.  
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Chapter 4 Motivations for receiving PE investments 
4.1 Introduction  
The conventional wisdom is that the professional PE investor has a deep understanding 
of the private equity landscape in nontraditional markets based on former investment 
experience (Gilligan and Wright, 2010; Povaly, 2007; Cornelius, 2011). PE investment 
can reduce the presence of the asymmetric information problem and help to signal the 
intrinsic value of the portfolio firms to the market and to other potential investors (Janney 
and Folta, 2003; Engel and Stiebale, 2009). PE investment is also an important source of 
financing for SMEs, especially in cases where intangible assets are the core business 
(Capizzi et al., 2011). Additionally, in the case of buyouts, after PE investors become 
majority shareholder of a firm, they solve the agency conflict by aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Wright et al., 2009). By investing 
into younger, smaller firms in high-tech sectors , PE investors are able to generate above 
market returns and these PE portfolio firms outperform similar firms without PE 
investment (Gompers and Lerner., 2000; Davila et al., 2003; Alemany and Marti, 2005). 
A report from the Boston Consulting Group indicates that more than 70% of PE deals 
resulted in portfolio firms’ annual profit growth rate (measured by annual EBITDA) by 
at least 20%, and nearly half of the PE deals received profit growth (measured by annual 
EBITDA) of 50% a year or more (BCG, 2012).  
As discussed in chapter 2, it is clear that the Chinese PE market differs from the mature 
markets in several ways, including a much larger market size (Preqin, 2015), a less 
developed capital market (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2007), 
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PE investors normally become minority shareholders in their Chinese portfolio firms 
(Cao et al., 2014) and PE investors make use of IPO as an efficient exit channel, It seems 
reasonable to assume that not all results found for PE in the US and Europeans countries 
will be valid for the Chinese market. Consequently, this chapter aims to fill the gap in the 
literature by examining the motivations for receiving PE investment for Chinese firms 
and detecting the factors that drive the recipient of PE investment.  
We study a sample of 195 PE portfolio firms and matched them with 318 similar firms 
without PE investment using the Propensity Score Method (Abadie and Imbens, 2002; 
Acharya et al., 2010; Leslie and Oyer, 2013). Testing hypotheses based on different 
theories on motivations of receiving PE investment, namely financing for investment and 
growth theory, signaling theory and agency theory, have been constructed in chapter 3. 
We use Probit and Logit regression as our empirical models to test the relationship 
between the probability of receiving PE investment and the proposed testing variables. It 
is not surprising to find out financing and signaling are not the primary reasons for 
receiving PE investment given that the Chinese PE market is largely driven by IPO. The 
signaling effect from stock market event study further confirms that there is no significant 
stock market reaction to the announcement of PE investment. Moreover, from the agency 
perspective, we find there is a positive and significant relationship between the existence 
of a largest shareholder and the probability of receiving PE investment, which matches 
PE investor’s role as a minority shareholder. The above findings are consistent for both 
whole sample firms and new board listed firms.   
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, we advance the knowledge of PE 
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investment in China by comparing it with other existing literatures.  It is interesting to see 
how the theories concerning PE motivations in mature markets are applied to the Chinese 
PE market, which features as a lack of financing, ownership concentration and an IPO 
‘hot issue’ market. Secondly, this study examines the relevance of different motivation 
theories using a matched sample method by collecting PE-backed firms and non-PE-
backed firms for the period 2000-2011. Recently, there are a few studies discuss the 
reasons on why firms receive PE investment before IPO. For example, Zhang and Li 
(2012) compare 185 PE-backed IPOs to 73 non-PE-backed IPOs from the period 
September, 17, 2009 to February 28, 2011. The authors describe that the motivation of 
receiving PE investment is to improve the CSRC passing rate for listing. We adopt 
different theories to examine the motivations of receiving PE investment and we use a 
much longer observation period and a larger sample size than other studies, which may 
give us a deeper understanding of this topic.   
This chapter is tightly connected with the next empirical chapter (chapter 5), which 
evaluates the impact of PE investment on the portfolio firms. Although the theoretical 
background are similar for both empirical chapters, each chapter has a different empirical 
focus. Chapter 4 prioritizes on existing theories that can possibly explain the motivations 
for receiving PE investment, meaning the ex-ante factors. While chapter 5 provides 
evidence on how PE affects their Chinese portfolio firms’ operating performance and 
examines the post-PE performance in the long run, meaning the ex-post factors. 
  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The empirical analysis is provided in 
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section 2, based on the literature review and hypotheses from chapter 3. This section 
reports data description, the constructions of proxy variables and how Propensity Score 
Method is used for generating the sample of matched firms. A conclusion is provided in 
section 3. An explanation of the Propensity Score Method is provided in an Appendix 4.1. 
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4.2 Empirical analysis  
4.2.1 Data 
In Chapter 2, we have identified a sample of 364 PE deals from 307 PE-backed firms 
from Chinese mainland stock markets during the period 2000 to 2011.  Firm-specific 
information is collected from China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database 
(CSMAR). PE related information is collected from Asia Venture Capital Journal Dataset 
(AVCJ). As discussed previously, a large number of our sample firms received PE 
investment before IPO.  These firms’ related information can only be accessed three years 
before IPO due to the information disclosure requirement from CSRC. According to the 
available financial statements and corporate governance information, a sample of 195 
portfolio firms is used as matched samples for this chapter. 
 
4.2.2 The propensity score matching (PSM) estimation  
The matched firm approach is used to identify a set of firms that are similar to our PE 
portfolio firms but not backed by PE investment, which helps to compare and explain the 
motivations of receiving PE investment.  The idea is, by comparing PE-backed firms and 
non-PE-backed firms, if one proxy is found to be significantly different between PE-
backed group and the matched samples, such proxy can be regarded as motivation for 
receiving PE investment. Theoretically speaking, the selected firms do not differ from PE 
portfolio firms regarding firm’s basic characteristics. To achieve this, the Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) method is adapted, which refers to pairing of treatment and 
control groups with similar values on the propensity score in order to discard the 
unmatched groups. The concept of PMS was first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
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(1983). The specific propensity score matching implementation we use is based on 
Abadie and Imben’s (2002) application of the idea from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
The detailed analysis on the statistical definition is provided in the Appendix 3.1. Similar 
to Acharya et al. (2009) and Leslie and Oyer (2008), the nearest neighbor propensity score 
matching method is used to ensure that those matched samples are as comparable as 
possible. For a given treated subject, the nearest neighbor matching method selects the 
untreated group whose propensity score is closest to that of the treated group. For a given 
treated group, one could identify multiple untreated groups whose propensity scores lay 
within a specified distance of the treated group.  
 
In our case, the PE-backed firms are regarded as the ‘treated group’ and the matched firms 
are regarded as the ‘control group’. The selection process is as follows: firstly, we identify 
Chinese listed nonfinancial firms that match PE-backed IPO firms in terms of the year of 
listing and the CSRC two-digit industry classification and treat them as candidate non-
PE-backed IPOs that can be possibly matched with PE-backed IPOs in our sample. We 
control the year effect to avoid selection bias for the matched group. The reason for the 
controlling of industry effect is because some industries receive more PE investment than 
others (as reported in Panel 6 from Table 2.4, the majority of PE investment took place in 
the manufacturing industry).  Secondly, we calculate the absolute distance in propensity 
score based on firm size between each PE-backed IPO firm and non-PE-backed IPO firms 
from step 1. More specifically, we use the Stata command psmatch to calculate propensity 
scores. We require the maximum difference between the matching firm and the portfolio 
firm to be below 5% in absolute value (caliper=0.05). Because the majority of PE-backed 
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IPOs are listed on the two new stock markets after 2004, a significant amount of PE-
backed IPOs have no non-PE-backed IPOs to be matched. In addition there are also some 
matched firms whose information on accounting or corporate governance is missing from 
CSMAR database. Thirdly, we calculate the absolute distance in propensity score between 
each PE portfolio firm and firm generated from step 1 based on firm size. After the above 
three steps, a sample of 318 non-PE peers from 2000-2011 is generated as our matching 
firms. In Table 4.1, we present the comparison between PE-backed group and the matched 
group in terms of firm performance, measured by firm size (the natural logarithm of total 
assets), and leverage ratio (total debt scaled by total assets). These two variables capture 
the basic firm performance information and confirm the minimal observable difference 
in our motivation testing between PE-backed firms and their non-PE peers. We find no 
significant differences between these three indicators. As a result, we can say that the 
propensity score matching is able to eliminate most of the differences in firm 
characteristics.  
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Table 4.1 Propensity Score Matching testing results of PE-backed firms peers  
In this table, we identify control samples using a propensity score matching procedure. Three firm 
performance controlling variables are used, including firm size (the natural logarithm of firm size) 
and leverage (leverage ratio is measured by total debt over total assets). The mean of non-PE-
backed firms reported are after the ‘nearest-neighbour-matching’ process.   
 
 
N Mean  Median  Std. Dev Min  Max Diff 
t-test 
Lnsize        
PE-backed 195 20.52  1.4 18.32 26.55 -0.27 
Peers 318 20.21  1.17 18.31 25.25  
Leverage         
PE-backed 195 0.29  0.80 0.003 11.13 0.97 
Peers 318 0.26  0.467 0.001 5.108  
Data source: CSMAR China Stock Market Trading Database and Asian Venture Capital Journal 
Database 
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4.2.3 Empirical model and measurement of variables 
To test the motivation for receiving PE investment, we follow the Probit model method 
used by Pagano et al. (1998). In their paper, the authors proxy the variables that affect 
IPO listing using the maximum likelihood Probit model. From the empirical results, the 
authors prove that company size, growth rate, ROA and industry market-to-book ratio 
variables are significant and so can be used as motivation factors for a firm to go public. 
Similarly, for our case, if a proxy is found to be statistically significant between similar 
firms that are with or without PE investment, this proxy can be severed as a motivation 
indicator for PE investment.  
 
Based on the theoretical predictions on variables that may affect the likelihood of PE 
investment, we use both Probit and Logit model as our empirical models 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1
4 5 1 6 1
7 1 9 1 10 10
Pr( 1) (
_ _
arg )
it it it
it it
it it
PEdummy F Lnsize Leverage Age
Ave profit State dum Sales
HI L est Year industry
   
  
   
  
 
 
    
  
   
                                 (4.1) 
The dependent variable is binary: it takes 1 for PE-backed firms and 0 for non-PE-backed 
peers. The dependent variable is defined as year t  when PE investment took place. The 
independent variables are collected from firm’s 1t   annual report because the effects 
from lagged factors are observed in year t . For non-PE-backed firms, year t  is defined 
as the year in which their PE-backed peers received PE investments. For financing for 
investment and growth theory, the testing variable is sales growth rate ( )Sales , which is 
defined as the rate of change in sales in year y-2 and y-1 (Bo et al., 2010). For signaling 
effect, two variables are used: the average EBIT in the past three years ( _Ave profit  ); 
whether the firm is backed by state ownership ( _ )State dum , which equals 1 if the state 
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ownership exists and zero otherwise. In terms of agency theory testing, the following 
variables are constructed: concentrated ownership ( HI  ), measured by the Herfindahl 
Index, is the squared sum of share percentages held by top_4 shareholders (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Hovey et al., 2003); the shares controlled by the largest shareholder ( argL est ) 
(Xu and Wang, 1999). We also control for the firm performance indicators of firm size 
and leverage ratio firm age. The first two variables have been defined previously. Firm 
age ( Age ) is the age when PE investment took place. Year effect and industry effect are 
also controlled.  A summary of variables in reported in Appendix 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 reports the characteristics of PE-backed firms and non-PE-backed firms (apart 
from the two variables that have been reported in Table 4.1). We observe that PE-backed 
firms are younger on average and the difference is statistically significant (t = -2.6378). 
Although the sales growth rate appears to be higher for the non-PE cases, the difference 
between the two groups in sales growth is not statistically significant (t = 0.0218). These 
results provide initial evidence that the need for external financing may not be a 
motivation for PE investment. PE-backed firms also have slightly lower profitability 
ratios than non-PE-backed firms, although the different is not significant (t = -1.3227). A 
similar result is found for the state dummy variable, in which less PE-backed firms are 
with state ownership, yet the difference is not significant (t= -1.0624). Regarding agency 
theory, the values for both concentrated ownership and largest shareholder ownership are 
higher in PE-backed firms. In addition, the difference is significant for largest shareholder 
variables (t=7.8510). The above results give us an initial impression that the motivation 
for receiving PE investment may not be attributed to financing or signaling purpose. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of 195 PE deals and 318 non-PE peers. The sample 
period is 2001-2011. Firm age ( Age ), is the age of firm at the time of PE investment. For non-PE-
backed firms, Age  measured is defined as the year in which their peers received PE investments 
minus its establishment. Sales growth rate ( Sales ) is defined as rate of change in sales. The average 
profitability ( _Ave profit ) is the average return on assets the past three years. The state ownership 
dummy ( _State dum  ) indicates whether the firm is backed by state ownership. Concentrated 
ownership ( HI ), measured by the Herfindahl Index, is the squared sum of share percentages 
held by top4 shareholders. The largest ownership ( argL est ) is the ratio of shares controlled by 
the largest shareholder. 
 PE-backed firms  
Non-PE-backed 
firms 
 t-Test 
statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev.  
Age  195 7.1180 5.2653 318 8.3365 4.9614 -2.6378 
Sales  195 0.2361 0.5175 318 0.2212 0.0218 0.3706 
_Ave ROA  195 0.1547 0.1376 318 0.1614 0.1267 -1.3227 
_State dum   195 0.6205 0.4865 318 0.6667 0.4721 -1.0624 
HI  195 0.2119 0.1526 318 0.2008 0.1236 0.8992 
argL est  195 0.5567 0.4981 318 0.2327 0.4232 7.8510 
Data source:  China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
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4.2.4 Results and discussions 
The first four columns in Table 4.3 Panel 1 report equation (4.1) using a cross-section 
Probit model. For control variables, both firm size and leverage ratios are insignificant 
which is consistent with our previous explanations. The estimated coefficient for firm age 
control variable is negatively significant, suggesting that younger firms are more likely 
to undertake PE investment. In the first three columns, the hypothesis for different 
theories are reported respectively while in column (4) the whole model results are 
presented. The first column reports hypothesis 2a for financing for investment and growth 
theory. The estimated coefficient for sales growth rate has a positive sign but the 
coefficient is insignificant in both column (1) and (4). The second column outlines 
hypothesis 3a and 3b for signaling theory. The estimated coefficient for _Ave profit  is 
negatively insignificant, implying that firms with better profitability performance in the 
past years have lower motivation to receive PE investment compared to the matched 
sample firms however this variable is insignificant. The other proxy _State dum , is also 
negative in column (2) and (4), suggesting that firms backed with state-owners are less 
motivated in receiving PE investment than their non-state-backed peers but the effect is 
insignificant. Both hypotheses results suggest that signaling may not be a motivation for 
receiving PE investment. Hypothesis 4b and 4c for agency theory are reported in column 
(3). The coefficient for concentrated ownership turns out to be positively insignificant in 
both column (3) and (4). A positive and significant relationship between the largest 
shareholder and PE investment is found in column (3) and (4), showing that the existence 
of a largest shareholder is related to a higher motivation for receiving PE investment.  
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Taken together, the empirical results demonstrate that financing for investment and 
growth or signaling are not the motivations for receiving PE investment. Alternatively, 
we notice that there is a positively significant relationship between the existence of a 
dominant largest shareholder and the probability of receiving PE investment. To explain 
this observation, the characteristics of Chinese SME should be taken into account. For 
our sample observations, the ownership is tightly controlled by the founder of the firm 
with over 30% of total ownership. We also observe that, in firms from high-tech industries, 
the average holding of the largest shareholder can be as high as 58.64% (Shapiro et al., 
2015). Commonly, the management team members are selected within the range of family 
members and/or close friends. In this style of business structure, coordination and control 
are highly personal and there is tight control of financial and production management 
(Tsang, 2001). PE investor’s only take a small portion of the shares and they play limited 
role in corporate governance. As a result, the largest shareholders do not feel threatened 
by the entry of PE investors. Consequently, these largest shareholders have higher 
motivations in receiving PE investment and enjoy the investors’ benefits from PE 
investment.  
 
Further insights into the motivation for receiving PE investment can be obtained from 
new board listed firms, based on the fact that the majority of our PE-backed firms come 
from new boards. To answer the question of whether these SME firms have different 
motivation for receiving PE investment, we repeat equation 4.1 for new boards’ listed 
firms as our alternative check. The results are reported in Table 4.3 column (5) to (8). The 
results concerning control variables indicate that younger firms undertake more PE 
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investments than those of mature firms. Similar to the whole sample results, a positive 
but insignificant relationship is found between sales growth rate and PE probability. It is 
also noticed that firms with higher profitability records and firms backed by state 
ownership are not reasons to explain PE motivations. In consistent with the whole sample 
results, the largest shareholder variable is positively significant while the concentrated 
ownership variable is positively insignificant for new board listed firms.  
 
We repeat equation 4.1 for whole sample and new board sample using a Logit model and 
find similar results. The Logit model results are presented in the Table 4.3 Panel 2.  
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Table 4.3 Motivations for receiving PE investment 
The effect of the variables on the motivation to receiving PE investment is estimated by using 
both Probit and Logit regression. The estimation method is maximum likelihood. The sample 
contains 195 PE-backed and 318 non-PE-backed firms. The sample period is from 2000-2011. 
The empirical model is defined as the follows: 
Pr( 1) ( 0 1 1 2 1 3 1
_ _
4 5 1 6 1
arg )7 1 9 1 10 10
PEdummy F Lnsize Leverage Ageit it it
Ave profit State dum Sales
it it
HI L est Year industryit it
   
  
   
      
   
    
 
Firm age ( Age ), is the age of firm at the time of PE investment. For non-PE-backed firms, Age  
measured is defined as the year in which their peers received PE investments minus its 
establishment. Sales growth rate ( Sales  ) is defined as rate of change in sales. The average 
profitability ( _Ave profit ) is the average EBIT the past three years. The state ownership dummy 
( _State dum ) indicates whether the firms is backed with state ownership. Concentrated ownership 
( HI ), measured by the Herfindahl Index, is the squared sum of share percentages hold by top4 
shareholders. The largest ownership ( argL est  ) is the ratio of shares controlled by the largest 
shareholder. Both industry and year effects are controlled. The figures in parentheses are the t-
statistics. 
 
Panel 1 Probit results 
var iables   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lnsize  
 
0.1044 
(2.14) 
0.0932 
(1.83) 
0.0291 
(0.57) 
0.0173 
(0.31) 
0.1044 
(1.80) 
0.0841 
(1.37) 
0.0360 
(0.59) 
0.0059 
(0.09) 
Leverage  
 
0.0506 
(0.53) 
0.0535 
(0.56) 
0.0895 
(0.90) 
0.0982 
(0.98) 
0.0441 
(0.44) 
0.0454 
(0.46) 
0.0839 
(0.80) 
0.0830 
(0.79) 
Age  
 
-0.0323 
(-2.74) 
-0.0329 
(-2.78) 
-0.0333 
(-2.74) 
-0.0335 
(-2.72) 
-0.0758 
(-4.58) 
-0.0778 
(-4.68) 
-0.0766 
(-4.58) 
-0.0771 
(-4.58) 
Sales  
 
0.008 
(0.06) 
  0.0412 
(0.29) 
0.0644 
(0.42) 
  0.1211 
(0.73) 
_Ave ROA  
 
 -0.4519 
(-0.96) 
 -.4199 
(-0.82) 
 -0.6205 
(-1.14) 
 -0.7204 
(-1.20) 
_State dum   -0.1632 
(-1.34) 
 -0.2409 
(-1.45) 
 -0.1333 
(-0.91) 
 -0.1405 
(-0.71) 
HI    0.3503 
(0.78) 
0.9510 
(1.60) 
  0.3471 
(0.67) 
0.7405 
(1.07) 
argL est    0.0926 
(7.18) 
0.8957 
(6.88) 
  0.7465 
(4.85) 
0.7083 
(4.50) 
Industry  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
2Pseudo R   0.0428 0.0470 0.1210 0.1250 0.0686 0.0728 0.1161 0.1201 
_ ( )F test p value   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 
Obs   513 513 513 513 365 365 364 364 
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Panel 2 Logit results 
var iables   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lnsize  
 
0.1703 
(2.17) 
0.1537 
(1.87) 
0.0521 
(0.61) 
0.0312 
(0.34) 
0.1679 
(1.78) 
0.1354 
(1.36) 
0.0605 
(0.60) 
0.0088 
(0.08) 
Leverage  
 
0.0804 
(0.54) 
0.0860 
(0.58) 
0.1466 
(0.94) 
0.1604 
(1.02) 
0.0663 
(0.43) 
0.0703 
(0.45) 
0.1318 
(0.80) 
0.1307 
(0.79) 
Age  
 
-0.0533 
(-2.73) 
-0.0537 
(-2.73) 
-0.0539 
(-2.63) 
-0.0539 
(-2.61) 
-0.1229 
(-4.46) 
-0.1260 
(-4.54) 
-0.1260 
(-4.47) 
-0.1273 
(-4.48) 
Sales  
 
0.0234 
(0.11) 
  0.0851 
(0.37) 
0.1109 
(0.45) 
  0.2169 
(0.80) 
_Ave ROA  
 
 -0.6930 
(-0.90) 
 -0.7091 
(-0.84) 
 -0.9926 
(-1.12) 
 -1.2062 
(-1.22) 
_State dum   -0.2610 
(-1.32) 
 -0.3965 
(-1.42) 
 -0.2147 
(-0.90) 
 -0.2471 
(-0.75) 
HI    0.6007 
(0.81) 
1.5849 
(1.61) 
  0.5610 
(0.65) 
1.2411 
(1.09) 
argL est    1.5065 
(7.01) 
1.4586 
(6.74) 
  1.2252 
(4.80) 
1.1646 
(4.47) 
Industry  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
2Pseudo R   0.0431 0.0470 0.1202 0.1241 0.0681 0.0721 0.1158 0.1202 
_ ( )F test p value   0.0036 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 
Obs   513 513 512 512 365 365 364 364 
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4.2.5 Robustness check using an event study 
Apart from using Probit and Logit regression as empirical models, another commonly 
used empirical method is event study. Event study, outlined by Campbell et al (1997) and 
developed by Fama et al (1969), is used to measure the signaling effect of market 
reactions to a certain announcement.  
 
Because the majority of our samples are pre-IPO firms, our previous hypothesis is mainly 
based on the motivation for receiving PE investment before IPO. However, this 
hypothesis may not be useful for explaining why listed firms require PE investment. For 
example, because the firm is already listed, financing for investment and growth theory 
may not be a motivation for seeking PE investment. As a result, we adopt the event study 
as a robustness check to see whether receiving PE investment plays a positive role in 
stock market pricing, which can help to explain the signaling effect.  
 
The event study is based on the assumption that, given the rationality in the marketplace, 
the effect of an event announcement will be reflected immediately in stock market prices. 
The use of this method includes the following steps: select the sample; determine the 
measurement of abnormal return; define the event; outline a procedure for estimating the 
abnormal return; outline a procedure for testing the hypotheses; present and interpret the 
empirical results (Campbell et al., 1997).  A number of studies have adopted the event 
study method to test the signaling effect after PE announcement (Wruck, 1989; 
MacKinlay, 1997; Ma et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2005). In the event study, if the 
announcement of an investment increases the abnormal return, then the investment does 
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implement the signaling effect. In addition, if there is no post-announcement drift on stock 
prices, then the effect of such investment can be regarded as permanent.  
 
Our sample firms are defined as firms that received PE investment after IPO. After 
excluding pre-IPO-backed IPO firms, we are left with a sample of only 50 PE-backed 
listed firms from the period 2000-2011. Because of the small sample size, we do not 
differentiate firms by stock boards and we use the Shanghai Composite Index to measure 
market returns for all sample firms. Both security daily stock returns and market index 
information are collected from CSMAR dataset.  
 
The expected return is the return expected if the event did not occur and the abnormal 
return is the difference between the expected normal return and the actual return 
(MacKinlay, 1997). There are four models that are commonly used to estimate the 
expected returns, including 1) the constant-mean-return model; 2) the market model; 3) 
factor models; 4) the market-adjusted-return model. The constant-mean-return model 
assumes that the expected return is constant through a time period whereas the market 
model assumes that there is a linear relationship between market return and the return of 
a stock (MacKinlay, 1997). Compared to the constant-mean return model, the market 
model removes part of the return that is related to variation in the market returns, which 
can help to decrease the variance of the abnormal returns (Campbell et al., 1997). The 
factor models include other factors than the market return as explanatory variables to 
explain the abnormal returns32. The market-adjusted-return model is used when we do not 
                                                             
32 According to Campbell et al (1997), the benefits from employing multifactor models are limited, because the 
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need an estimation period for estimating the expected returns. Based on the different 
characteristics of the event study methods, we adopt the market model and define it as 
follows: 
it i i mt itR R     , where 
1
( ) 1itit
it
P
R
P 
             (4.2) 
Where itR   and mtR   are the returns for period t for security i   and the market index 
respectively t  is the time index and i  stands for different firms. it  is the error term for 
security i  for period t  and is expected to be mean zero and the variance equals to 2
i
 . 
itP  and 1itP   are the closing prices for security i  at time t  and time -1t  respectively. 
 
The expected return is defined as: 
( )it i i i mt itE R X R                                           (4.3) 
The abnormal return can therefore be defined as: 
( )it it it iAR R E R X                                               (4.4) 
The abnormal return is measured over an event window, which comprises the number of 
event days we want to examine. The daily abnormal returns are summarized over the 
event window to derive the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs): 
2
1 2 1
i(T )
T
T itT
CAR AR                                                 (4.5) 
Where  iCAR   is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i  over the event window (T2, 
T1). When we investigate the effect on the announcement of a PE investment, not only 
does the effect across days but also across different securities are to be measured. 
Therefore, we propose to calculate the average CAR  for each individual securities. The 
                                                             
marginal explanatory power from each variable is limited.  
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measurement is called the cumulative average abnormal return ( )CAAR   and can be 
calculated using the formula as follows: 
1
1 N
ii
CAAR CAR
N 
                                              (4.6) 
Another important issue on using the event study method is to define the measure of Rmt , 
which is normally measured by using the return of a market index.  
 
Our Event study is constructed following Wruck (1989), MacKinlay (1997), Ma et al. 
(2009) and Wu et al. (2005). We collect the information of PE investment announcement 
day from AVCJ database and define it as day 0. The event window (or the estimation 
period) runs from day (-15) through day (+15). The abnormal returns are calculated for 
each security and then averaged across firms for the event days. A standardized test 
statistic is constructed to determine whether the mean abnormal return is significantly 
different from zero. The cumulative average abnormal return is also reported for each 
event window. Multiple event windows have also been added. One day after the 
announcement day can capture the market reaction if the announcement occurs after 
trading hours. One day prior to the announcement day can capture the market reaction to 
possible information leakages before the official announcement (Ma et al., 2009). 
However, accuracy will decrease when more days are included in the event window due 
to the possibility of confounding effects from other market events (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Therefore, to examine the sensitivity of the empirical results to different event window, 
we also highlight the CARs of two-day [-1, 0], [0, +1], three-day [-1, +1] and multiple-
day [1, 20].  
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Figure 4.1 shows the CAR of our PE portfolio firms from day (-15) to day (+15) and we 
can see a graduate increasing trend before PE announce. There is a price drop on the 
announcement day but the returns increased in the following days after the announcement 
then dropped in the longer period. There is no significant PE announcement effect on 
stock returns.  
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Figure 4.1 Cumulative abnormal return to PE announcement (day -20 to day 20) 
 
Data source: PE-backed firm’s daily share return data is collected from China Securities Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database; PE announcement information is from Asian Venture 
Capital Journal (AVCJ) database. 
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Table 4.4 presents daily average abnormal returns, cumulative average abnormal returns, 
cumulative average abnormal returns from day (-15) up to day (+15) on the announcement 
of a PE investment. Significant positive average abnormal returns are found before the 
announcement day. The average abnormal return is 0.46% in day (-1), which is higher 
than the 0.27% average abnormal returns in day (-2). Moreover, the average abnormal 
return falls slightly on the event day, which equals to -1.7%. After the event day, abnormal 
returns keep a general positive trend in the following days but decrease afterwards. We 
highlight the CARs of two-day [-1, 0], [0, +1], three-day [-1,+1], and multiple-day [-3,0] 
and [1,20] event windows at the bottom of Table 4.4. The selection of event windows is 
similar to Wruck (1989) and Ma et al (2009). In the first event window, a negative but 
significant CARs is observed between day (-1) and day (0) (z=-1.9446). In the event 
window day (0) to day (+1), the CAR is statistically insignificant (z=-0.1668). Combining 
the returns from day (-1) to day (+1), the CARs turn out to be positive but insignificant 
(z=0.7191). If we take a look at the multiple-day event windows, the CARs from day (-
3) to the event day is negatively significant (z=-1.4164). However, after the event day, the 
CARs from day (+1) to day (+20) is positively insignificant (z=0.8669). The event study 
results show the market reaction is not very positive to the announcement of PE 
investment. We also notice that there is a post-announcement drift in stock prices, which 
is in contrast to the findings of Wruck (1989). The results indicate PE investment does 
not play a significant signaling role in the listed portfolio firms.   
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Table 4.4 Market reaction to the private equity announcement 
This table presents daily average abnormal stock returns (AAR), cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAR) and t-values for a sample of 50 PE-backed listed firms from 2000-2011 period. 
The event days are calculated from -15 up to 15, where the PE announcement day is defined as 
event day 0. We also highlight CARs for the two-day and three-day announcement windows, and 
their z-values at the bottom of the table.  
Event days Average abnormal 
return 
Cumulative average abnormal 
returns 
Test statistics 
-15 0.0023  0.0980  1.9107  
-14 0.0044  0.0067  1.9970  
-13 0.0033  0.0100  2.0616  
-12 -0.0013  0.0087  2.0357  
-11 -0.0020  0.0068  1.9977  
-10 -0.0195  -0.0127  1.6183  
-9 0.0004  -0.0124  1.6252  
-8 0.0031  -0.0092  1.6864  
-7 0.0066  -0.0026  1.8146  
-6 0.0015  -0.0011  1.8445  
-5 -0.0008  -0.0019  1.8292  
-4 0.0042  0.0023  1.9103  
-3 0.0006  0.0029  1.9228  
-2 0.0027  0.0057  1.9762  
-1 0.0046  0.0102  2.0657  
0 -0.0170  -0.0068  1.7339  
1 0.0170  0.0102  2.0645  
2 -0.0019  0.0083  2.0272  
3 0.0021  0.0104  2.0682  
4 0.0037  0.0140  2.1394  
5 -0.0044  0.0096  2.0534  
6 0.0013  0.0110  2.0795  
7 -0.0033  0.0076  2.0144  
8 -0.0032  0.0045  1.9527  
9 -0.0021  0.0023  1.9116  
10 -0.0019  0.0004  1.8739  
11 0.0000  0.0004  1.8736  
12 0.0000  0.0004  1.8728  
13 0.0033  0.0037  1.9375  
14 -0.0054  -0.0017  1.8325  
15 0.0004  -0.0013  1.8407  
    CAR z-statistics 
2-day [-1,0] -0.0124 -1.9446 
  [0,1] -0.0013 -0.1968 
3-day [-1,1] 0.0045 0.7191 
multiple-
day 
[-3,0] -0.0090 -1.4164 
 [1,20] 0.0055 0.8669 
Data source: CSMAR China Stock Market Trading Database 
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4.3 Conclusion 
General knowledge of private equity investment usually focuses on fund performance and 
portfolio firm performance but little is known about the motivation for seeking PE 
investment (Cao et al., 2014). In this chapter, we study the motivation explanations from 
mature market evidence using Chinese data and help to provide new insights to the 
existing western literature and adding Chinese evidence. The key findings are as follows: 
first of all, although lack of financing is common in Chinse SMEs, the purpose of PE 
investment is not to get external funding which is shown by the insignificant results from 
financing for investment and growth theory. This finding supports the fact that our 
samples are listed of ready-listed firms, indicating that they are less likely to be 
problematic in their financial statement to meet the listing requirements. This finding also 
suggests the potential data bias problem for our data selection.  Secondly, firms with better 
profitability track records and state-ownership are not motivated in signaling themselves 
for PE investment. The stock event study further confirms insignificant signaling effect 
by showing that the announcement does not have a lasting positive effect on share values. 
Thirdly, from agency theory perspective, we find that concentrated ownership helps to 
increase the likelihood of receiving PE investment, especially when there exist a largest 
shareholder the relationship, the indicator becomes significant. This finding subsidizes 
the minority shareholder role of PE investors. These motivation examination results do 
not differentiate between new board listed firms and the whole sample. Because the 
existing theories cannot fully explain why firms receive PE investment in China, we 
wonder PE investment in China may fulfill another role in their portfolio firms which will 
be further discussed in the following Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5 The impact of PE investment on portfolio firm performance  
5.1 Introduction  
Following the central hypothesis from Jensen (1989), Private equity investment is 
regarded as an efficient tool for a PE portfolio firm to experience higher growth in several 
ways: in providing financing for the firm’s further development, in signaling the 
capability and growth opportunity of the firm to outside investors and in solving the 
principal-agent conflict. The existing literature shows that PE investors who have 
accumulated superior past industry experience can pick up high potential growth firms 
more easily (Gilligan and Wright, 2010; Povaly, 2007). On one hand, the enrollment of 
PE investors can improve the corporate governance operation in the portfolio firms, 
helping to improve firm performance and mitigate agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders (Wright et al., 2009). On the other hand, the entry of a PE investor can also 
send out positive signals regarding the intrinsic value of the firm and therefore attract the 
interest of future investors (Lerner, 1998; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Janney and Folta, 
2005).  
However, most of the existing research on PE-backed portfolio firm performance have 
concentrated on PE-backed buyout firms and the majority of these firms come from 
mature market economies, especially the US and Western European countries (Kaplan, 
1989; Guo et al., 2011; Bernstein et al., 2010; Bruton et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2012). It 
is questionable, whether theories and empirical evidence developed and gathered in major 
developed countries can be applied universally to other institutional settings, especially 
in fast growing economies like China. Chinese firms are operating in a transitional 
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environment in which both capital market and corporate governance perform differently 
from those of mature markets (Bai et al., 2004). These differences are due to several 
distinct features in China such as PE types and the role of PE investors. For example, 
buyout investment can hardly be found in the Chinese market. Instead, growth capital and 
Pre-IPO play a dominant role in the Chinese market and these PE investors normally 
become minority shareholder in their portfolio firms (a comparison of the differences 
between the Chinese PE market and other mature PE markets has been provided in 
chapter 2). The Chinese PE market has experienced tremendous growth in the past 10 
years and the existing literature may not be able to provide sufficient explanations for the 
current development. As a result, there is an ongoing need to examine the operation of PE 
investment in China and to update the general literature by adding Chinese evidence. As 
Wood and Wright (2009) have indicated: there is an important need for systematic 
research to explore the rationale for such differences. 
 
In this chapter, we examine how firms perform after receiving PE investment. We study 
a sample of 306 PE portfolio firms during the period 2000-2011, which includes 364 PE 
transaction deals. Four classic theories, including financing for growth and development 
theory, signaling theory, agency theory and institutional theory, have been adapted to 
explain the impact of PE investment on portfolio firms. In this chapter, we test the 
hypotheses developed in chapter 3 and provide evidence on how portfolio firms 
experience immediate profitability increase after PE investment, which seems to be 
consistent with the financing role of PE investment. However, we find the shareholding 
taken by PE investors is not always helpful for firm performance: occasionally it is 
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negatively related to firm performance. To capture more characteristics of the Chinese PE 
market, we carry out tests on four sub-groups, including sub-groups by PE type, by PE 
investors’ countries of origin, by listing stock boards and by whether the PE investment 
is undertaken by joint-investors. We find some results that are further in line with the 
financing and signaling effect from PE investors. Nevertheless, we did not obtain any 
evidence supporting the governance role of PE investment in China. Taken together, we 
argue PE investment in China is aimed at short-term exit purpose and has no real effect 
on the portfolio firms. This is because (1) PE investors normally become minority 
shareholders and they play limited roles in corporate governance management in their 
portfolio firms. (2) The current booming PE market is resulted from a hot IPO market, 
which provides a quick and secure exit channel for PE investment. (3) The majority of 
the PE investment happened shortly before IPO to ensure PE investors can exit with high 
stock market returns. We further find PE investment does not lead to performance change 
in the long-term. As a result, PE investment in China is with short-term profit orientation 
and does not aim to improve firm performance in the long-term.  
 
This research is a response to the increasing importance of the Chinese PE market in the 
global market and has made the following contributions to the general PE literature. (1) 
We update the existing PE literature by analyzing the characteristics of the Chinese PE 
market, addressing different PE types that are operating in China, introducing the latest 
booming Chinese market and evaluating firms’ reactions to these PE investments. We 
have noticed that these questions are not answered clearly in the current PE literature. As 
a result, a good understanding of the operating environment of the Chinese PE market is 
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crucial in academic studies. (2) This study also contributes to the existing Chinese PE 
literature in several ways. Firstly, unlike the majority of the existing studies (Batjargal 
and Liu, 2004; Tan et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2014) that focus on Chinese VC investment, 
this study contains all PE types that are available in the Chinese market, which enables a 
more detailed analysis of PE industry expansion in China and can therefore capture 
different characteristics among different PE types. Secondly, this study covers a more 
extended period of time. Instead of focusing on the PE expansion period after 2005, we 
include a long period (2000-2011) for our sample firms which can provide better 
understanding of the development of PE industry in China. Thirdly, this study contains 
by far the largest sample of PE portfolio firms. In order to increase our sample size, we 
include all the portfolio firms that undertake PE investment either before or after IPO. 
Based on the fact that most PE transactions happened not long before IPO, we are able to 
collect both accounting and stock market information for these portfolio firms. (3) 
Compared to the existed non-academic PE studies, which mainly focus on the technical 
operation of PE investment in China, this study fills the Chinese PE literature gap from 
the academic perspective. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as the follows. In section 2, data and methodology is 
provided. In Section 3 we discuss how PE investment affects their portfolio firms in both 
short-term and long-term as well as the sub-sample testing. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
 
129 
 
5.2 Empirical design 
5.2.1 Data selection 
Our data come from two sources. The first dataset contains PE investment information 
compiled by Asian Venture Capital Journal dataset (AVCJ). The listed firms’ accounting 
information, including balance sheet, statement of cash flow and income statement, is 
collected from China Securities Market and Accounting Research dataset (CSMAR). Our 
data selection process is summarized as follows: firstly, PE deals are collected from 2000 
to 2011.  The majority of our sample PE deals happened after 2000 and PE investment 
happened before 2000 can cause heteroscedasticity due to the different economic 
environment and conditions in different time period. As a result, two PE-backed firms 
that received investment in the mid-90s are excluded from our sample. Secondly, we 
exclude financial firms from our sample. A number of 476 PE-backed listed firms are 
collected from the AVCJ dataset by the end of 2011 and a group of 25 PE-backed listed 
financial firms are eliminated from our dataset. Further, we map the necessary financial 
information for these sample firms from the CSMAR dataset. For the mapping step, we 
set aside firms with no accounting information available at the time of PE investment33. 
After the above procedures, 364 PE investments from 307 PE-backed firms that are listed 
on the Chinese mainland stock markets by the end of 2011 are used in our data sample. 
This sample covers PE-backed portfolio firms from 2000-2011, which contains the main 
history of PE-backed Chinese stock market firms and enables us to test the effect from 
PE investment along the progress of China’s economic transition. 
                                                             
33  Firms that are willing to be listed on the Chinese stock markets are required to provide financial information in the 
past three years. Some of our sample portfolio firms received PE investments before IPO. If the PE investment was 
made up to three years before IPO, we can still find available accounting information from CSMAR dataset. Otherwise, 
we exclude this firm from our sample.  
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5.2.2 Empirical models and measurement of variables 
The aim of this study is to examine how PE investment affects their portfolio firms’ 
accounting performance. To do this, performance indicators from standard literature and 
add PE information into the empirical models. More specifically, the return on assets 
( ROA) is used as the dependent variable to measure profitability performance (Wilson et 
al., 2012). The following controlling variables are included: Firm size ( Size ) is measured 
by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets (Bruton et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2012). 
Firm size indicates the financial constraints faced by the firm, for example, large size 
firms may have more external financing sources than smaller ones. Mixed results are 
found with regard to the relationship between firm size and profitability. Hall and Weiss 
(1967), Fiegenbaum and Karnani (1991) find a positive relationship while Shepherd 
(1972) and Beck et al., (2010) find a negative one. Other than these contradictory findings, 
Simon (1962) and Whittington (1980) indicate that firm size does not have an impact on 
profitability.  Leverage ratio ( Leverage  ), is measured by total debt over total assets. 
Leverage ratio is an important source of external financing and is complemented by equity 
financing (Wilson et al., 2012). A higher leverage ratio is likely to decrease the ROA 
because the high profitability firms are supposed to accompany with lower leverage ratio 
(Titman and Wessisl, 1988). Sales growth rate ( Sales ), is calculated by (S ( 1) ( ))ales t Sales t   
divided by Sa ( )les t  where t is the year PE investment took place. Sales growth is an 
indicator of firm’s growth potential (Huang and Song, 2002) and high growth rate leads 
to greater demand for borrowing. Year dummy and industry dummy are used as control 
variables in all estimations for time- effects and industry effects respectively. The industry 
dummy is defined following the CSRC two-digit industry classification guidance. 
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After controlling for profitability factors, we add in the following PE information 
variables as our testing proxies. (1) PE amount ( amountPE  ) represents the size of PE 
investment and is calculated by total amount of PE investment scaled by total assets. It 
captures the most direct effect from PE investment and implies the effect of PE financing 
impact. This variable is for testing hypothesis 2a.  (2) PE deal stake ( dealPE ) measures the 
percentage of total shares held by PE investor for each transaction. This variable contains 
the ownership that has been transformed to outside PE investors and can help to represent 
the governance role of PE investors. This variable is for testing hypothesis 4d.  (3) PE 
round ( Round _ dum ) indicates the frequency of PE investment, it takes 1 if this is the first 
PE investment to the portfolio firms and 0 otherwise. This variable also captures the 
preference of PE investors. If the portfolio firm has received more than one PE investment 
then we can say this firm is more attractive to PE investors because of their higher 
profitability and/or high growth rate. (4) We also differentiate our sample firms according 
to the timing of PE investment by using an IPO dummy variable ( _IPO dum ). This dummy 
variable equals 1 if PE investment happened before IPO and 0 if PE investment happened 
after IPO. IPO information dummy variable helps to control for market entry timing. 
 
Our benchmark empirical model is specified as follows: 
ln
1 0 1 2 3 4 5
_ _
6 7 8 9
ROA size leverage sales PEamount PEdeal
it it it it it it
round dum IPO dum Industry Year
it it i
     
    
     

    
         (5.1)  
In the cross-section regression models, the year of PE investment is defined as t. All the 
dependent variable information is collected from year t. The information from t+1 period 
is used for the independent variables because the impact of PE investment on financial 
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information will be observed in the following year. The definitions of the variables and 
their measurements are summarized in Appendix 5.1. 
 
5.2.3 Sample distribution 
Table 5.1 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of our variables. A significant 
relationship between ROA and PE investment ( PEamount ) is observed, suggesting that the 
larger the PE investment, the greater the ROA. ROA also has a strong relationship with 
PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum  ) and PE round dummy variable ( _Round dum  ). 
Regarding control variables, all three variables, namely firm size ( Size  ), leverage ratio 
( Leverage ) and sales growth rate ( Sales ), have a strong relationship with ROA .We do not 
find a strong relationship between ROA and the ownership controlled by PE investors 
( dealPE ).  
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Table 5.1 Pearson Correlation coefficients 
This table presents the correlation coefficients of 364 PE deals from 307 PE-backed listed firms 
on mainland stock markets from 2000 to 2011. ROA is measured by net income over total assets. 
Firm size ( Size  ), is measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Leverage ratio 
( Leverage ), is measured by total debt over total assets. Sales ( Sales ) is defined as sales growth rate, 
calculated by sales rate in year t+1 minus sales rate in year t divided by sales rate in year t. PE 
amount ( amountPE ), is the size of PE investment over firm’s total assets. The deal stake of PE 
investment ( dealPE ), measures the percentage of total amount of shares held by PE investor for 
each transaction. PE round dummy variable ( Round _ dum ) equals 1 if this is the first time for PE 
investment and 0 otherwise; PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum ) equals 1 if PE investment is made 
before listing and 0 if the investment is made after listing.* Indicates statistically significant at 5% 
level.  
No Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 ROA  1        
2 Size  -0.4597* 1       
3 Leverage  -0.3761* 0.3325* 1      
4 Sales  0.1200* -0.0874 0.0929 1     
5 amountPE  0.2485* -0.2682* -0.1938* 0.0831 1    
6 dealPE  -0.0181 -0.0898 0.0870 0.0550 0.3862* 1   
7 Round _ dum  -0.1038* 0.0664 0.2019* -0.0281 0.0846 0.1730* 1  
8 _IPO dum  0.4199* -0.5131* -0.0701 0.1876* 0.0071 -0.0834 -0.1567* 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for 364 deals from 307 PE-backed listed firms 
between 2000 and 2011. The mean ROA is 12.17%. The average leverage ratio is 47.23% 
and ranges from the lowest 3% to the highest 108%, showing a high debt ratio exists in 
PE portfolio firms. The sales growth ratio is 32.13% on average, while the higher growth 
rate is 532% and the lowest rate is -0.41%. For PE measurements, the size of PE 
investment ( amountPE ) accounts for 9% of firm size on average, indicating the inflow of 
PE fund is very small compared to the actual firm size, suggesting the financing role of 
PE investment is not significant. In exchange for the PE funds, PE investors take an 
average of 10.94% firm ownership and PE deal stake ( dealPE ) ranges from 0.12% to 100%. 
PE round dummy variable ( Round _ dum ) shows 79.28% of the sample firms received their 
PE investment for the first time and the rest of the sample firms received repeated PE 
investment. PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum ) indicates that 85.16% of the portfolio 
firms received PE investment before IPO, which is consistent with our observation that 
Chinese PE market is IPO-driven. Information is missing for PE investment ( amountPE ) 
and PE deal stake ( dealPE ) variables because of undisclosed PE deal information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of 364 PE deals from 307 PE-backed listed firms on 
mainland stock markets from 2000 to 2011. Independent variable ROA is measured by net income 
over total assets. Firm size ( Size ), is measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. 
Leverage ratio ( Leverage ), is measured by total debt over total assets. Sales ( Sales ) is defined as sales 
growth rate, calculated by sales rate in year t+1 minus sales rate in year t divided by sales rate in 
year t. PE amount ( amountPE ), is the size of PE investment over firm’s total assets. The deal stake 
of PE investment ( dealPE ), measures the percentage of total shares held by PE investor for each 
transaction. PE round dummy variable ( Round _ dum  ) equals 1 if this is the first time for PE 
investment and 0 otherwise; PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum ) equals 1 if PE investment is made 
before listing and 0 if the investment is made after listing. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA  364 0.1217 0.0782 -0.14 0.47 
Size  364 20.3693 1.4714 17.94 26.61 
Leverage  364 0.4723 0.1787 0.03 1.08 
Sales  364 0.3213 0.4216 -0.41 5.32 
amountPE  348 0.0931 0.0991 0.0003 0.8342 
dealPE  331 0.1094 0.1225 0.0012 1 
Round _ dum  362 0.7928 0.4058 0 1 
_IPO dum  364 0.8516 0.3559 0 1 
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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5.3 Empirical results 
5.3.1 The impact of PE investment  
Table 5.3 reports the impact of PE investment on firm’s accounting performance for the 
whole sample resutls. As far as control variables are concerned, the size of PE investment 
( PEamount  ) is positively significant with ROA, suggesting that larger size of PE 
investment helps to improve firm profitability in year t+1. This result confirms hypothesis 
2a. Similarly, the PE deal stake ( dealPE  ) variable shows a negatively significant 
relationship with ROA, which confirms our hypothesis 4d. PE deal stake is an indicator 
representing the percentage of shares that have passed to outside PE investors. The 
negative relationship shows that PE investors are not engaged into any corporate 
governance improvement activities which is consistent with the minority shareholder role 
of these investors.  The PE round dummy ( Round _ dum ) is insignificant, suggesting that 
whether a previous PE investment is available does not affect the current PE investment. 
The PE investment before IPO dummy variable ( _IPO dum  ) is positively significant, 
showing that PE investment before IPO tends to bring in higher profitability. This finding 
is consistent with the fact that most of our sample firms receive PE investment shortly 
before going for IPO and they need to have strong operating performance, balance sheet 
and positive cash flow. For the controlling variables, firm size variable is negatively 
significant with profitability, which is consistent with findings from Haines (1970) and 
Shepherd (1972). According to Haines (1970), large firms might have grown beyond the 
optimum, so large firms would be growing more slowly than smaller firms. This 
explanation is supported by our sample firms because most of them are listed on new 
stock boards and are relatively small in firm size. The leverage ratio is also negatively 
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significant with profitability and confirms our predictions. 
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Table 5.3 Cross-section OLS on whole sample 
This table reports the results of our cross-sectional regressions. Independent variable ROA is 
measured by net income over total assets. Firm size ( Size ), is measured by the natural logarithm of 
a firm’s total assets. Leverage ratio ( Leverage ), is measured by total debt over total assets. Sales 
( Sales ) is defined as sales growth rate, calculated by sales rate in year t+1 minus sales rate in year 
t divided by sales rate in year t. PE amount ( amountPE ), is the size of PE investment over firm’s 
total assets. The deal stake of PE investment ( dealPE ), measures the percentage of total shares held 
by PE investor for each transaction. PE round dummy variable ( Round _ dum ) equals 1 if this is the 
first time for PE investment and 0 otherwise; PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum ) equals 1 if PE 
investment is made before listing and 0 if the investment is made after listing. Industry and year 
factors are included into modeling. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics, computed using 
the robust heteroskedasticity standard error.  
 ROA     
 (1) (2) (3) 
Size  -0.0121 
(-3.21) 
-0.0096 
(-3.35) 
-0.0151 
(-3.56) 
Leverage  -0.1278 
(-5.22) 
-0.1193 
(-5.03) 
-0.1235 
(-4.98) 
Sales  0.0090 
(0.78) 
0.0116 
(1.00) 
0.0102 
(0.88) 
PEamount
 
0.0062 
(1.76) 
 0.0101 
(2.58) 
PEdeal   -0.0142 
(-0.64) 
-0.0505 
(-1.86) 
Round _ dum  0.0012 
(0.13) 
0.0044 
(0.48) 
-0.0505 
(-1.86) 
_IPO dum  0.0663 
(5.75) 
0.0593 
(5.41) 
0.0678 
(5.48) 
Cons   0.2244 
(3.19) 
0.2815 
(4.15) 
0.2249 
(3.06) 
Industry   Included   Included  Included  
Year   Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.3546 0.3526 0.3556 
Obs  347 343 329 
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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5.3.2 Robustness check 
Previously we have discovered the effect of PE investors on their Chinese portfolio firms 
and we have proposed some consistent results between the Chinese PE market and the 
existing literature. In this section, we want to provide further details regarding the effect 
of PE investment in China. To do this, we carry out four sub-groups of robustness check. 
 
The first sub-group is based on PE-backed firms’ listing board. Since the growing PE-
backed IPO market was aligned with the setting up of the two new stock boards. We 
expect PE investments to have different impact on firms from different stock boards. 
Because most of the new board listed firms receive PE investment before IPO, these firms 
make use of PE investment to ensure their successful listing process. Consequently, PE 
investment may play a significant role in new boards’ listed firms than main boards’ listed 
firms, as proposed in the hypothesis 5a.  
The second group is based on PE investor’s different country of origin, that is, whether 
PE investors are domestic or non-domestic. As shown in Chapter 2, the majority of the 
PE investors in China are domestic investors, including the government-affiliated PE 
investors, financial institution-affiliated PE investors, university-affiliated PE investor 
and corporate PE investors etc. Given that PE investors used to be the experts in a specific 
industry, we expect that domestic investors have a better understanding of the Chinese 
market and of the demands of portfolio firms and so can play a more active role than their 
non-domestic counterparts, as proposed in the hypothesis 5b.  
One feature of Chinese listed firms is the state background, namely either the firm is with 
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a state-related legal person or is affiliated to a SOE (state-owned enterprises). Such firms 
are commonly found in Shanghai and Shenzhen main stock boards. Although the majority 
of our sample firms are SMEs and not SOEs, there is still a certain number of firms with 
state shares in the ownership structure. We want to differentiate these two types of firms 
in our third sub-group test. We expect PE investment has less impact on firms with state 
shares, as proposed in the hypothesis 5c.  
 
We also take into account the joint-effect of PE investors, namely the syndicate PE 
investors, as our last sub-group testing. Chinese PE investors, regardless of whether they 
are syndicated or not, normally become minority shareholders in their portfolio firms. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether the syndicated PE investors or a single PE investor 
has higher impact on portfolio firms. Based on the discussions from chapter 3, we expect  
syndicated PE investors have significant impact portfolio firms than single PE investors, 
as proposed in the hypothesis 4a.  
 
For the first subgroup testing, the sample firms are divided according to different board 
of listing: it equals one if the PE-backed firm is listed on main boards and otherwise if 
the firm is listed on new boards. The model is the same as in equation 5.1 and results are 
reported in Table 5.4. With relaxing listing requirements in the newly set up stock boards, 
the number of firms from new boards is almost three times the number of main boards 
listed firms, with 256 firms and 76 firms respectively. We find PE amount variable is 
positively significant for new boards’ listed firms but has no significant impact for main 
boards listed firms. Due to the fact that firms listed on new boards are smaller, the ratio 
141 
 
of PE investment capital inflow can be relatively large. Therefore, the size of PE 
investment has a positively significant impact for new board listed firms but not for main 
board listed firms. Smaller firm size also means the entry of external investors can affect 
the role of dominant shareholders and thus accelerate agency conflict. Accordingly, it is 
observed that PE deal stake is negatively significant in firm performance for new boards 
listed firms but insignificant for main boards’ listed firms. In sum, we accept hypothesis 
5a by concluding that PE investors have significant impact on new board listed firms due 
to the better understanding of the Chinese market. However, due to the short-term profit 
intention from new-board listed firms, PE investors have no or less interests in involving 
into portfolio firm’s corporate governance issue. Also the short-term profit incentive may 
create some conflicts of interest between PE investors and portfolio firms, shown as the 
negative relationship between PE deal stake and performance measurement.  
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Table 5.4 Cross-section OLS by listed stock board sub-groups  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 if the PE-backed firm is listed on Shanghai stock main board and Shenzhen stock main 
board, and 0 if the PE-backed firm is listed on SME and ChiNext new boards. This table reports 
the results of our cross-sectional regressions. Independent variable ROA is measured by net 
income over total assets. Firm size ( Size ), is measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total 
assets. Leverage ratio ( Leverage ), is measured by total debt over total assets. Sales ( Sales ) is defined 
as sales growth rate, calculated by sales rate in year t+1 minus sales rate in year t divided by sales 
rate in year t. PE amount ( amountPE ), is the size of PE investment over firm’s total assets. The deal 
stake of PE investment ( dealPE ), measures the percentage of total shares held by PE investor for 
each transaction. PE round dummy variable ( Round _ dum ) equals 1 if this is the first time for PE 
investment and 0 otherwise; PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum ) equals 1 if PE investment is made 
before listing and 0 if the investment is made after listing. Industry and year factors are included 
into modeling. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics, computed using the robust 
heteroskedasticity standard error.  
 ROA 
Main boards 
    ROA 
New boards 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size  -0.0033 
(-0.76) 
-0.0037 
(-0.92) 
-0.0020 
(-0.46) 
-0.0107 
(-1.62) 
-0.0162 
(-2.41) 
-0.0094 
(-1.39) 
Leverage  -0.1225 
(-3.03) 
-0.1083 
(-3.20) 
-0.1387 
(-3.40) 
-0.1138 
(-3.87) 
-0.1214 
(-3.78) 
-0.0989 
(-3.31) 
Sales  0.0236 
(1.35) 
0.0256 
(1.53) 
0.0250 
(1.37) 
0.0063 
(0.55) 
0.0130 
(1.03) 
0.0106 
(0.93) 
PEamount
 
0.0030 
(0.09) 
 -0.0091 
(-0.23) 
0.1392 
(2.03) 
 0.2548 
(3.46) 
PEdeal   0.0209 
(0.91) 
0.0273 
(1.01) 
 -0.0950 
(-1.68) 
-0.2036 
(-3.27) 
Round _ dum  -0.0158 
(-1.14) 
-0.0163 
(-0.92) 
-0.0146 
(-0.77) 
-0.0019 
(-0.19) 
0.0068 
(0.65) 
0.0039 
(0.37) 
_IPO dum  0.0634 
(5.55) 
0.0606 
(5.76) 
0.0668 
(5.84) 
0.0147 
(0.38) 
0.0141 
(0.34) 
0.0322 
(0.82) 
Cons   0.1868 
(1.87) 
0.1772 
(1.80) 
0.1596 
(1.55) 
0.3213 
(2.05) 
0.4424 
(2.80) 
0.2793 
(1.77) 
Industry   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.5159 0.5230 0.5478 0.2391 0.2090 0.2689 
Obs  76 83 73 271 260 256 
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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For the second subgroup testing, we separate our sample firms by whether the PE 
investment is made by domestic or non-domestic investors, reported in Table 5.5. As 
expected, we find PE amount is positively significant and PE deal stake is negatively 
significant for the domestic investor group but insignificant for the non-domestic group. 
This observation can be attributed to domestic investors’ better understanding of the 
Chinese market and the demand for PE portfolio firms. Even though domestic investors 
are younger on average than their non-domestic counterparts (as shown in Panel 5 Table 
2.4), they have developed a better network in China based on guanxi and past experience. 
For example, based on their reputation and connection with accounting and law firms, 
domestic investors can provide better paper work for IPO application and hence increase 
CSRC listing rate (Zhang and Li., 2012). Despite the fact that non-domestic investors 
have longer operation history and have raised larger funds, they need a better 
understanding of the Chinese portfolio firms before making an investment. Consequently, 
they have the strategy of concentrating their funds on a small number of PE investments 
which is consistent with our observation from Panel 4 Table 2.4. Taken together, we 
accept hypothesis 5b, stating that domestic PE investors have significant impact on 
portfolio firms than their non-domestic competitors.  
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Table 5.5 Cross-section OLS by PE investor sub-groups 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 if PE investor is from domestic, and 0 if the PE investor is non-domestic (including 
HongKong). This table reports the results of our cross-sectional regressions. Independent variable 
ROA is measured by net income over total assets. Firm size ( Size ), is measured by the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Leverage ratio ( Leverage ), is measured by total debt over total 
assets. Sales ( Sales ) is defined as sales growth rate, calculated by sales rate in year t+1 minus sales 
rate in year t divided by sales rate in year t. PE amount ( amountPE ), is the size of PE investment 
over firm’s total assets. The deal stake of PE investment ( dealPE ), measures the percentage of total 
shares held by PE investor for each transaction. PE round dummy variable ( Round _ dum ) equals 1 
if this is the first time for PE investment and 0 otherwise; PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum ) 
equals 1 if PE investment is made before listing and 0 if the investment is made after listing. 
Industry and year factors are included into modeling. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics, 
computed using the robust heteroskedasticity standard error.  
  ROA 
Domestic 
investors 
    ROA 
Non-domestic 
investors 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size  -0.0093 
(-2.15) 
-0.0134 
(-3.63) 
-0.0092 
(-2.08) 
-0.0098 
(-2.19) 
-0.0113 
(-2.88) 
-0.0105 
(-2.44) 
Leverage  -0.1117 
(-4.28) 
-0.1093 
(-4.51) 
-0.1000 
(-3.79) 
-0.1679 
(-3.47) 
-0.1604 
(-3.82) 
-0.1760 
(-3.68) 
Sales  0.0193 
(1.61) 
0.0235 
(2.02) 
0.0216 
(1.77) 
0.0071 
(1.04) 
0.0083 
(1.19) 
0.0081 
(1.19) 
PEamount
 
0.1077 
(1.77) 
 0.1871 
(2.81) 
0.0304 
(0.83) 
 0.0277 
(0.72) 
PEdeal   -0.0297 
(-0.85) 
-0.0978 
(-2.15) 
 -0.0139 
(-0.43) 
-0.0176 
(-0.47) 
Round _ dum  0.0031 
(0.33) 
0.0094 
(0.97) 
0.0054 
(0.55) 
-0.0489 
(-2.01) 
-0.0485 
(-2.04) 
-0.0483 
(-1.96) 
_IPO dum  0.0727 
(4.66) 
0.0686 
(4.68) 
0.0794 
(4.67) 
0.0746 
(5.08) 
0.0624 
(4.63) 
0.0663 
(4.14) 
Cons   0.2404 
(2.46) 
0.3356 
(3.97) 
0.2378 
(2.32) 
0.3889 
(3.89) 
0.4109 
(4.34) 
0.4147 
(4.30) 
Industry   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.3373 0.3310 0.3527 0.7029 0.6988 0.7120 
Obs  295 289 278 52 54 51 
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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In the third testing group, we separate firms by whether they have state background, 
indicated by where state ownership exists in the firm. The results are reported in Table 
5.6. From the table, we find PE amount is positively significant and PE deal stake is 
negatively significant in the non-state group. Similar results are not found for firms with 
state ownership. In addition, it is observed that there are four times as many non-state as 
state-backed firms. This finding is consistent with the nature of our sample firms, most of 
which are private, small and medium sized firms listed on two new stock boards. However, 
due to the size of SME firms and the lack of mechanism for monitoring between owners 
and managers, there could be some possible conflicts between PE investors and the 
insiders. The disagreement may hurt firm performance, leading to the negatively 
relationship between PE deal stake and firm operation. For state-backed firms, the 
motivation for receiving PE investment can be different from SME motivation. For 
example, some of the state enterprises regard domestic listing as the first step to multi-
listing on the international IPO market in the long-term (Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 
2013), which confirms the insignificant impact from two PE measurements. Taken 
together, we confirm hypothesis 5c by stating that PE investors have significant impact 
on non-state-backed portfolio firms than on firms with state ownership. 
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Table 5.6 Cross-section OLS by state-ownership sub-groups 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 if PE portfolio firm is with state-ownership, and 0 if PE portfolio firm is without state-
ownership. This table reports the results of our cross-sectional regressions. Independent variable 
ROA is measured by net income over total assets. Firm size ( Size ), is measured by the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Leverage ratio ( Leverage ), is measured by total debt over total 
assets. Sales ( Sales ) is defined as sales growth rate, calculated by sales rate in year t+1 minus sales 
rate in year t divided by sales rate in year t. PE amount ( amountPE ), is the size of PE investment 
over firm’s total assets. The deal stake of PE investment ( dealPE ), measures the percentage of total 
shares held by PE investor for each transaction. PE round dummy variable ( Round _ dum ) equals 1 
if this is the first time for PE investment and 0 otherwise; PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum ) 
equals 1 if PE investment is made before listing and 0 if the investment is made after listing. 
Industry and year factors are included into modeling. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics, 
computed using the robust heteroskedasticity standard error.  
  ROA 
State-ownership 
    ROA 
Non-state  
ownership 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size  -0.0134 
(-2.72) 
-0.0091 
(-1.95) 
-0.0119 
(-2.44) 
-0.0067 
(-1.68) 
-0.0106 
(-3.00) 
-0.0058 
(-1.45) 
Leverage  0.0494 
(1.17) 
0.0091 
(0.25) 
0.0434 
(1.00) 
-0.1459 
(-5.18) 
-0.1492 
(-5.33) 
-0.1344 
(-4.74) 
Sales  0.0618 
(1.91) 
0.0673 
(2.10) 
0.0610 
(1.79) 
-0.0034 
(-0.42) 
-0.0002 
(-0.03) 
-0.0020 
(-0.26) 
PEamount
 
-0.0557 
(-1.57) 
 -0.0575 
(-1.66) 
0.1252 
(2.11) 
 0.2191 
(3.39) 
PEdeal   0.0535 
(0.80) 
0.0629 
(0.76) 
 -0.0119 
(-0.49) 
-0.0868 
(-2.52) 
Round _ dum  0.0029 
(0.09) 
-0.0045 
(-0.14) 
0.0018 
(0.05) 
0.0067 
(0.72) 
0.0118 
(1.26) 
0.0077 
(0.81) 
_IPO dum  0.0773 
(2.45) 
0.0750 
(2.23) 
0.0866 
(2.10) 
0.0789 
(4.41) 
0.0731 
(4.21) 
0.0876 
(4.62) 
Cons   0.3030 
(2.75) 
0.2102 
(1.61) 
0.2569 
(2.00) 
0.1865 
(2.12) 
0.2768 
(3.46) 
0.1650 
(1.84) 
Industry   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.5036 0.4850 0.5051 0.3853 0.3671 0.4100 
Obs  55 60 54 292 283 275 
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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In the last sub-group, we differentiate firms by whether they have a single PE investor or 
syndicated PE investors, reported in Table 5.7. We observe similar results from previous 
models for portfolio firms with a single PE investor, in which PE amount is positively 
significant and PE deal stake is negatively significant. This is consistent with our 
expectation that a concentrated ownership has more direct effect on the target firm. The 
syndicated PE investor group does not show such results, which may be explained by the 
diluted number of shares obtained by each investor or the weak joint effect due to the co-
investment choice between different investors. These results are in contrast to both Guo 
and Jiang (2013) and Hua et al (2016) by showing syndicated investors do not have 
significant impact on portfolio firms. Our understanding of the inconsistent results can be 
explained by the different sample firms that have been used. In both studies, the authors 
mainly focus on VC investors while in our sample, both VC and non-VC investors are 
included. But in our sample we focus on PE rather than VC investors. As a result, we 
reject the hypothesis by revealing syndicated PE investors have insignificant impact on 
portfolio firms.  
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Table 5.7 Cross-section OLS by number of PE investors sub-groups 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 if PE portfolio firm is with single PE investors, and 0 if PE portfolio firm is without 
syndicated PE investors. This table reports the results of our cross-sectional regressions. 
Independent variable ROA is measured by net income over total assets. Firm size ( Size  ), is 
measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Leverage ratio ( Leverage ), is measured 
by total debt over total assets. Sales ( Sales ) is defined as sales growth rate, calculated by sales rate 
in year t+1 minus sales rate in year t divided by sales rate in year t. PE amount ( amountPE ), is the 
size of PE investment over firm’s total assets. The deal stake of PE investment ( dealPE ), measures 
the percentage of total shares held by PE investor for each transaction. PE round dummy variable 
( Round _ dum ) equals 1 if this is the first time for PE investment and 0 otherwise; PE type dummy 
variable ( _IPO dum ) equals 1 if PE investment is made before listing and 0 if the investment is made 
after listing. Industry and year factors are included into modeling. The figures in parentheses are 
the t-statistics, computed using the robust heteroskedasticity standard error.  
 ROA 
Single  
investor 
    ROA 
Multiple  
investors 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size  -0.0047 
(-1.23) 
-0.0067 
(-1.83) 
-0.0092 
(-2.08) 
-0.0138 
(-2.83) 
-0.0153 
(-3.34) 
-0.0105 
(-2.44) 
Leverage  -0.1137 
(-4.07) 
-0.1061 
(-4.02) 
-0.1000 
(-3.79) 
-0.1004 
(-2.34) 
-0.1652 
(-3.38) 
-0.1760 
(-3.68 
Sales  0.0371 
(2.85) 
0.0387 
(2.98) 
0.0216 
(1.77) 
-0.0103 
(-1.46) 
-0.0041 
(-0.56) 
0.0081 
(1.19) 
PEamount
 
0.0671 
(1.27) 
 0.1871 
(2.81) 
0.1720 
(1.86) 
 0.0277 
(0.72) 
PEdeal   -0.0048 
(-0.14) 
-0.0978 
(-2.15) 
 -0.0161 
(-0.35) 
-0.0176 
(-0.47) 
Round _ dum  -0.0061 
(-0.51) 
-0.0009 
(-0.07) 
0.0054 
(0.55) 
0.0111 
(0.82) 
0.0146 
(1.03) 
-0.0483 
(-1.96) 
_IPO dum  0.0713 
(5.33) 
0.0651 
(5.14) 
0.0794 
(4.67) 
0.0123 
(0.36) 
0.0191 
(0.53) 
0.0663 
(4.14) 
Cons   -0.1776 
(-0.23) 
0.2154 
(2.53) 
0.2378 
(2.32) 
0.3551 
(0.004) 
0.4120 
(3.24) 
0.4147 
(4.30) 
Industry   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.3675 0.3684 0.3527 0.4380 0.4013 0.7120 
Obs  233 237 278 113 105 51 
Data source:  (1) China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
(2) Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ) 
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5.3.3 The persistence of PE impact on portfolio firms 
In the previous sections, we focus on the impact of PE investment (in year t) on firm 
performance (in t+1) and find out significant impact on portfolio firms. In this section, 
we are curious to know about the persistence of PE impact, which is stated in hypothesis 
5d. To understand the evolution of portfolio firm performance, we collect post-PE firm 
performance information for variables in equation (5.1). For ROA, information is 
collected in year t+2 and t+3, while the information for firm size, leverage and sales 
growth are collected for year t+1 and t+2. The performance indication indices are 
compared between the initial year and the year after. Table 5.8 provides this preliminary 
analysis of the persistence of the PE portfolio firm performance. We find the entry of PE 
investment instantly increases ROA in the year after PE investment but the figures drop 
in subsequent years. The corresponding t test indicates that ROA experience a significant 
increase in year t+1, but then drop afterwards in year t+2 and year t+3. For firm 
performance controlling variables, firm size variable rises while both leverage and sales 
growth variable fall in the long run. Similar t test statistics provide significant results for 
each controlling variable. Considering that most of our sample firms become listed in t+2 
and t+3 period, the increased firm size is consistent with the gradual development of the 
firm after or getting closer to listing. In addition, the decreased leverage ratio can be 
explained by PE financing overtaking debt financing in these firms. We then repeat the 
above equation (5.1) to test PE impacts in the long run, reported in Table 5.9. It is observed 
that PE investment has no significant impact in t+2 and t+3 time period, suggesting a 
short-run orientation of Chinese PE investment. Further, to explain the insignificant long 
term performance, we cannot neglect the general economic environment in China. The 
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Chinese stock market has been in a downward spiral since 2009. At the same time, the 
global financial crisis has a great impact on export related industries in China, in fact on 
most manufacturing firms. This manufacturing industry provided most of our sample 
firms (shown in Table 2.4, Panel 6). Taken together, Table 5.9 suggests that PE investment 
does not change firm performance significantly in the long run. Combining the previous 
results, we conclude that PE investment in Chinese firms is mainly driven by short term 
profitability purpose and PE investors are speculative in the Chinese market. 
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Table 5.8 Time-series firm performance comparison of investee firms 
The numbers in the first row are mean values of ROA . Year t  is defined as the PE investment year. 
T test is applied to mean values respectively. ROA  is measured by net income over total assets. 
Firm size ( Size  ), is measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Leverage ratio 
( Leverage ), is measured by total debt over total assets. Sales ( Sales ) is defined as sales growth rate, 
calculated by sales rate in year t+1 minus sales rate in year t  divided by sales rate in year t .  
   Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 1VAR  2VAR  3VAR   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (4)-(3) 
ROA   0.0982 0.1217 0.0724 0.0596 0.0235 
(7.3903) 
-0.0493 
(-12.4731) 
-0.0129 
(-4.708) 
Size  20.3693 20.6242 21.2681 --- 0.2532 
(10.2787) 
0.6886 
(25.7109) 
--- 
Leverage  1.6898 1.072 0.6351 --- -0.6196 
(-0.3101) 
-0.4513 
(-13.1535) 
--- 
Sales  0.3213 0.2851 0.1713 --- -0.037 
(-1.2832) 
-0.1367 
(-3.8643)  
--- 
Obs  364 364 364 364    
Data source:  China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
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Table 5.9 The impact of PE investment in the long-run 
Independent variable ROA  is collected for T+3 and T+2 time period where t  is the year in which PE 
investment took place. Control variables include: firm size ( Size ), Leverage ratio ( Leverage ), and Sales 
( Sales ). These three variables are collected for T, T+1 and T+2 time period where T is the year of PE 
investment. Testing variables include PE amount ( amountPE ), PE deal stake ( dealPE ), PE round dummy 
variable ( Round _ dum ) and PE type dummy variable ( _IPO dum ). Industry and year factors are included 
in modeling. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
  ROA  
3T    
ROA   
2T    
  (1) (2) 
Size  2t   -0.0079 
(-1.28) 
 
 1t   0.0101 
(1.48) 
-0.0144 
(-2.36) 
 t   0.0019 
(0.34) 
0.0104 
(1.73) 
Leverage  2t   -0.0298 
(-1.58) 
 
 1t   -0.0115 
(-0.48) 
-0.0141 
(-0.56) 
 t   -0.0260 
(-1.16) 
-0.0462 
(-1.67) 
Sales  2t   0.0043 
(1.09) 
 
 1t   0.0151 
(2.49) 
0.0022 
(0.36) 
 t   0.0118 
(1.07) 
0.0107 
(0.83) 
PEamount
 
 -0.0036 
(-1.37) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
PEdeal   0.0383 
(1.68) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
_Round dum   0.0073 
(1.48) 
0.0132 
(1.87) 
_IPO dum   0.0185 
(1.75) 
0.0180 
(1.79) 
Cons    0.0182 
(0.27) 
0.1452 
(2.16) 
Industry    Included  Included  
Year    Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq   0.2129 0.1389 
Obs   320 328 
Data source: China Stock Market Financial Statements Databases 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides the impact of PE investment on its portfolio firms based on the 
existing literature and adds new evidence to Chinese PE literature. Using a sample of 364 
PE deals from 307 Chinese listed firms between 2000-2011, the following findings are 
reached. First of all, we confirm that the inflow of PE investment leads to better firm 
performance in the short run, which seems to be consistent with the financing role of PE 
investment. Although PE investors normally perform as the minority shareholder, the 
entry of PE investors leads to a negative relationship between PE deal stake and firm 
performance. Secondly, by expanding our sample period, we examine PE impact in the 
long-run and observe no evidence of PE investment’s impact in the long-run. Considering 
that most of the PE investment happened shortly before IPO, we speculate that such PE 
investment is with short-term profit orientation which aims to exit after IPO with 
excessive returns. These initial results suggest a speculation problem in Chinese PE 
market. We will carry on this discussion in chapter 6. Last but not least, we find some 
characteristics of different PE investors and PE portfolio firms: (1) PE-backed portfolio 
firms’ listing board provides information by revealing the trends and the orientation of 
the Chinese PE market. The setting up of new stock boards, SME and ChiNext, provides 
the chance for PE-backed firms to go listing. We conclude that the current booming PE 
market is largely IPO driven, which provides consistent evidence that PE investment has 
significant impact in new board listed firms. (2) Investors’ country of origin reveals the 
nature of PE investors. By examining different investment strategy and impact, we find 
that the majority of PE investment comes from domestic PE investors. Although the 
domestic investors are young and with limited past experience on average, they have a 
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better understanding of the Chinese market than the non-domestic competitors. (3) Since 
state-owned firms commonly exist in the Chinese market, the subgroup PE-backed firms 
with state-ownership can tell us the different role of PE investors in different firms, which 
is beneficial in understanding the advantage as well as the limitation of PE investments 
in their portfolio firms. We find firms with state-ownership are not affected by PE 
investment. This finding reveals the potential alternative purpose for firms with state-
ownership to receive PE investment. (4) We carry out the sub-group testing based on 
whether the PE investment is made by single investor or syndicated investors. Our 
empirical results support the assumption that a single PE investor with more concentrated 
ownership control of portfolio firms can have higher impact than firms with multiple PE 
investors.  
 
Existing studies based on mature market evidence highlight the governance role of PE 
investment, which reduces agency conflicts between shareholders and managers (Wright 
et al., 2009). In addition, PE investment can release financial constraints faced by 
portfolio firms by making direct investment into these firms (Brown and Floros, 2012). 
However, these conclusions do not seem to match the Chinese case. In this chapter, we 
analyze the impact from PE investment on Chinese listed portfolio firms in a systematic 
way. Most importantly, we confirm there is no corporate governance from PE investor in 
Chinese portfolio firms. Instead, the inflow of short-term profit driven PE funds may 
cause different interests to the existing shareholder which may lead to a negative impact 
on firms’ profitability performance. Especially, this negative impact exists in firms which 
has a low level of corporate governance such as a non-state-backed firms or firms listed 
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on new boards (the SME board and the ChiNext board). Another significant impact from 
PE investment is the boost of accounting performance after the inflow of PE funds, which 
is consistent with the fact the PE investors help with the IPO listing process. All together, 
we suggest the speculation behaviour of PE investors.   
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Chapter 6 Private Equity Investment and IPO underpricing in China34 
6.1 Introduction  
IPO underpricing is defined as the positive return that a shareholder can achieve when a 
newly publicly-listed share is bought at its offering price and sold at its first day closing 
price. IPO underpricing is commonly found in both developed and developing counties 
but high underpricing is more commonly discovered in the latter (Loughran et al., 1994). 
The existence of asymmetric information decreases the likelihood for potential investors 
making correct prediction on the real value of the firm and thus leads to underpricing. In 
the standard literature, several factors have been indicated to help reduce high 
underpricing, such as the reputation of the underwriter (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Among 
these factors, the entry of Private Equity (PE) investment is indicated as playing a 
significant role in lower underpricing. On the one hand, PE investors play the monitoring 
role (Barry et al., 1990) and the certification role (Megginson and Weiss., 1991), which 
help to lower the asymmetric information problem. On the other hand, PE investment 
may lead to lower underpricing according to the grandstanding hypothesis (Gompers, 
1995), which states that young PE investors would rather undertake the cost of IPO 
underpricing (leaving the money ‘on the table’) to build up their reputation. 
 
Previous studies on Chinese IPOs have shown a much higher underpricing ratio compared 
to other developing markets. According to Ritter (2003), the average underpricing on the 
Chinese market was as high as 256.9% from 1996-2000. This  high Chinese IPO 
                                                             
34 This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Dr. Hong Bo. 
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underpricing is explained by the high asymmetric information and the IPO listing 
regulations in the Chinese stock market, including the regulatory underpricing (Gannon 
and Zhou, 2008; Tian, 2011); the ‘Winner’s curse’ problem (Yu and Tse, 2006); the 
underwriters’ reputation effect (Su and Brookfield, 2013) and the strategic signaling effect 
of the issuer (Su and Fleisher, 1999). 
 
A large amount of capital has flowed into China's booming Private Equity market. In 2013, 
China is already the third-largest market in the world with US$ 47 billion available for 
investment, behind the UK with US$ 76 billion and the US with $464 billion. Especially 
after the setting up of the SME board in 2005 and the ChiNext board in 2009, IPO has 
become the most populated exit channel for PE investors. To date, more than one third of 
the IPOs listed on these two boards are backed by PE investment. In contrast to the 
populated PE-backed IPO market in China, we have found very few studies that examine 
the IPO underpricing for PE-backed IPOs. The only two studies we have found so far on 
this topic are Jiang et al (2014) and Tan et al (2013). We will review these two studies in 
section3. 
 
In this chapter, we investigate how PE-backed IPOs differ from non PE-backed IPOs in 
underpricing. We examine a sample of 1301 Chinese IPOs over the period 2000-2011, 
which includes 295 PE-backed IPOs. We find PE investors in the Chinese market play 
the certification role, which seems to be consistent with the general literature evidence 
(Megginson and Weiss., 1991; Barry et al., 1990; Jiang et al., 2014). However, we argue 
that, even if a PE investment is negatively related to IPO underpricing, the result may not 
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be attributed only to the monitoring/certification explanation. This is because, if lower 
underpricing happens due to the entry of PE investors, then other investors who 
experience a smaller IPO discount tend to believe that the entry of PE investors helps to 
improve firm performance. As a result, there must be some mechanisms through which 
PE investors can improve firm performance. The possible mechanisms include: the 
financing role of PE investment, the governance role through PE investment, and the 
signaling effect based on the reputation of PE investors. However, by setting up different 
testing variables for each possible mechanism, our test results show none of the 
mechanisms can explain lower underpricing for PE-backed IPOs. Hence, we argue that 
the certification/monitoring role fails to explain the Chinese IPO underpricing. Our results 
further show that PE-backed IPOs listed on China’s two newly established stock market 
boards, namely the SME board and the ChiNext board, experience lower IPO 
underpricing. Considering firms listed on these two stock boards are normally young, 
small, from high-tech sectors, lack of bank financing sources and with lower corporate 
governance level, the lower underpricing may be caused by the speculation behaviour of 
PE investors, especially for IPOs listed on the two new stock boards. The reason is that 
due to the nature of these firms, PE investors have less incentive to become involved in 
corporate governance operation and their investments aim for short term profit. As a result, 
the PE-backed IPOs set up higher offering prices than non-PE backed IPOs and can be 
provided with higher profits via IPO exit.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following aspects. Firstly, based on 
general Chinese IPO studies, we make an explicit connection between the Chinese IPO 
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market and the Chinese PE market which has hardly been studied before. This is because 
IPOs have become the most welcomed exit channel for PE investment, especially after 
the setting up of the SME board in 2004 and the ChiNext board in 2009. Our study also 
distinguishes itself from a few similar studies in the following aspects: (1) instead of 
focusing on a specific type of PE investment, we take into account all types of PE 
investment taking place in China between 2001 and 2011. In previous studies, for 
example Tan et al (2013) study 273 IPOs listed on the SME board between May 2004 and 
December 2008 by including only 59 VC-backed IPOs and Jiang et al (2014) use 419 
IPOs on the two new stock markets during June 2004-March 2010 including only 153 
VC-backed IPOs. In our study, we examine a sample of 1301 IPOs listed on the Chinese 
domestics markets including 259 PE-backed IPOs.  (2) Previous studies focus on IPOs 
listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock main boards. Our sample firms come from both 
main stock boards and new stock boards. Moreover, the majority of our IPOs come from 
new stock boards which can provide new insights on the IPO operation in China. (3) 
Although previous studies have provided some consistent results to general PE findings, 
there is a lack of explanation for the nature of the Chinese stock market and Chinese IPOs. 
Moreover, these studies do not examine other theories that may be a direct cause of lower 
underpricing in China, such as, signaling effect, governance effect and the financing role 
of PE investment. In sum, instead of providing consistent results for the existing literature, 
we provide a new mechanism which helps to explain the lower underpricing in China.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: in section 2, the background information regarding 
Chinese stock market and its relationship with the Chinese PE market are introduced. In 
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section 3, a review of the literature in the context of IPO underpricing and 
underperformance is provided. The model and data on IPO underpricing and 
underperformance are presented in section 4 and section 5 respectively. Section 6 
concludes. 
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6.2 Institutional background 
In December 1990, the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SSE) was set up and in April of 
the following year the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) was founded. To solve financing 
difficulties for small and medium sized firms, the SME board was established in 2005 
followed by the ChiNext board in 2009. The ChiNext board is regarded as the NASDAQ 
board in China. The setting up of the two new stock boards stimulated the Chinese IPO 
market as well as the PE market. In this section, we analyze the features for both the 
Chinese IPO market and the Chinese PE market. We also provide integration on how 
these features affect underpricing. 
 
An important feature of the heavily intervened Chinese IPO market is the quota system, 
which was effective between 1993 and 2000. Under this system, the quota was first 
determined by the State Council Securities Committee, the State Planning Commission, 
and the People’s Bank of China (PBC). The quota was then allocated to different 
provinces and municipalities, according to which local authorities selected IPOs based on 
firms’ accounting performance and the objectives of the local economic development plan. 
It was not until 2001 when the first non-quota IPO was listed in the Chinese stock market. 
The quota system has resulted in high IPO first day initial returns as a result of lack of 
supply in the stock market. Moreover, because the IPO quota was largely allocated to 
SOEs, privately-owned Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) in China had few 
opportunities to be listed in the stock market during the quota system period. To solve 
SMEs financing problems, China set up the Small and Medium sized Enterprises board 
(hereafter the SME board) in the Shenzhen stock exchange in May 2004. The listing 
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requirements for the SME Board are similar to those of the two main boards apart from 
the size of the IPO. For example, firms issuing more than 80 million shares can be listed 
on the two main boards, whereas firms issuing less than 50 million shares have to apply 
for IPOs on the SME board. The ChiNext board was established in 2009. According to 
the CSRC, the ChiNext board was designed for high growth and high-tech firms as well 
as firms in the new economy, new services, new agriculture, new energy, new material 
and new business mode. In addition, the requirements for listing on the ChiNext board 
are less restrictive than on the two main boards. For example, firms applying for IPOs on 
the ChiNext board need only meet the requirement concerning profitability and cash flow 
in the past one or at most two years, whereas firms have to meet profitability requirements 
for the past three consecutive years if they want to be listed on the two main boards and 
the SME board. A comparison of listing requirements among main boards, the SME board 
and the ChiNext board can be found in Chapter 2. The establishment of new stock boards 
has provided wider opportunity for IPO listing (Talmor and Vasvari, 2011). Since IPO 
listing is regarded as the most efficient exit channel for PE investment, the setting up of 
new boards has helped to stimulate the development of the Chinese PE market.  
 
Another feature of the Chinese IPO market is the control of IPO pricing, which results 
from the quota system. The CSRC required that the offering price should be set according 
to the following general formula: offering price = EPS*P/E, where EPS refers to earnings 
per share and P/E refers to the price-to-earnings ratio. Chinese administrative intervention 
in the IPO pricing system can be divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period 
from 1996 to 2001. Before 1996, EPS was the forecasted earnings per share and the P/E 
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ratio was fixed between 13 and 15 by the regulator. From 26 December 1996 onwards, 
the CSRC required that EPS should be measured by the average of the firm’s realized 
earnings per share in the past three years. On 10 September 1997, the CSRC modified the 
IPO pricing formula to: IPO price = EPS*P/E, where EPS = 0.7*EPS in the year before 
the IPO + 0.3*Forecasted EPS in the IPO year. The range of P/E was decided by the 
CSRC. Moreover, on 17 March 1998, the CSRC further changed the IPO pricing formula 
to: IPO price = EPS*P/E, where EPS= EPS = Forecasted Earnings/(Total number of 
shares before IPO + Number of IPO shares*(12-month)/12)35. In the meantime, the range 
of P/E was still decided by the CSRC. In March 1999, the CSRC began to allow issuers 
and underwriters to set a range of initial offering prices subject to CSRC approval, which 
is an earlier attempt of applying the ‘book-building’ system. The IPO issuing size was 
still under the instruction of ‘the Quota System’ at that moment. The second stage of the 
IPO pricing system development in China covers the period from 2001 to 2004. In 2001, 
the ‘Quota System’ was officially terminated and a ‘Sanction System’ started to apply. 
Under the Sanction System underwriters recommend new issuers to the CSRC for 
approval and the issuing size of IPOs was no longer restricted. However, the P/E ratio 
was still restricted to below 20. The third stage of the Chinese IPO pricing system refers 
to the application of the ‘book-building’ system which officially took effect after 2005. 
Under the book-building system, the issuer and the lead underwriter first set a price range 
by soliciting an initial price based on quotes from institutional investors. The 
subscriptions from institutional investors help to decide the final offering price. A 
maximal 50 percent of IPO shares are allocated to offline institutional investors, the rest 
                                                             
35 Where ‘month’ is the month when IPO is offered. 
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are sold to the public via an online system. The offering price is the same for both 
institutional investors and public investors (Tan et al., 2013). As a result, heavy 
administrative intervention in setting IPO offering price leads to the potential high 
underpricing problem in the Chinese stock market.  
 
There are some other characteristics of the Chinese stock market that can affect IPO 
underpricing. For example, an IPO lottery system was established in August 1992 to 
control for the share distribution in the primary market. Under this system, funds had to 
be deposited in an electronic trading account. If the account was chosen to be allocated 
with new IPO shares, then the owner of this account won a lottery in successfully 
purchasing some IPO shares at offering prices. The winning lottery ratio is the proportion 
of the successful subscription to the total subscription of new shares. This system was 
modified in May 2002, to require that the subscribers who participate in the lottery system 
have already held at least 10000 RMB worth of shares in the secondary market. The 
purpose of this modification was to curb speculative behaviour in subscribers’ purchasing 
of new shares.36 As a result, a low lottery ratio suggests that the demand for IPO shares 
will be higher in the second market, which will push up the first day trading price of the 
IPO. 
 
Another feature of the Chinese IPO market is the regulation of waiting days, defining as 
the number of days between the IPO offering day and its first trading day. After making 
an initial offering to the public, the IPO firm has to wait for further authorization from the 
                                                             
36 Available from Shenzhen stock exchange document: 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/AboutSZSE/SZSENews/SZSENews/39751017.shtml  
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CSRC before the shares can actually be traded in the secondary stock market. This waiting 
period is normally around two months (Cedergren, 2014). The long waiting period is 
likely to increase uncertainty for investors leading to higher IPO underpricing.  
 
The Chinese PE market has made its major development along with the establishment of 
two new stock boards after 2005. As a result, the Chinese PE market contains some unique 
features absent from other mature PE markets and these features have implications for 
IPO underpricing. Firstly, the Chinese PE market is heavily driven by IPOs. According to 
the Asian Venture Capital Journal (AVCJ) dataset, the number of PE deals from Pre-IPO 
type accounts for 79.01% of all PE deals in the Chinese PE market in the period between 
2000 and 2011. Along with the booming stock market and the setting up of new stock 
boards in 2000, PE-backed IPOs make up 23% and 41% of total IPOs from the SME 
board and the ChiNext board respectively by the end of 2011. The Pre-IPO PE portfolio 
firms often use PE investment as a certification to pass through the IPO approval process 
(Zhang and Li, 2012). Secondly, PE investors in China normally become minority rather 
than majority shareholders and these investors have less interests in improving corporate 
governance in portfolio firms. These PE investors made investments before IPO, helped 
with the passing rate from CSRC and exited after the listing. The role of a minority 
shareholder provides limited space for PE investors to help with corporate governance 
improvement and other value-added activities.  
 
In Table 6.1, we demonstrate the development of the Chinese PE-backed IPO market from 
2001-2011. As shown in Panel 1, the IPO market maintained steady growth until 2007, at 
which point growth accelerated following the setting up of two new boards. The number 
of both PE-backed IPOs and non-PE backed IPOs peaked in 2010 with 231 and 113 newly 
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listed firms respectively. In 2011, PE-backed IPOs accounted for two thirds of total IPOs 
in the China IPO market. Panel 2 shows the capital raised on the first day of IPO. Both 
PE-backed and non-PE backed IPOs showed significant capital increase after 2007 which 
is consistent with the observations in Panel 1. We notice that the capital raised from PE-
backed IPOs exceed their non-PE peers for the first time in 2008 with capital raised worth 
54.49 million RMB. However, a sharp decrease was found in the following year which 
can be attributed to the Chinese stock bubble bursting in 2007. In Oct 2009, the setting 
up of the ChiNext board and the first batch of high-tech firms trading on ChiNext, helped 
to recover the Chinese IPO market. In the latest Panel, the annual IPO performance is 
reported. We observe PE-backed IPOs have lower underpricing than non-PE backed IPOs 
on average. Accompanied by the booming Chinese stock market, the highest underpricing 
period was found in 2007 and 2008. After the setting up of new boards, underpricing for 
PE-backed IPOs exceeded the other group in 2009 and 2011. The above results indicate 
PE investment has been largely evolved into the Chinese stock market. The booming 
stock market and the setting up of new boards have attracted more PE investors into the 
stock market. The hot PE-backed IPO market implies the potential for speculative 
behaviour in China. 
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Table 6.1 PE-backed vs. Non-PE backed IPO 
This table shows the development of IPOs in China between 2001 and 2011. We do not exclude those 
companies that delisted from the stock market since we only focus on IPO performance.  
 
Panel 1 Distributions of IPO transactions by year, 2001-2011 
Year  Non-PE 
backed IPO 
Percentage 
(%)  
PE-backed IPO Percentage  
(%) 
Total number of deals 
2001 75 7.46 1 0.10 76 
2002 68 6.77 1 0.10 69 
2003 63 6.27 2 0.20 65 
2004 95 9.45 5 0.50 100 
2005 14 1.39 1 0.10 15 
2006 58 5.77 6 0.60 64 
2007 94 9.35 21 2.09 115 
2008 61 6.07 16 1.59 77 
2009 53 5.27 44 4.38 97 
2010 231 22.99 113 11.24 344 
2011 193 19.20 86 8.56 279 
Sum  1005  296  1301 
Data source: Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange market statistics. 
 
 
Panel 2 Distributions of IPO capital raised, 2001-2011 
Year  Total amount raised by 
non-PE backed IPO 
(Million RMB) 
Percentage 
(%)  
Total amount 
raised by PE-
backed IPO 
(Million RMB) 
Percentage 
(%)  
Total 
amount 
raised 
2001 49.15 3.82 11.82 3.11 60.97 
2002 40.33 3.14 0.28 0.07 40.61 
2003 39.31 3.06 0.53 0.14 39.84 
2004 36.81 2.86 1.02 0.27 37.83 
2005 5.60 0.44 0.16 0.04 5.76 
2006 70.67 5.50 5.74 1.51 76.41 
2007 204.46 15.91 51.32 13.51 255.78 
2008 51.90 4.04 54.49 14.34 106.39 
2009 135.06 10.51 30.76 8.10 165.82 
2010 257.96 20.07 128.56 33.84 386.52 
2011 394.09 30.66 95.24 25.07 489.33 
Sum  1285.34  379.92  1665.26 
Data source: CSMAR China Stock Market Trading Database 
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Panel 3 underpricing for IPOs, 2001-2011  
Year  Non-PE  
backed IPO 
  PE-backed 
IPO 
  
 MAAR_SH 
(%)  
MAAR_SZ 
(%) 
IR 
(%) 
MAAR_SH 
(%) 
MAAR_SZ 
(%) 
IR 
(%) 
2001 141.05 141.07 139.59 17.00 17.00 3.32 
2002 134.24 134.24 132.53 148.14 148.14 141 
2003 71.34 71.34 71.05 151.03 151.03 155.25 
2004 73.44 71.78 70.34 72.80 72.06 66.26 
2005 48.56 49.31 43.44 79.12 78.27 68.70 
2006 87.95 84.71 94.44 62.76 67.55 75.34 
2007 191.12 189.93 200.79 198.74 200.49 208.03 
2008 125.71 125.46 118.35 114.50 115.69 101.58 
2009 71.89 70.69 72.43 78.15 76.42 78.71 
2010 42.37 42.29 41.07 43.84 43.77 43.76 
2011 25.53 23.51 23.43 15.47 15.83 14.74 
Sum  80.33 79.88 80.27 57.48 57.57 57.35 
Data source: CSMAR China Stock Market Trading Database 
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6.3 Related Literature 
6.3.1 Theories on IPO underpricing 
In the standard literature developed in mature market systems, the most commonly used 
theory explaining IPO underpricing is related to the asymmetric information problem. 
Based on different participants in IPOs, the asymmetric information problem can be 
referred to different forms such as the ‘winner’s curse’ problem, ex ante uncertainty, and 
the signaling effect.  
 
The ‘winner’s curse’ model (Rock, 1996) assumes two types of investors in the market: 
informed and uninformed investors. Informed investors purchase good quality shares, 
whereas uninformed investors cannot distinguish between good and bad quality shares. 
The existence of asymmetric information decreases the likelihood for uniformed investors 
to obtain a reliable prediction on the true value of the firm. Therefore, the ‘winner’s curse’ 
problem occurs. Potential losses will result uninformed investors to leave the IPO market 
if they are not properly compensated. To ensure the participation of uninformed investors, 
it is rational for the issuer to provide an offering price with a discount, hence underpricing 
(Ritter, 1984; Rock, 1986). The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis addresses the asymmetric 
information problem between the issuer and investors who face uncertainties when 
investing in the firm. Beatty and Ritter (1986) propose a positive relationship between 
IPO underpricing and ex ante uncertainty about the issuer’s value. Ex ante uncertainty 
can be measured by the firm’s characteristics, such as firm age, firm size, the industry in 
which the firm is operating, and the size of IPO. Beatty and Ritter (1986) propose the role 
of underwriters in reducing such ex ante uncertainty. Highly reputable underwriters can 
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help signal the quality of IPOs and thus reduce asymmetric information between the issuer 
and potential investors. In addition, IPO underpricing can be strategically used by the 
issuer signaling the quality of the firm to potential investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). 
Because investors believe that only good quality firms can afford the cost of signaling by 
using IPO underpricing. 
 
6.3.2 Studies of Chinese IPO underpricing 
Previous studies report that Chinese IPO underpricing ranges from 75% (Gannon and 
Zhou, 2008) to 289% (Mok and Hui, 1998), which is the highest in the world. Different 
explanations are found based often on using the asymmetric information theory to explain 
high IPO underpricing in China. 
 
Mok and Hui (1998) examine a sample of 87 A-share IPOs issued on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange between 1990 and 1993. They document that IPO underpricing for their sample 
IPOs is 289% after excluding the market effect (the initial return is 362.3%). The authors 
attribute high IPO underpricing to the long waiting between the offering day and the first 
trading day. A longer waiting period increases uncertainty, hence a higher underpricing is 
needed to compensate investors. Su and Fleisher (1999) examine 308 Chinese IPO firms 
between the period 1987-1995 and report a 231% underpricing on average. They indicate 
that a firm uses underpricing as a strategy to signal its value to outside investors and leads 
to the high underpricing ratio. The authors also find that firms can recoup the cost of 
underpricing by issuing Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) in the following years. Yu and 
Tse (2006) report that the average initial return of 343 A-share IPOs is 123.59% from 
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1995 to 1998. They find uninformed investors have much higher probability of receiving 
overpriced IPOs than informed investors, which is consistent with the winner’s curse 
theory. The authors indicate that the winner’s curse problem in China is caused by the 
lower transparency, the large number of individual investors (which take up over 90% of 
total investors) without having access to sufficient information about IPO firms and the 
control of IPO supply from the government. Chang et al (2008) find the average initial 
returns of 891 IPOs from 1996 to 2004 is as high as 123% and the authors attribute the 
higher abnormal returns on the first IPO day to the asymmetric information hypothesis. 
The asymmetric information hypothesis suggests that when investors know less about the 
IPO shares than the existing traded shares, they are bearing the higher risks of buying 
IPOs. Moreover, the authors provide some new insights regarding the role of the lottery 
ratio on IPO return. Due to the pricing intervention from the government, the P/E ratios 
are much lower in the primary market than in the secondary market. The pricing gap 
provides the room for speculation thus leads to higher IPO demand in the primary market. 
Hence, the lottery ratio represents the demand of primary market and has no impact on 
the secondary market IPO returns.  
 
Apart from explanations based on the asymmetric information theory, more recent studies 
have begun to analyze China’s high IPO underpricing based on specifically Chinese 
characteristics, such as government control and regulations in the IPO market. For 
example, Chi and Padgett (2005) find the underpricing is 129.16% for 668 IPO firms 
between 1996 and 2000. They conclude that the underpricing mainly resulted from the 
large number of uninformed investors and the shortage of IPO supply under the quota 
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system. The authors also indicate that government ownership (normally covering around 
70% of our sample IPOs) fails to send out signals regarding the quality of the IPO firms. 
Instead, they argue that the government is better at capturing the market opportunities 
during the hot IPO issue periods and hence receive better market returns. Tian and 
Megginson (2007) document an average underpricing of 247% based on a sample of 1397 
IPOs between 1991 and 2004. They argue that the high IPO underpricing resulted from 
Chinese regulations, including the quota system, the intervention in IPO pricing, and the 
waiting-time regulation.  
  
In sum, the above mentioned studies provide consistent conclusions on the high ratio of 
Chinese IPO underpricing using different explanation theories. However, these results are 
mainly based on main stock boards and most of the studies were carried out before the 
setting up of two new stock boards. Therefore, it is necessary to update the existing 
literature by adding in IPO performance evidence from new boards, which is one of our 
contributions to the literature. 
 
6.3.3 Empirical studies on how PE investment affects IPO performance 
The role of VC/PE in affecting IPO pricing is normally explained by the monitoring 
(governance) hypothesis and the certification hypothesis. Based on a sample of 433 VC-
backed IPOs from 1978 to 1987, Barry et al (1990) document that monitoring services 
provided by VC investors play a positive role in reducing IPO underpricing. Since many 
of these VC capitalists are repeated participants in the capital markets, the experience of 
VC investors can be regarded as sending out positive signals to outside investors during 
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the IPO process. As a result, IPOs with high quality VC capitalists are less underpriced. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) also highlight the certification role of VC investors in 
reducing IPO underpricing. They compare VC-backed IPOs to non-VC-backed IPOs 
between 1983-1987 in the US market and document that VC-backed IPOs are less 
underpriced than non-VC-backed IPOs. The authors argue that venture capitalists are 
more capable of assessing the intrinsic value of the firm. Therefore the involvement of 
VC in the IPO can be regarded as a positive signaling/certification about the firm’s 
prospective development. However, Lee and Wahal (2004) argue that VC investment is 
not a random selection; it may be a result of an endogenous choice by both entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists. To solve the endogeneity problem, Lee and Wahal (2004) estimate 
a Heckman two-stage selection model and document that VC-backed firms do not have 
lower underpricing than non-VC-backed firms.  
 
Another feature regarding the entry of PE investors is that they can improve corporate 
governance by making use of their managerial skills and value increasing activities. This 
effect should be reflected in the long-run performance of the portfolio firms. Brav and 
Gompers (1997) examine 934 US VC-backed IPOs compared to a matched sample of 
non-VC-backed IPOs during 1972-1992. They report that VC-backed firms outperform 
non-VC-backed firms on average. They attribute the better long-run abnormal 
performance of VC-backed firms to the improved corporate governance structures after 
the entry of VC investors. Krishnan et al (2011) examine 1503 US VC-backed IPOs 
during the period of 1993 and 2004. They describe IPOs backed by more reputable VC 
investors performing better in the 3-years post-IPO period. The authors argue that 
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reputable VCs are able to select better reputation portfolio firms, hold a higher proportion 
of shares and take more board seats in portfolio firms, hence the firm’s corporate 
governance is improved after the entering of VC investors. Similar studies have also been 
carried out in emerging economics. For example, Minardi et al (2013) examine the 
performance of PE-backed IPOs in Brazil during 2004-2008. The average one-year 
accumulated abnormal returns (CAR) for PE-backed IPOs is 13.72%, whereas it is -3.23% 
for non-PE backed IPOs. The authors explain this result by noting that PE investors are 
good at selecting firms with better quality of corporate governance. However, the authors 
acknowledge that stock market returns for PE-backed IPOs may not be provided by value-
added activities from PE investors; instead the higher stock market returns may be caused 
by PE investors’ market timing behaviour.  
 
As far as the Chinese PE market is concerned, Jiang et al (2014) compare 153 VC-backed 
IPOs to 326 non-VC backed IPOs listed on the SME board and the ChiNext board from 
June 2004 to March 2010. They find that VC-backed IPOs have lower initial underpricing, 
which can be explained by the value-added activities provided by VC investors. These 
findings are in line with the certification and monitoring hypothesis. However, Jiang et al 
(2014) did not address the long run performance of VC-backed IPOs. Tan et al (2013) 
argue that due to the adverse selection problem, firms that are listed on the SME board 
are more risky on average and Chinese VC investors are rent-seeking orientated. 
Therefore, these domestic VC investors neither add value to their invested firms in the 
IPO process nor improve the firm’s operating performance. Although both Tan et al (2013) 
and Jiang et al (2014) focus on the underpricing performance of VC-backed IPOs in China, 
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they have provided inconsistent results. The existing studies of Chinese PE-backed IPO 
provide some possible insights regarding the role of PE investors. However, it is still not 
clear what kind of mechanism affects underpricing. We want to provide the most likely 
explanation for underpricing of PE-backed IPOs in the rest of this chapter and this is 
another contribution to the literature.  
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6.4 IPO underpricing 
6.4.1 Data and methodology 
We refer to 1301 IPO firms (including 295 PE-backed IPOs) listed on the Chinese stock 
markets between 2001 and 2011. The reason our sample period starts from 2001 is that 
there were few PE-backed IPOs in the 1990s and most of them emerged after 2001. 
Because the regulation and market conditions changed greatly after 2000, we use IPO 
firm information after that date to avoid potential outlier issues. Our data come from two 
sources. We use information from China Stock Market & Accounting Research database 
(CSMAR) for IPO information and firm accounting information (including income 
statement and balance sheet). PE investment related information (whether a PE 
investment took place, PE deal information and PE investor information) is collected 
from Asian Venture Capital Journal Dataset (AVCJ).  
 
For measuring IPO underpricing, we use the following formula to calculate the return 
from IPO firm i on day t : 1 01
0
P Pi iIRi Pi

 , where 1iIR  is the total return from stock i on its first 
trading day, 1iP  is the closing price of stock i on the first trading day and 0iP  is the 
offering price of stock i.  
 
We also construct two market-adjusted abnormal returns  sMAAR  by taking market effect 
into account. For the first index _MAAR SH , the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-
share Index is used as the benchmark for the whole sample. We use a second index 
_MAAR SZ  to separate the market effect from different stock boards, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Composite Index is used as a benchmark for Shanghai stock board listed IPOs 
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while Shenzhen Component Index is used for Shenzhen stock market listed IPOs 
separately. The Shenzhen Component Index not only captures Shenzhen main board IPOs, 
but also includes SME board IPOs and ChiNext IPOs37 . Using different stock index 
benchmarks, the market-adjusted abnormal return  MAARir 38 for stock i on the first 
trading day is defined as follows:  1 1 1i i mMAAR IR R  , where 1Rm  is the return of market 
benchmark during the same period, defined as 1 0
1
0
m m
m
m
p p
r
p

  , where 1mp  is the closing 
price for the corresponding benchmark index on the first trading day and 0mp  is the closing 
price of the market index on the offering day. 
 
6.4.2 Empirical models and variables 
To examine the effects of PE investment on IPO underpricing, we use a regression model 
on IPO performance factors plus a dummy variable which is defined as PE=1 for PE-
backed IPO and PE=0 otherwise. The endogeneity problem arises when there are other 
factors affecting the decision to receive PE investment. Therefore, we address the 
potential selection bias problem by using a two-stage Heckman model following Lee and 
Wahal (2004) and Jiang et al (2014). In the first stage of Heckman model we control the 
factors for PE investment.  
 
The first stage of Heckman model is as follows:  
                                                             
37  We do not separate new board IPO from main board IPO using different market index. Because the SME Component 
Index was launched in June 2004 and ChiNext Price Index was released in June 2010 and so cannot represent or cover 
the majority of our new board IPOs.  
38  When MAARir   is interpreted as an abnormal return, it is assumed that the systematic risk of the IPOs under 
consideration is the same as that of the index, i.e., the betas of the IPOs average to unity. However, previous studies 
have indicated that that the average beta of newly listed firms is higher than one. As a result, the calculated abnormal 
return MAARir  provides an upward-biased estimate of the IPO performance relative to the market (Chi and Padgett, 2002).  
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Pr ( )
0 1 2 3 4 6
obit PE Size Age Leverage ROA Industry
i i i i i
                (6.1) 
 
Where the independent variable is a dummy variable taking 1 if the IPO is backed with 
PE investment and zero otherwise. The independent variables include: (a) Firm size  Size , 
which is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in the last fiscal year before IPO; 
(2) firm age  Age  measures the time of PE investment, which is calculated using the IPO 
year minus the firm’s establishment year; (3) The debt to equity ratio ( )Leverage  is selected 
to represent the total debt to total equity in the last fiscal year before IPO; (4) The return 
on assets ratio  ROA  is calculated as the net income divided by total assets in the fiscal 
year prior to IPO. (5) Industry classifications are controlled in the equation by adding 
industry dummies  Industry  . (6) Year dummy  Year   is also controlled. All of the 
independent variables are commonly found in previous literature as determinants of PE 
decisions (Gompers, 1996; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Jiang et al., 2014).  
 
In the second stage, we run the regression following the following equation: 
iiiii
iiiiii
YearIndustryLambdaStateVolatilityDelayLottery
PEratiooceedsrUnderwriteAgeSizePEngUnderprici




13121110987
6543210 Pr (6.2) 
 
Where the dependent variables include three underpricing indicators: _MAAR SH  and
_MAAR SZ  and 1iIR . The key testing variable is the PE dummy variable which represents 
1 if the IPO firm has received PE investment before and 0 otherwise. A group of variables 
are used to control for underpricing determinants: (1) Firm size  Size , which is defined as 
the natural logarithm of total assets in the last fiscal year before IPO. According to Beatty 
and Ritter (1986), smaller size firms publish less information than large firms and are 
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normally regarded as more risky and with higher uncertainty. (2) Firm age ( Age ) at the 
time of PE investment, which is calculated using the IPO year minus the firm’s year of 
establishment. Ritter (1991) used age as a measurement for ex-ante uncertainty and found 
older firms have lower risk and to be likely to experience less underpricing than those 
young firms. (3) Underwriters’ reputation  Underwriter . Carter et al (1998) suggest that IPOs 
with prestigious underwriters, cause the least ex-ate uncertainty for shareholders and 
show a low level of underpricing. This variable equals one if the underwriter is from a 
high reputation group shown in Appendix 6.2. Appendix 6.2 provides a list of high 
reputation underwriters and the construction of underwriter ranking. (4) IPO proceeds
 Proceeds  is measured by the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds. Chemmanur’s (1993) 
model shows that lower underpricing is associated with larger gross proceeds from the 
IPO. (5) Offering price to earnings ratio  PEratio . According to the asymmetric information 
theory, the higher the offering P/E ratio, the less space for high initial returns and vice 
versa (Ljunqvist, 2004). (6) The odds of winning the lottery  Lottery . As indicated by Chi 
and Padgett (2005), when fewer people want to invest in a certain IPO, a higher lottery 
ratio leads to lower demand and causes less underpricing. (7) Lag days  Ldays  , these are 
measured by the listing day minus the day of PE investment. Chan et al (2004) indicate 
that long lag days increase risk for investors and require higher underpricing. Mok and 
Hui (1998) support that the lag days as a key determinants of market-adjusted IPO 
underpricing for Chinese IPOs. (8) Volatility  Volatility  is the standard deviation of market 
return in the past 90 days of IPO. Firm’s underpricing is positively related to market 
volatility (Lowry et al., 2010). (9) State ownership  State , measured by the percentage of 
shares held by the State. The government knows more than investors about the quality of 
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the IPO firm and the level of risk involved in the initial issue. To convince and attract 
outside investors, the government tends to set up lower IPO offering prices and this leads 
to higher underpricing (Chi and Padgett., 2005). (10) The inverse mills ratio (Lambda) 
from the first stage is controlled for potential selection bias for IPOs backed with PE 
investment in the second stage. (11) Industry dummy  Industry  and year dummy  Year are 
controlling in all equations. All the definitions of the variables are summarized in 
Appendix 6.3. 
 
6.4.3 Sample distribution 
Table 6.2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables that are relevant 
in this study for the match-pair sample. The correlation coefficients are reported for both 
PE-backed group and non-PE-backed group. We find that there is a positive and 
significant correlation between PE investment dummy and firm age  Age . But there is no 
significant relationship between PE investment dummy and other firm characteristic 
variables, including firm size  Size  , leverage ratio  leverage   and ROA  ROA  . We find 
underwriter’s reputation  Underwriter , IPO proceeds  Proceeds , lottery ratio  Lottery , PE lag day 
 Ldays  and State ownership are negatively related to PE financing. We also notice a non-
significant correlation between PE financing and IPO PE ratio  PEratio and stock market 
volatility  Volatility . The likelihood of PE financing is also found leading to a decrease in 
both initial stock market returns  IR  and adjusted stock market returns  _MAAR SH . These 
results provide a preliminary impression that PE investment has a potential for lower 
underpricing.  
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Table 6.2 Pearson Correlation coefficients 
This table presents the correlation coefficients of 1301 IPO firms (including 295 PE-backed IPOs) listed on the Chinese stock markets between 2001 and 2011. PE 
dummy ( PE ), equals 1 if the IPO is backed with PE investment and 0 otherwise; firm size ( Size ), is the natural logarithm of firm size at the time of IPO; firm age 
( Age ), measured by the PE investment year minus the year of establishment; leverage ratio ( Leverage ) is the debt/equity ratio at the last fiscal year before IPO; ROA  is 
calculated as the net income divided by total assets at the fiscal year prior IPO; underwriter dummy ( Underwriter ) equals 1 if the underwriter is from top list and 0 otherwise; 
offer price to earnings ratio ( PEratio ); lottery ratio ( Lottery ) is the percentage of winning the IPO lottery; Lday ( Delay ) is the number of days between the offering day and 
the IPO day; volatility ( Volatility ) measures the 90-day market return volatility before the IPO day; the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds ( Proceeds ) controls for the size 
of the offering; the State ownership is the size of shares controlled by the State.  
No Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 PE  1              
2 Size  0.0250 1             
3 Age  0.0904*    0.0226 1            
4 Leverage -.0185    0.3948*    0.0172  1           
5 ROA  -0.0047 -0.1003* -0.0373 -0.0690* 1          
6 Underwriter  0.0959* 0.0657* 0.0248 0.0067 -0.0714* 1         
7 Proceeds  0.1433* 0.0577* -0.0161 0.0226 -0.0328 0.2149* 1        
8 PEratio  0.0226 -0.0758* 0.0007 0.0129 -0.0365 -0.0419 -0.0092 1       
9 Lottery  0.1003* 0.0002 0.0763* 0.0053 -0.0235 0.0428 0.1893* 0.0083 1      
10 Delay  -0.1248* 0.0383 -0.1967* 0.0232 -0.0112 -0.0548* -0.0822* 0.0191 -0.0910* 1     
11 Volatility -0.0067 -0.0094 -0.0042 0.0306 -0.0038 0.0381 0.0850* -0.0157 -0.0294 0.0179 1    
12 State  -0.1818* 0.0662* -0.2392* 0.0460* -0.0959* 0.0068 0.1623* -0.0162 -0.0890* 0.2442* 0.0729 1   
13 IR   -0.1183* 0.0236 -0.2055* -0.0035 0.0324 -0.0011 -0.0391 -0.0128 -0.2071* 0.2049* 0.3291* 0.1993* 1  
14 _MAAR SH   -0.1202* 0.0241 -0.2084* -0.0067 0.0311 -0.0033 -0.0489 -0.0114 -0.2116* 0.1987* 0.2769* 0.2080* 0.9919* 1 
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Table 6.3 reports the firm characteristics and IPO performance of PE-backed and non-PE 
backed IPO firms. More specifically, we examine firm size, firm age, profitability, debt 
situation, ownership structure, IPO size and IPO issuing information. The firm age 
variable shows that IPO companies normally go public 6 to 7 years after their 
establishment. However, firms backed by PE investment are listed 7.15 years after its 
setting up, which is one year older than the other group on average. It is found that PE-
backed firms hold larger total assets and use lower level of leverage ratio but the observed 
differences between the two groups are not significant. The ROA value suggests that both 
IPO groups are similar in profitability. It is also observed that PE-backed firms have a 
significantly lower State-ownership ratio than the other group. Regarding IPO 
information, we find PE-backed IPOs are backed by more reputable underwriters, higher 
online lottery ratio and shorter lag days between offering day and IPO day. There is no 
significant difference in price to earnings ratio and stock market volatility between these 
two groups. The PE-backed firms have significantly larger IPO proceeds value than their 
non-PE backed peers. Our main testing variables are the initial underpricing, _MAAR SH  and 
_MAAR SZ  . The initial underpricing  1IRi  for PE-backed IPOs is 0.57 while for non-PE 
backed IPOs it is 0.80. We observe similar results in the market-adjusted abnormal returns
 1MAARi  for _MAAR SH  and _MAAR SZ , the value is 0.80 for non-PE backed IPOs and 0.57 for 
PE backed IPOs. Overall, the descriptive analysis documents some significant differences 
in both firm and IPO characteristics between PE-backed IPOs and non-PE backed IPOs. 
We find initial evidence PE-backed IPOs have significantly lower underpricing than that 
of non-PE backed IPOs.  
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Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics 
 Whole sample Non-PE 
Backed IPOs 
PE-backed IPOs T test 
Mean  
 Mean  Median Mean   Median  Mean  Median   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (3)-(5) 
Size  20.24 20 20.23 20 20.30 20.01 -0.90 
Age  6.41 5.61 6.19 5.06 7.15 6.95 -3.27*** 
Leverage 0.73 0.46 0.74 0.48 0.69 0.43 0.68 
ROA  0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.26 
rUnderwrite  0.60 1 0.57 1 0.68 1 -3.47*** 
oceedsPr  22.02 21.88 21.94 21.79 22.26 22.11 -5.22*** 
PEratio  65.68 43.83 64.17 43.43 70.82 45.19 -0.81 
Lottery  0.86 0.43 0.72 0.36 1.31 0.65 -3.63*** 
Delay  13.81 13 14.27 14 12.24 11 4.53*** 
Volatility 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.02 0.01 0.25 
State  0.17 0 0.20 0 0.09 0 6.66*** 
IR   0.75 0.50 0.80 0.56 0.57 0.35 4.29*** 
_MAAR SH   0.75 0.51 0.80 0.56 0.57 0.37 4.36*** 
_MAAR SZ  0.75 0.51 0.80 0.56 0.57 0.39 4.28*** 
.Obs   1301 1301 1005 1005 296 296  
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6.4.4 How PE investment affects IPOs underpricing 
The Heckman model outcome is shown in Table 6.4. Panel 1 reports the determinants of 
PE investment from the Heckman first stage Probit model. The table shows firms with 
longer operating history and larger size are more likely to accept PE investment in general 
(t value equals 3.31 and 1.69 respectively). However, the leverage  Leverage  and the firm 
performance measurement  ROA  are not significant, which fails to explain whether the 
IPO is backed by PE investment. The lambda ratio is generated after the Probit model and 
added to the second stage.   
 
Panel 2 of Table 6.4 reports the impact of PE investment on IPO underpricing. We have 
constructed two models by using different independent variables: _MAAR SH and 1IRi
39. In 
both models, PE-backed IPOs show lower underpricing compared to non-PE backed IPOs. 
For the control variables, older firms  Age  tend to have lower underpricing because mature 
firms are less risky for investors and hence require less underpricing (Ritter, 1991). A 
higher lottery ratio  Lottery  leads to lower demand for IPOs and thus results in lower 
underpricing. A positively significant relationship is found between lag days  Lday  and 
underpricing, indicating that long lag days cause higher risk so higher underpricing is a 
good way to compensate the investors. The stock market volatility  Volatility  before IPO 
does have a positively significant impact on the first-day returns. Larger IPO proceeds 
help to decrease underpricing. Higher level of State ownership  State  is also regarded as 
sending out a signal to the market regarding the quality of the firm and inducing a positive 
impact on first day IPO returns. The Lambda ratio  Lambda  is negatively significant in the 
                                                             
39 We observe very similar results between _MAAR SZ  and _MAAR SH  . To avoid duplicated results, we only report 
regression results using _MAAR SH  and 1IRi  as dependent variable. 
185 
 
market adjusted model but not in the initial returns model, suggesting the unobserved 
factors result in lower underpricing. The negative Lambda ratio further confirms the 
necessity of using the Heckman two-stage selection model.  
 
These findings provide some consistent results to add to the mature stock market findings. 
Some of the potential reasons for lower underpricing can be summarized as the following: 
the ‘certification’ role of PE investment proposed by Megginson and Weiss (1991); the 
involvement of PE investors helps to ensure the future corporate governance 
improvement of the firm (Barry et al., 1990); by providing the new financing channel 
(Brown and Floros, 2012); for high reputation PE investors, they tend to send out positive 
signals regarding the future value of the firm to outside investors (Beatty and Ritter., 
1986); PE investors would like to set up higher offering pricing to increase their returns 
which can be regarded as the speculative behaviour of PE investors. All of the above 
mentioned potential channels help to describe lower underpricing for PE-backed IPOs but 
we cannot conclude directly which statement is supportive to our empirical results. To 
solve this problem, we narrow down our sample to PE-backed IPOs only in the next 
section. To help us understand the underpricing mechanism, we add some PE related 
testing variables to the following PE-backed IPO models. 
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Table 6.4 Heckman model results  
This table adopts the Heckman selection model to control endogeneity. In the first stage regression, 
the dependent variable is the IPO decision. The independent variables include: firm size ( Size ), 
natural logarithm of firm size at the time of IPO; firm age ( Age ), measured by the PE investment 
year minus the year of establishment; leverage ratio ( Leverage ) which is the debt/equity ratio at the 
last fiscal year before IPO; ROA  is calculated as the net income divided by total assets in the fiscal 
year prior to IPO. In the second stage, the dependent variable is the _MAAR SH  and IR . The testing 
variable is PE dummy, equaling 1 if the IPO is backed with PE investment and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables include: firm age; underwriter dummy ( Underwriter  ) equaling 1 if the 
underwriter is from top list and 0 otherwise; offer price to earnings ratio ( PEratio ); lottery ratio ( Lottery ) 
which is the percentage of winning the IPO lottery; Lday ( Delay ) is the number of days between 
the offering day and the IPO day; volatility (Volatility ) measures the 90-day market return volatility 
before the IPO day; the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds ( Proceeds ) controls for the size of the 
offering; the State ownership is the size of shares controlled by the State. The figures in 
parentheses are the t-statistics. 
Panel 1. 1st stage: the determinants of PE investment 
  
Cons  -2.6659 
(-3.38)*** 
Size  0.0628 
(1.69)* 
Age  0.0280 
(3.31)*** 
Leverage -0.0703 
(-1.27) 
ROA  0.0380 
(0.05) 
Industry Included  
Wald 2Chi
 p value     
22.18 
(0.0046) 
Obs  1301 
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Panel 2: 2nd stage: the impact of PE investment on IPO underpricing 
 (1) 
_MAAR SH  
(2) 
IR  
Cons  215.9419 
(2.42) 
197.094 
(2.08) 
PE  -8.5091 
(-1.83)** 
-9.0660 
(-1.93)** 
Size   0.3338 
(0.17) 
0.4254 
(0.20) 
Age   -3.4503 
(-4.79)*** 
-3.4764 
(-4.61)*** 
rUnderwrite  2.6795 
(0.64) 
2.5413 
(0.61) 
oceedsPr  -2.3248 
(-1.02) 
-1.8054 
(-0.78) 
PEratio  -0.0017 
(-0.18) 
-0.0023 
(-0.24) 
Lottery  -5.1491 
(-2.23)*** 
-5.1143 
(-2.24)*** 
Delay  1.0437 
(3.54)*** 
1.2106 
(3.99)*** 
Volatility 1.0961 
(8.27)*** 
1.3242 
(9.73)*** 
State  0.2494 
(2.58)*** 
0.2122 
(2.20)*** 
amL bda  -50.6404 
(-1.97)*** 
-49.7504 
(-1.76)** 
Industry   Included Included  
Year  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.1970 0.2235 
  F statistic p value   18.40 
(0.0000) 
19.93 
(0.0000) 
Obs  1301 1301 
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6.4.5 Regression results on underpricing of PE-backed IPOs  
In the previous section, we have raised the question of why Chinese PE-backed IPOs 
experience lower underpricing which may be due to PE investors’ reputation factors, the 
speculation of PE investors or the corporate governance role of PE investors. To solve 
this question, we reduce our sample to PE-backed IPOs only. By adding PE related 
variables, the purpose is to examine how PE factors affect IPO underpricing directly.  
 
Four PE related factors are used in our model: PE amount, PE deal stake, PE investor’s 
reputation and PE investment Pre-IPO type. PE amount ( aPE mount ) is measured using the 
cumulated total amount of PE investment received before IPO to divide the firm’s total 
assets. PE deal stake ( PEdeal ) is the accumulated total shares controlled by PE investors 
before IPO. These two variables capture the most direct effect of PE investment in IPO 
firms. The PE reputation ( PEreputation ) indicator helps to control investor’s behaviour. For 
measuring PE reputation, we collect the annual China Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Annual Ranking report provided by Zero2IPO group40. In this annual report, the ranking 
of top 30 PE investors is announced based on overall survey information including 
investment, management, fundraising and exit. The ranking was initiated by Zero2IPO 
dataset in 2001 and has become well-known for providing sound evaluation and a 
reference system to both investors and portfolio firms. We collect the top 30 PE firms 
listed on China Venture Capital and Private Equity Annual Ranking from 2007-2011 for 
two reasons: firstly, this period covers the booming PE-backed IPO market in China; 
secondly, the report before 2006 did not differentiate venture capitalists and PE investors. 
The name and country of these top 30 PE investors are reported in Appendix 6.4. Another 
testing variable in our model is the new board dummy ( Newboard ), which equals to 1 if 
                                                             
40 Founded in 1999, Zero2IPO is a leading integrated service provider in the China venture capital and private equity 
industry. 
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the IPO is listed on new boards and equals to 0 if listed on main boards. This testing 
variable helps to control investor behaviour on different stock boards. Guo and Fung 
(2011) find that new boards, especially the ChiNext board was under high speculation. 
As a result, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange authority issued regulations intended to 
monitor and control risk and so minimize the excessive speculative trading risk of new 
board IPOs in September 2014. All the definitions of the variables are summarized in 
Appendix 6.2. 
 
Our empirical model is as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pr7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16
Underpricing PEamount PEdeal PEreputation Newboard Size Age
i i i i i
Underwriter oceeds PEratio Lottery Delay Volatility Statei i i i i
Lambda Industry Year
i i
      
      
   
       
       
   
(6.3) 
All the control variables are the same as those in equation 6.2.  
 
Table 6.5 reports the empirical results. We first run each testing variables respectively in 
the first four models, then combine all the testing variables into model five to see the joint 
effects. _MAAR SH  and IR  are reported as dependent variable respectively in panel 1 and 
2. In panel 1, the PE amount variable ( aPE mount ) is negatively significant in both model 1 
and model 5, suggesting that a large PE investment leads to lower underpricing. This 
could be explained by: 1) PE investors have better understanding and techniques for 
valuing the ready-listed firm. Hence, they help with setting the offering price closer to the 
IPO firm’s intrinsic value. The higher offering prices reduce the abnormal returns from 
the secondary market and result in lower underpricing; 2) PE investors are more 
speculative in setting up high offering prices so they can exit with higher returns. We find 
PE deal stake ( PEdeal ) has no impact on IPO performance which is consistent with the fact 
that most PE investors become minority shareholders in their Chinese portfolio 
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companies. This result also suggests that there is no governance role of PE investment 
that reduces IPO underpricing. The PE reputation ( PEreputation  ) variable is also 
insignificant in both model (3) and model (5), which does not support the 
certification/monitoring hypothesis proposed by Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry 
et al. (1990). We also find firms listed on new boards experience lower underpricing than 
main board listed firms. This observation is consistent with the fact that the establishment 
of new boards has provided easier listing channels and encouraged qualified firms to go 
listed. Since IPO is the easiest and more profitable way for PE exit, PE investors captured 
the opportunity and rushed into the IPO pool. As a result, speculation happened and the 
PE-backed IPOs, especially on new boards, experience lower underpricing than the non-
PE backed IPOs. 
 
For other control variables, similar results on lottery ratio ( Lottery ), lag days before IPO 
( Delay ), overall stock market volatility (Volatility ) and state ownership ( State ) are found 
from the previous Table 6.4. We also observe the coefficient for P/E ratio ( PEratio ) is 
negatively significant, suggesting that firms with higher P/E ratios are more likely to 
experience lower underpricing which is consistent with the role of P/E ratio in convincing 
outside investors.  
 
In panel 2 of Table 6.5, IR  is used as independent variable. The observed results are 
consistent with that from panel 1 using _MAAR SH  as dependent variable.  
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Table 6.5 The impact of PE investment on PE-backed IPOs, whole sample 
This table shows the sample of PE-backed IPOs. The dependent variables are _MAAR SH  and IR  
respectively. The testing variables include: aPE mount  measured using the cumulated total amount 
of PE investment received before IPO to divide firm’s total assets; PEdeal  is the cumulated total 
shares controlled by P investors before IPO; PEreputation  captures whether the PE investor has a 
high reputation; Newboard  variable equals 1 if the IPO is listed on new boards and equals to 0 if 
listed on main boards. The control variables include: natural logarithm of firm size( Size ); firm 
age ( Age); underwriter dummy ( rUnderwrite ) equals 1 if the underwriter is from top list and 0 
otherwise; the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds ( oceedsPr ) controls for the size of the offering; 
PEratio is the offer price to earnings ratio; Lottery  is the percentage of winning the IPO lottery; Delay
is the number of days between the offering day and the IPO day; Volatilitymeasures the 90-day 
market return volatility before the IPO day;; the State ownership is the size of shares controlled 
by the State. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics.  
Panel 1. The dependent variable is IPO underpricing measured by _MAAR SH  
 _MAAR SH      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cons  115.3612 
(0.91) 
186.3267 
(1.26) 
93.0927 
(0.73) 
15.7281 
(0.12) 
45.7844 
(0.32) 
PEamount   -11.5267 
(-3.19)*** 
   -12.7568 
(-3.09)*** 
PEdeal    -16.5582 
(-0.50) 
  44.6419 
(1.05) 
PEreputation    8.4714 
(1.06) 
 13.0372 
(1.64) 
Newboard     -28.7603 
(-2.68)*** 
-27.3254 
(-2.46)*** 
Size  0.7050 
(0.28) 
-0.8522 
(-0.28) 
2.0519 
(0.78) 
1.9578 
(0.75) 
0.0883 
(0.03) 
Age  -1.1512 
(-1.32) 
-1.1457 
(-1.24) 
-0.9549 
(-1.06) 
-0.9252 
(-1.06) 
-0.9648 
(-0.98) 
Underwriter  -8.2094 
(-1.13) 
-6.1325 
(-0.75) 
-6.8978 
(-0.87) 
-7.1573 
(-0.91) 
-8.1594 
(-1.10) 
Proceeds  4.4522 
(0.69) 
-5.6159 
(-0.92) 
-4.2895 
(-0.85) 
0.0136 
(0.00) 
9.1370 
(1.24) 
PEratio  -0.0145 
(-2.24)*** 
-0.0139 
(-2.03)*** 
-0.0160 
(-2.15)*** 
-0.0145 
(-2.04)*** 
-0.0184 
(-2.48)*** 
Lottery  -1.9023 
(-2.09)*** 
-1.9668 
(-1.76)** 
-2.2524 
(-1.76)** 
-2.1902 
(-1.95)** 
-1.6840 
(-2.00)*** 
Delay  0.7884 
(1.08) 
1.4185 
(1.73)** 
2.1405 
(2.77)*** 
1.9496 
(2.52)*** 
-1.6840 
(-2.00)*** 
Volatility  0.0607 
(0.20) 
0.3540 
(0.95) 
0.8669 
(2.68)*** 
0.8043 
(2.50)*** 
0.0921 
(0.29) 
State  0.7344 
(2.94)*** 
0.6953 
(2.63)*** 
0.6777 
(2.65)*** 
0.7493 
(2.87)*** 
0.9133 
(3.47)*** 
Industry  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.1505 0.2232 0.1850 0.1865 0.1707 
  F statistic p value   3.46 
(0.0000) 
2.44 
(0.0033) 
4.01 
(0.0000) 
4.42 
(0.0000) 
2.94 
(0.0001) 
Obs  248 243 289 294 232 
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Panel 2 The dependent variable is IPO underpricing measured by IR  
 IR      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cons  111.1633 
(0.87) 
187.7817 
(1.25) 
76.5056 
(0.59) 
-8.1072 
(-0.06) 
35.8811 
(0.25) 
PEamount   -11.8500 
(-3.27)*** 
   -13.0777 
(-3.14)*** 
PEdeal    -16.2638 
(-0.49) 
  45.5075 
(1.09) 
PEreputation    7.7745 
(0.97) 
 12.5840 
(1.63) 
Newboard     -31.9393 
(-2.87)*** 
-29.3454 
(-2.60)*** 
Size  0.9122 
(0.35) 
-0.7283 
(-0.23) 
2.3344 
(0.85) 
2.2302 
(0.82) 
0.3408 
(0.12) 
Age  -1.0660 
(-1.30) 
-1.0734 
(-1.24) 
-0.8793 
(-1.00) 
-0.8459 
(-0.99) 
-0.8630 
(-0.94) 
Underwriter  -8.9971 
(-1.25) 
-6.7188 
(-0.82) 
-6.5718 
(-0.81) 
-6.8159 
(-0.85) 
-9.0885 
(-1.24) 
Proceeds  4.3387 
(0.66) 
-6.1078 
(-0.99) 
-4.1175 
(-0.80) 
0.5783 
(0.10) 
9.2838 
(1.23) 
PEratio  -0.0146 
(-2.26)*** 
-0.0140 
(-2.03)*** 
-0.0153 
(-2.07)*** 
-0.0139 
(-1.97)** 
-0.0185 
(-2.51)*** 
Lottery  -1.8285 
(-2.10)*** 
-1.8949 
(-1.76)** 
-2.2006 
(-1.77)** 
-2.1215 
(-1.98)*** 
-1.6006 
(-2.04)*** 
Delay  1.1270 
(1.40) 
1.7785 
(1.97)*** 
2.5221 
(3.01)*** 
2.3283 
(2.78)*** 
1.2056 
(1.37) 
Volatility  0.2183 
(0.75) 
0.5358 
(1.43) 
1.1043 
(3.29)*** 
1.0410 
(3.12)*** 
0.2459 
(0.82) 
State  0.7519 
(3.03)*** 
0.7100 
(2.70)*** 
0.6864 
(2.56)*** 
0.7707 
(2.83)*** 
0.9418 
(3.55)*** 
Industry  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.1765 0.1388 0.2211 0.2245 0.1993 
  F statistic p value   3.63 
(0.0000) 
2.68 
(0.0012) 
4.23 
(0.0000) 
4.75 
(0.0000) 
3.13 
(0.0001) 
Obs  248 243 289 294 232 
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By extending the previous results, we further test PE impacts by subgrouping the sample 
firms according to PE type and investor’s country of origin. The aim is to further explore 
PE investors’ behaviour in the Chinese IPO market. PE type group is defined to 1 if PE 
is Pre-IPO type and 0 otherwise. Although Pre-IPO type focuses on helping the firm to 
go listing, in fact, all PE-backed firms are aiming for listing regardless of PE types during 
the hot stock market period. The investors’ country of origin variable is based on whether 
the PE investment is made by a domestic or non-domestic PE investor. The results are 
shown in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6 The impact of PE investment on PE-backed IPOs 
This table shows the subgroup testing of PE-backed IPOs. The first two groups are based on Pre-
IPO group and non-Pre-IPO group. The last two groups are based on domestic PE investors and 
non-domestic PE investors. The dependent variable is _MAAR SH . The testing variables include: PE 
amount ( aPE mount ) is measured using the accumulated total amount of PE investment received 
before IPO to divide firm’s total assets; PE deal stake ( PEdeal  ) is the accumulated total shares 
controlled by P investors before IPO; PE reputation ( PEreputation ) captures whether the PE investor 
has a high reputation; New board dummy ( Newboard ) variable equals 1 if the IPO is listed on new 
boards and equals to 0 if listed on main boards. The control variables include: natural logarithm 
of firm size( Size ); firm age ( Age); underwriter dummy ( rUnderwrite ) equals 1 if the underwriter 
is from top list and 0 otherwise; the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds ( oceedsPr ) controls for the 
size of the offering; PEratio is the offer price to earnings ratio; Lottery  is the percentage of winning 
the IPO lottery; Delay is the number of days between the offering day and the IPO day; Volatility
measures the 90-day market return volatility before the IPO day;; the State ownership is the size 
of shares controlled by the State. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics.  
 (1) 
Pre-IPO 
group 
(2) 
Non Pre-IPO 
group 
(3) 
Domestic 
investors 
(4) 
Non-domestic 
investors 
Cons  -496.2592 
(-2.19) 
22.2593 
(1.12) 
26.4530 
(0.17) 
819.3387 
(1.42) 
PEamount   -21.8544 
(-4.09)*** 
-9.3743 
(-2.05) 
-14.5527 
(-3.22) 
-30.4803 
(-1.03) 
PEdeal   130.7551 
(1.76) 
43.4577 
(1.03) 
78.9523 
(1.42) 
4.3740 
(0.05) 
PEreputation  22.2890 
(1.77) 
2.8486 
(0.29) 
10.5555 
(1.30) 
28.9487 
(0.22) 
Newboard  -37.8400 
(-1.94)*** 
-17.6937 
(-1.53) 
-33.5917 
(-2.99) 
64.0564 
(0.97) 
Size  -3.7510 
(-0.66) 
-0.5200 
(-0.18) 
1.9017 
(0.71) 
-13.2659 
(-0.43) 
Age  -1.1652  
(-0.89)  
-0.6970 
(-0.50) 
-0.9898 
(-0.94) 
-8.6437 
(-0.64) 
Underwriter  -4.2654  
(-0.28) 
-9.6330 
(-1.11) 
-8.4563 
(-1.09) 
-46.1063 
(-0.43) 
Proceeds  42.8673  
(4.31)*** 
1.4036 
(0.18) 
9.5993 
(1.18) 
6.5223 
(0.15) 
PEratio  0.2900 
(3.83) 
-0.0222 
(-2.52) 
-0.0165 
(-2.18) 
-.3637 
(-0.36) 
Lottery  -1.2904 
(-4.07) 
-14.8319 
(-2.66) 
-1.5218 
(-2.11) 
-1.9514 
(-0.11) 
Delay  1.7149 
(2.31) 
0.4295 
(0.45) 
0.7455 
(0.91) 
-2.4340 
(-0.28) 
Volatility  -0.0106 
(-0.03) 
-0.1479 
(-0.31) 
-0.2682 
(-0.76) 
1.6823 
(1.59) 
State  -0.0598 
(-0.14) 
0.9527 
(3.24) 
0.9332 
(3.70) 
0.3992 
(0.22) 
Industry  Included Included  Included  Included  
Year   Included Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.6257 0.2008 0.1806 0.7828 
  F statistic p value   10.26 
(0.00) 
2.31 
(0.00) 
2.99 
(0.00) 
5.68 
(0.05) 
Obs  56 176 213 19 
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From the first testing group, we notice that PE amount helps to reduce underpricing for 
both Pre-IPO and non-Pre-IPO group, suggesting similar investment behaviour for all 
investors. All IPOs listed on new boards are found to experience lower underpricing than 
main boards IPOs. From the second testing group, PE investment from domestic investors 
leads to lower underpricing and the underpricing is particularly high for new board listed 
firms. We do not observe the same empirical results from the non-domestic PE investor 
group. Combining the behaviour and impact of different PE investors, we suggest that 
speculation exists regardless of PE types. The speculation behaviour is more commonly 
found in new board IPOs and in investment made by domestic PE investors.  
 
To summarize, we find no evidence to support PE reputation or PE corporate governance 
effect. After excluding other possible explanations, we can attribute the lower 
underpricing to the speculation behaviour of PE investors in the Chinese market. We 
further approve this statement by carrying out sub-sample testing. We find PE investors, 
despite their investment amount and PE types, are willing to benefit from less 
underpricing. Due to the newly set-up of new boards, firms listed on new boards 
experience higher underpricing than firms on main boards. This finding is consistent with 
the fact that the setting up of new stock boards after 2005 and the Bull market in 2007, a 
large amount of PE capital rushed into the Chinese stock market to benefit from the high 
initial stock returns. 
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6.5 The impact of PE investment in the long term 
In the previous section, we have confirmed that PE investment led to less underpricing in 
the Chinese stock market at the time of IPO. Considering the existence of speculation 
behaviour, it is useful to compare the impact of PE investment in China in the long-run 
to the existing mature market evidence.  
 
Ritter (1991) has indicated that BHARs can be used to provide an unbiased measure for 
long-run abnormal returns on IPOs. In this section, we test the impact of PE investment 
in both 12 months and 24 months for the sample of 1301 IPO firms, including 296 PE-
backed IPO firms. We do not include 3 years’ aftermarket performance because some of 
the IPO firms were listed in 2011. When a firm in the portfolio is delisted or suspended 
from the stock markets, the portfolio return for the next month is an equally weighted 
average of the remaining firms in the portfolio41.  
 
To calculate long-term underperformance, the market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
return is used. The aftermarket performance for IPO sample is computed as  
[1 ] [1 ]
1 1
T T
BHAR R R
it it mt
t t
    
 
 , where itR  is the return of stock i in the tht   trading month, 
and Rmt  is the market index return for the corresponding period.  Consistent with the 
previous IPO underpricing testing, we use Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-share 
index as benchmark for all of our sample IPOs.  
 
To test the impact from PE investment to IPO performance in the long-run, we carry out 
the following two sets of regression model: 
                                                             
41 There is one firm is our data that has been suspended from ChiNext stock market since June 2013 due to fake IPO 
application information provided.  
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Industry Year
i
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  
     
       
  
               (6.5) 
 
In equitation 6.4, PE dummy is the testing variable. Apart from the control variables we 
used in the underpricing models, we remove some IPO performance related variables and 
add a few other controlling variables that may affect long-term performance. The first 
variable is Seasonal Equity Offering ( SEO ), which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if SEO 
is issued within two years after IPO and 0 otherwise. According to Welch (1989), the 
issuing prices of SEO after the IPO is three times higher than the initial IPO offering price, 
which is regarded as a strategy for high quality firms to compensate their cost of high 
underpricing at the time of IPO. Thus, the issuing of new equity usually leads to long-run 
underperformance as a result of the information asymmetry problem. The other variables 
to measure sales growth rate ( Sales ) at the time of IPO and Tobin’s q (TobinQ ). Chan et al. 
(2004) have proved that, although managers tended to manipulate operating performance 
before IPO, the change of operating performance is still important in adjusting stock 
prices in the long run. In equation (6.5), we narrow down the sample to PE-backed IPOs 
only. The testing variables include PE amount, PE deal, PE reputation and IPO listing 
board dummy. The same control variables are used in equation (6.3). For both equations, 
n equals to 12-month and 24-month periods respectively. The regression results are shown 
in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7 IPO underpermance regression: the effect of PE backing 
This table shows the long term performance of PE-backed IPOs. The first two groups are based 
on whole sample IPOs in 12-months and 24-months period. The second groups are based on PE-
backed IPOs in 12-month and 24-month periods. The dependent variable is the _MAAR SH . The 
testing variables include: PE dummy, equals 1 if the IPO is backed by PE investment and 0 
otherwise; PE amount ( aPE mount  ) is measured using the accumulated total amount of PE 
investment that have been received before IPO to divide firm’s total assets; PE deal stake ( PEdeal ) 
is the accumulated total shares controlled by P investors before IPO; PE reputation ( PEreputation ) 
captures whether the PE investor is with high reputation or not; New board dummy ( Newboard ) 
variable equals 1 if the IPO is listed on new boards and equals 0 if listed on main boards. The 
control variables include: natural logarithm of firm size( Size  ); firm age ( Age  ); SEO  dummy 
variable equals to 1 if SEO is issued within two years after IPO and 0 otherwise measures; sales 
growth ( sales ) is measured by the sales growth rate at the time of IPOs; Tobin’s Q (TobinQ ) is 
measured by the Tobin’s Q at the time of IPOs; the State ownership is the size of shares controlled 
by the State. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics.  
 Whole sample IPOs PE-backed IPOs 
 12BHAR  24BHAR  12BHAR  24BHAR  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C tanons t  -0.2573 
(-1.06) 
-0.5311 
(-2.32) 
0.4879 
(1.02) 
0.6989 
(1.37) 
PE  0.0065 
(0.25) 
-0.0258 
(-0.99) 
  
PEamount     -0.0564 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.0506 
(-3.08)*** 
PEdeal     0.0713 
(0.48) 
0.0081 
(0.03) 
PEreputation    -0.0430 
(-0.94) 
-0.0646 
(-1.45) 
Newboard    0.1327 
(1.73)** 
0.1797 
(2.62)*** 
Size  0.0065 
(0.55) 
0.0079 
(0.70) 
0.0107 
(0.57) 
-0.0131 
(-0.74) 
Age  -0.0023 
(-0.93) 
-0.0018 
(-0.66) 
-0.0068 
(-1.45) 
-0.0071 
(-1.79) 
Sales  0.0085 
(2.16)*** 
0.0044 
(0.76) 
0.0961 
(5.29)*** 
0.1346 
(3.25)*** 
TobinQ  -0.0076 
(-0.51) 
-0.0148 
(-1.04) 
-0.0299 
(-1.24) 
-0.0389 
(-1.37) 
Leverage  -0.0883 
(-1.40) 
0.0197 
(0.32) 
0.0945 
(0.66) 
0.2365 
(2.04)*** 
SEO  0.0263 
(0.54) 
0.0490 
(1.20) 
-0.0060 
(-0.07) 
0.0482 
(0.83) 
State  0.0016 
(2.89)*** 
0.0025 
(4.70)*** 
0.0033 
(2.57)*** 
0.0030 
(2.83)*** 
Industry   Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 _Adj R sq  0.0216 0.0305 0.1985 0.2926 
  F statistic p value   2.91 
(0.0004) 
3.09 
(0.0002) 
4.42 
(0.0000) 
3.50 
(0.0000) 
Obs  1299 1299 232 232 
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In both 12-month and 24-month whole sample stock performance results, PE dummy 
variables are insignificant. For the controlling variables, high sales growth firms and firms 
with State ownership have better 12-month stock performance. In the 24-month period, 
only State ownership variable has positively significant impact on BHAR . These outcomes 
further confirm our previous results that PE investors are speculative in China stock 
market and do not provide any value added activities in the long run, such as corporate 
governance improvement. Nevertheless, the adjusted R squares in both 12-month and 24-
month models are too small for the whole sample results. 
 
We then reduce our sample to PE-backed IPOs only and the results are reported in Table 
6.7 model (3) and (4). IPO firms with large PE amount ( PEamount ) and firms listed on new 
boards ( Newboard ) are found to experience a lower return in the long-run. The standardized 
coefficient for PE amount is -22.21% in a 12-month period, which is slightly lower than 
the 19.29% in a 24-month period. In both models, PE reputation factors and PE deal stake 
are found to be insignificant.  
 
These results help to provide more insights into our previous questions. Firstly, we can 
conclude that the underpricing of PE-backed IPOs may not be caused by certification 
hypothesis or the corporate governance effect from PE investors. The testing variables for 
these two theories, PE reputation ( PEreputation ) and PE deal stake ( PEdeal ), are shown as 
insignificant in all of our model results. Secondly, our results support the financing role 
of PE investment in the Chinese IPOs, shown by the PE amount variable ( PEamount ). The 
above results support our previous suggestion concerning the speculation behaviour of 
PE investors in the Chinese stock market. In contrast to findings on lower long-term 
performance of new board IPOs (Anderson et al., 2013), we observe PE-backed firms 
listed on new boards experience better long term performance. This may be explained by 
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the fact that our sample PE-backed IPOs are still under a fast expanding Chinese PE 
market and investors in the secondary market have higher expectations on the new board 
listed firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
201 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
Using a sample of 1301 Chinese IPOs, including 295 PE-backed IPOs issued from 2001 
to 2011, we study the role of PE investment in Chinese mainland IPOs. We demonstrate 
a number of results that fill the gap between existing literature review based on mature 
market economics and the evidence of PE investment in the Chinese stock market. Our 
main findings are as follows. 
 
Firstly, we find that PE-backed IPOs experience lower underpricing than non PE-backed 
IPOs. This finding implies that PE investment does enhance firm performance and 
provides some consistent results to general literature based on mature market evidence, 
such as PE certification role. However, thinking about the hot IPO market in China, it can 
be argued that there may be other possible explanations for low underpricing, such as PE 
investor’s speculation behaviour, PE investor’s reputation and corporate governance 
effect from PE investors. To prove that, we narrow down our sample firms to PE-backed 
IPOs only. We find the amount of PE investment has a negatively significant relationship 
with the underpricing that is, PE investors with a large amount of PE investment are more 
willing to set up high offering price and benefit from the initial IPO returns. In contrast 
to the normal ‘leave the money on the table’ strategy of PE investors, this result unveils 
the speculation tendency of Chinese PE investors. We also observe that firms listed on 
new boards experience higher speculation than their main board peers. Both PE reputation 
and PE deal stake variables are not statistically significant which denies our explanation 
of the effect of PE reputation and PE corporate governance role. Moreover, by dividing 
PE-backed IPOs into different sub-groups, the following outcomes are found: regardless 
of PE types, all PE-backed IPOs experience lower underpricing; Chinese domestic PE 
investors lead to lower underpricing than non-domestic PE investors. The above sub-
sample tests provide additional outcomes in proving the speculation behaviour of PE 
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investors in the Chinese stock markets.  
 
Secondly, we expand our IPO samples by including their aftermarket performance in both 
12-month and 24-month periods. Comparing PE-backed IPOs and non-PE backed IPOs, 
we find PE investment does not affect BHARs in either time period, which further 
confirms the speculation behaviour that we proposed from the short-term performance. 
By examining the performance of PE-backed IPOs, we discover that the larger PE 
investment results in worse performance in both 12-month and 24-month period. 
Consistent with the hot PE market, IPOs listed on new boards have better after market 
performance. 
 
To sum up, this chapter provides the role of PE investors in China based on existing 
literature and adds Chinese evidence. First of all, in general, PE investors lead to lower 
underpricing which is consistent with the mature market evidence; secondly, we argue 
that the lower underpricing may be caused by reasons other than the commonly used 
certification hypothesis. We propose tests on how PE influences their portfolio firm IPO 
performance in both short run and long run. Our results do not support the certification 
hypothesis by showing PE reputation factors have no impact on IPO underpricing. 
Regarding the minority shareholder positions of most PE investors, during their 
investment period, they play a limited governance role and they may only help with 
securing the IPO listing through their network and past experience (Zhang and Li., 2012). 
Moreover, given the background of the hot IPO market, the heavy intervention capital 
market, and the weak law and regulation protection environment, PE investment acts only 
as a new financing channel and the investments are mostly speculative. The purpose of 
the PE investment is to help a firm go to listing, especially on the new stock boards. By 
setting up higher offering prices, the PE investors can play their certification role by 
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signaling the value of the IPO firms and they themselves can exit via IPO and get higher 
initial returns. The results are not surprising given that China is a fast growing economy 
and the capital market is still under construction.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we first summarize the main findings from this thesis, especially from the 
three empirical chapters. We then suggest the implication of these findings and illustrate 
some of the limitations of this study. Lastly, we analyze the current economic and 
financial difficulties of the Chinese economy and suggest some future research topics on 
PE investment in China.  
 
7.1 Summary of the main findings 
In this thesis, we investigate how the recent hybrid PE investment fits into Chinese 
economic development, and we unveil the role of PE investment in their portfolio firms. 
This thesis has three setting points. Firstly, we examine the motivations for Chinese 
portfolio firms to accept PE investment based on theories from mature market evidence. 
Secondly, we move on to evaluate the effect of the entry of PE investment on Chinese 
mainland PE-backed listed firms’ in both short and long term. Thirdly, we compare the 
short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance between PE-backed IPOs and 
non-PE-backed IPO firms.  
 
In chapter 4, we discuss the motivations for portfolio firms to receive PE investment. 
Based on the analysis from the literature review, we set our hypothesis based on three 
standard finance theories, namely financing for investment and growth theory, agency 
theory and signalling theory. Both Probit and Logit models are used to compare PE 
portfolio firms to a group of matched firms generated by the Propensity Score Matching 
method. First of all, we notice that financing for investment and growth theory does not 
play a significant role in motivating PE investment. This result may be explained by pre-
IPO firms having met listing requirements without severe financing difficulties. Secondly, 
it is shown that firms with better performance and with state background are not 
205 
 
motivated to apply for PE investment rejects signaling themselves as a motivation for PE 
investment, which seems to consistent with the fact that both type of firms have the 
advantages of getting listed. Thirdly, firms with a single largest shareholder have higher 
motivation for receiving PE investment and, especially if the ownership is tightly 
controlled by the largest shareholder, the motivation becomes significant. This finding is 
consistent with the fact that PE investors normally become minority shareholders in the 
portfolio firms. A robustness test focuses on SME listed firms confirms the whole sample 
findings. Although most of our sample firms received PE investment prior to IPO, there 
remains a group of post-IPO PE portfolio firms. We examine how the announcement of 
PE investment affects the stock market prices of the listed firms using an event study. The 
result implies that there is no significant stock market price change after the 
announcement of PE investment, showing an insignificant signaling effect. After rejecting 
some motivation factors from standard literature, this chapter suggests that the motivation 
of PE investment is for a different purpose in China.  
 
In chapter 5, the PE portfolio firms’ accounting performance is examined using cross-
section regression models. The evidence shows that the entry of PE investment plays a 
significant role in affecting portfolio firms’ accounting performance in the short-run, 
although the proportion of PE amount is relatively small compared to firm size. To be 
more specific, the amount of PE investment has a positive relationship with profitability 
while the ownership passed on to PE investors has a negative relationship with 
profitability. The latter can be explained by the short-term profit intention results from 
the conflicts of interest between PE investors and portfolio firms. To take a closer look at 
the impact of PE investment, a further step is to divide our sample into sub-groups 
according to their different stock boards, investor’s country of origin, state-ownership 
information and the probability of syndicated investors. These tests provide an in-depth 
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understanding on PE impact and differentiate investment behaviour across groups. The 
findings include: (1) New boards’ listed firms are significantly affected by the inflow of 
PE investment than mainboard listed firms. (2) PE investment from domestic investors 
has more significant impacts on portfolio firm performance than their non-domestic peers. 
(3) Firms without state-ownership are more significantly affected by PE investment than 
firms with state-ownership. (4) Non-syndicated PE investors have greater impact on 
portfolio firm performance than those syndicated PE investors. The overall results suggest 
that PE investment does play a significant role in their portfolio firms immediately after 
PE investment but, at the same time, the conflict of interests leads to a negative effect on 
performance from PE ownership. Nevertheless, we find PE investment has no impact in 
the long-run, defined as the two and three years after PE investment. Considering the fact 
that PE investors normally become minority shareholders in their portfolio firms, we 
conclude PE investors are short-term profit driven rather than playing a significant role 
in the long run in their Chinese portfolio firms. The finding from this Chapter helps to 
reveal the operation of PE investment in China and provides some consistent findings to 
the previous chapter.  
 
There is no reason to leave out the stock market performance of portfolio firms when 
studying PE investment in China because the PE market has largely developed after the 
setting up of two new stock boards. Consequently, we study PE-backed IPO performance 
in chapter 6. Compared to non-PE-backed IPOs, PE-backed IPOs experience lower IPO 
underpricing. Although this observation is normally explained by the certification role of 
PE investors in literature, we attribute this finding to the speculation behaviour of Chinese 
PE investors after rejecting other possible hypotheses, such as PE reputation factors and 
PE corporate governance factors. Further evidence is found to support the speculative 
behaviour hypothesis in Chinese PE investment, including a negatively significant 
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relationship between the size of PE investment and the underpricing; the underpricing is 
more severe for new board listed firms than main board listed firms. We then narrow 
down our sample firms to PE-backed IPOs sample. The observations include: (1) 
Regardless of PE types, all PE-backed IPOs experience lower underpricing. (2) Chinese 
domestic PE investors lead to lower underpricing than non-domestic PE investors. By 
expanding our sample to 12-month and 24-month periods, we find PE investment does 
not affect long-term performance. These findings further prove the speculative behaviour 
of PE investment in China. In contrast to the existing literature, we provide further 
explanation of the investment behaviour of PE investment in China, which is consistent 
to the nature of this booming PE market and the results from the previous two empirical 
chapters.  
 
 We recapitulate the features of PE investment in China from the observations of PE-
backed listed portfolio firms as follows: 
- Accompany with the setup of SME and ChiNext board and the restart of IPO, the 
Chinese PE market underwent tremendous development during the period between 
2005 and 2011.  
- Until the end of 2011, the majority of PE investment in China had the purpose of 
generating higher exit returns from the stock market. Unlike PE investment in mature 
economies, PE investment in China plays a limited role in engaging into corporate 
governance issues and these investors are short-term profit orientated. This is because: 
(1) The hot IPO market provides a quick and less risky exit channel for PE investors. 
PE investor can make investment with a high IPO return after the one-year lock-up 
period. The IPO exit channel shortens the investment period compared to non-pre-
IPO PE investment, which normally takes 6 to 10 years to exit. (2) Most PE investors 
in China are quite young and so have short operating history. This lack of past 
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experience has restricted the domestic investors in providing efficient corporate 
governance instructions to their portfolios firms. (3) China is a country built on 
tradition and ownership is tightly controlled by ownership of firms for self-protection 
purposes. Firms with a dominant largest shareholder are more motivated in receiving 
PE investment due to the minority role of PE investors. Hence, after a PE investment 
is set-up, there is less chance for PE investors to have real control and, in most cases, 
even experienced PE investors become minority shareholders. (4) After the 
establishment of a PE transaction, the entry of PE investors as minority shareholders 
will be less motived in engaging into management issues. Moreover, the short-term 
profit orientation of PE investors may create conflict of interests with firm owners, 
leading to a negative impact on portfolio firm performance. (5) Under the 
environment of a hot Chinese IPO market, the financing role of PE investors is not 
significant and PE role is mainly concentrated on smoothing the IPO listing process 
to ensure a quick exit with high stock market returns. Based on the above mentioned 
characteristics, we conclude the Chinese PE market is speculative and the majority of 
investors are speculating on benefits derived from the booming IPO market. This 
result is determined by the nature of the Chinese market as well as the nature of 
Chinese IPO market. 
 
The three empirical chapters are tightly integrated.  Firstly, the speculation behaviour of 
PE investors is found in both chapter 5 and chapter 6 from both accounting performance 
analysis and stock market information. Although we do not conclude chapter 4 using the 
word speculation, we find that the financing and signaling effects are not the motivation 
for PE investment, implying the possibility of speculation behaviour. However, results 
from chapter 4 can be argued by our sample selection bias. Because we focus only on PE-
backed listed firms, firms that are really looking for external financing and/or signaling 
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themselves to PE investors have been missed out. The speculation behaviour is found to 
be more severe for PE domestic investors and firms listed on two new boards, which are 
confirmed in both chapter 5 and 6. Secondly, we find no evidence suggesting that PE 
investment helps with corporate governance or with solving agency conflict, namely, no 
long-term effect is observed in either empirical chapter 5 and 6. Results from chapter 4 
also support this opinion by showing that firms with a single largest shareholder are more 
motivated to accept PE investors as minority shareholders. Lastly, we find a combined 
result of the signaling effect of PE investment. In chapter 4, we observe insignificant stock 
market returns after the PE announcement in post-IPO investment firms. Nevertheless, in 
chapter 6, domestic investors are observed to have greater impact on portfolio firms than 
non-domestic investors, which can be explained by their better knowledge and 
understanding of the Chinese market.   
 
7.2 Implications of the research findings 
The overall findings of this research suggest that PE investors in China do not play the 
same financing and signaling role as they do in developed markets. Because of PE 
investors’ minority shareholder role, they are less motivated in engaging into governance 
issues and few value-added activities have been added to the portfolio firms. Due to the 
immature nature of Chinese PE market, investment behaviour is largely speculative and 
PE investment is largely driven by seeking short-term high profit via IPO exit.  
 
The results drawn from this study have wide implications for PE portfolio firms, PE 
investors and government policy-makers in China. For PE portfolio firms, rather than 
considering PE investment as a subsidy for a bank loan, IPO accelerator or even for tax 
avoidance, they should consider how to make use of PE investment as a tool for upgrading 
their operation and corporate governance. A concentrated ownership structure exists in 
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most Chinese firms which should be adjusted for the purpose of giving the rights and 
obligations to PE investors. After 2011, the IPO market has been cooled down again by 
the authority and the secondary markets showed worse performance, suggesting a more 
appropriate way of cooperation between the investor and portfolio firms. Following the 
experience from the western PE market, the next stage of PE development will mainly 
focus on PE buyout. As a consequence, how to accept and implicate buyout in China is a 
question for portfolio firms.  
 
Firstly, for domestic PE investors, it is important to understand the likely future trend of 
PE investment in China. For example, they may need to switch their business from Pre-
IPO to other PE types; to provide funding opportunities for firms seeking financing rather 
than focusing on IPO firms; to help SMEs with industry integration and industry upgrade. 
Most important, providing and transforming value added activities in PE portfolio firms 
are some of biggest challenges. Secondly, for non-domestic PE investors, the 
understanding of cultural discrepancies can still be an obstacle. For example, dealing with 
the guanxi relationship with local and central authorities is crucial for foreign PE investors’ 
expansions in China. Thirdly, if both types of PE investors want to act beyond the role of 
minority shareholder, the ability to solve the problem of the lack of ‘bridge’ managers is 
also very important. As indicated by Pukthuanthong and Walkter (2007), there is a 
shortage of professional PE managers in China. Since the IPO market is experiencing 
turbulence and Chinese GDP has slowed down, PE investors should have a deeper 
understanding of the cycle of Chinese economic development and prepare themselves for 
longer-term PE investment.  Last but not least, according to the standard literature, a 
syndication network is believed to help VCs in providing value-added activities for their 
portfolio firms, improving the chances of future funds for the portfolio firms and 
providing stronger signaling effect (Hochberg et al., 2007). However, in our empirical 
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findings from Chapter 5, PE investors do not fulfil these advantages in their portfolio 
firms. Thereafter, how to move from individual investor to syndicated investors and how 
to cooperate effectively with each other can also be a new task for PE investors.  
 
The implications for government policy and regulation are as follows: (1) Administration 
reform. Both central and local government would do well to think about integration of PE 
investment with the current capital market and financial system reform. For example, 
authority can provide more favorable regulation to encourage the entry of USD PE funds 
and to the setting up of hybrid foreign/Chinese USD & RMB private equity funds. (2) 
Legal reform. For example, all acquisitions in China by foreign investors are subject to 
and encouraged by the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries. 
However, in reality, the foreign ownership structure has been restricted from industries 
such as telecommunication. Even in a joint venture company where foreign ownership is 
permitted to perform as majority shareholder, the majority shareholder cannot obtain 
complete control when their partner has a State background (Eich and Li., 2006). Further, 
although the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of China has been in effect since June 2007, 
domestic firm owners are not familiar with this protection tool. Therefore, the government 
should strengthen investors’ and owners’ understanding of legal application with the help 
of experienced PE investors. (3) Investor reform. The development of Chinese PE market 
provides an opportunity for domestic investors to make PE investment overseas. The 
government has an obligation to set up laws and regulations to help domestic investors 
and smooth the way for ‘going out’. 
 
Based on the empirical findings, we make the following prediction on the future 
development trend of PE industry in China:  
(1) Domestic IPO exit is no longer the best PE channel given the poor performance of the 
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domestic IPO market, the unpredictable IPO freeze and the strengthened audit system for 
IPO issuing. Due to the current market saturation, firms (especially SOEs and large high-
tech firms) will choose to exit via IPO in overseas market rather than domestic stock 
markets. Hence, PE investors with overseas background and/or non-domestic PE 
investors will become more welcome. (2) The path of PE development in mature market 
economics has shown that a buyout market will eventually replace the PE-backed IPO 
market. Based on the current corporate governance upgrade in China, PE buyout 
investment will become the new trend in China. Therefore, there is room to expand the 
current business modes for PE investors, especially in coping with the concentrated 
ownership structure in portfolio firms and to provide value-added activities for PE 
portfolio firms. One concern would be whether PE investors can gain trust from their 
portfolio SOEs, especially in helping with corporate governance adjusted and resource 
reallocation. (3) Instead of targeting small and private firms, PE investors will start to 
work with SOEs and help with the current SOE upgrade. The selection of PE investors 
for large SOEs is mainly from large PE firms and PE investors with overseas background. 
For the latter, these PE investors can help SOEs with overseas business expansion, 
improving international collaboration and providing overseas listing opportunities.  
 
7.3 Limitations of this thesis 
There are a number of limitations in this study that should be addressed. First of all, the 
limitation of sample firms used in this thesis. The findings in this thesis are limited to the 
public listed firms and a large sample of PE-backed non-listed firms is left out. We believe 
that the focus on listed firms causes selection-bias problem. For example, good firms that 
are willing to be listed may not be bothered by the financing difficulty issues, confirmed 
by Chapter 4. Hence, our sample selection has left out a group of non-listed firms that 
cannot meet banking loan and listed requirements but are really looking for alternative 
213 
 
financing channels such as PE. It would be interesting to focus on non-listed firms in 
future studies. Secondly, although our sample includes by far the largest number of PE-
backed sample firms (a sample of 364 PE-backed firms), we use a cross-section rather 
than panel data due to the data limitation when PE took place before IPO. As a result, we 
are unable to employ advanced econometric methods, such as, instrument variable and 
GMM method, to avoid some potential selection and endogeneity problems. However, 
these data and methodology problems are difficult to avoid at this stage. We believe that, 
in the further development of a Chinese PE market, a more well-established dataset will 
be set up and will provide more comprehensive and reliable information. 
 
7.4 The future of the Chinese PE market and future work 
China is undergoing sweeping economic reforms, aiming to rebalance the economy. 
China’s double-digit annual growth-rate is over. According to the IMF report, the forecast 
inflation-adjusted GDP will continue to slow down from a projected 7.4% in 201442 , 
shown in Figure 7.1. Assuming no change in the exchange rate and a continuation of 
current policy plans, Chia’s inflation-adjusted GDP will continue to slow over the rest of 
decade. The slowing growth rate means policymakers have enough room to maintain 
growth rate in a comfortable range when delivering the reform. The current Chinese 
reform faces multiple challenges, including government reform, household registration 
reform, land reform, capital market and financial system reform. The capital market and 
financial system reform includes two most urgent factors which are the controlling of 
excessive local debt 43  and unregulated shadow banking 44 . These problems require 
                                                             
42 The GDP growth rate is 7.4% in China, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. 
43 At the end of 2013, it is revealed by China’s national auditor that the liabilities of provincial governments had grown 
to 10.9 trillion Yuan ($1.8 trillion), or 17.9 trillion Yuan if all of the debt guarantees were added. The figure was 
equivalent to around one thirds of the country’s GDP. These debts had grown in an enormous speed to become a national 
burden as well as an international concern regarding China’s future growth. 
44 Shadow banking refers to financial activities that occur off-balance sheet and are regulated. In contract to the 
conventional banks, the shadow banking system includes trusts, leasing companies, credit-guarantee outfits and money-
market funds. By promising returns as high as 10%, they raise money from business units and high net wealth 
individuals. They charge an even higher interest and lend to firms which are unable to borrow from banks, for example 
in industries where regulators realize the overinvestment and have commanded banks to restrain loans. The biggest 
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effective solutions to maintain the stability of China’s financial system. However, the 
country’s increasing domestic demand, favorable demographics, and its critical role as a 
global manufacturer and exporter will continue to provide a wide range of opportunities 
to investors with solid investment assets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
concern is the borrower are often from the so called ‘frothy industries’, such as property, steel and raw materials. The 
estimated size of shadow banking in China account for about 50-60 per cent of China’s GDP or around 25-30 per cent 
of banking assets, although still lower than the global average of 117% and 170% for the US. 
215 
 
Figure 7.1 The IMF forecasts on China’s inflation-adjusted GDP from 2014-2019 
 
Source: IMF report  
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Table 7.1 Four scenarios of the future of PE industry 
 Constant investor base Turnover in investor base 
Fair returns  Recovery  Backed to the future 
Disappointing returns  A broken industry The Limited Partners’ Desertion 
Lerner (2011), the future of Private Equity 
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In his work ‘The future of Private Equity’, Lerner (2011) has proposed a two-by-two 
matrix in predicting the four possible scenarios of the PE market, shown in Table 7.1. 
 
The horizontal axis indicates the role of investors: who still stay in the PE industry and 
who have made shifts to leave the industry. The vertical axis represents the returns of PE 
investment between fair returns and the investors who are going to get returns under their 
expectation. The first scenario ‘recovery’ shows increasing familiarity with the way PE 
process has make this type of investment even more attractive than it was, , leading to fair 
returns. According to the general pattern, investment made during the booming market 
(in terms of both fundraising and investment) appears to perform worse45 . Hence, to 
compensate investments made at the market peak, the level of PE is likely to rebound in 
the following years. In the second scenario ‘backed to the future’, due to the different 
returns for PE investors, the largest and smallest investors are more likely to exit46. Thus, 
the pool will be dominated by mid-sized investors and they are going to enjoy a less 
competitive and better performing market. In the scenario ‘the limited partners’, LP may 
be forced to exit the market given the disappointing returns and GPs can only raise smaller 
funds. The last scenario ‘a broken industry’ suggests a very unhappy ending that the 
inefficient industry might continue for a decade or even longer. The author’s opinion tends 
to be located in between the first and second scenarios.  
 
This prediction is for the general PE market but is mostly based on the mature economies. 
For China, we can be very optimistic about the future of the PE market: China will 
continue to attract significant funds from global investors as they want to participate in 
China’s growth story; the young Chinese market has left a lot of room for the exploration 
                                                             
45 For example, if firms use excessive leverage and overpay transactions during market peaks, it is expected that such 
firms with high leverage activities are going to experience downturns in the following years.  
46 Small funds are likely to exit because it is too costly for them to invest. For large PE investors, there remain a few 
choices given the size of capital they require for making investment. 
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of other PE types and PE exit routes; the access to the SOE sectors will attract a large 
amount of overseas PE investors. The Chinese PE market has exhibited some new 
features since 2011 (our sample period ends at 2011), which are listed as follows: 
- In the second half of 2011, PE fund raising became more difficult under the 
environment of inflationary pressures and the continued tightening of monetary 
policy. In 2013, IPO issuing was frozen for the whole year. The cooling down IPO 
market has forced PE investors to re-think their investment strategy and the 
mechanism of investment. PE institutions began to focus on professional investment 
and management after setting up the deals. A latest trend is M&A has substituted 
IPOs as the popular exit channel. 
- On 14th December 2013, the OTC market47  was set up which is regarded as a further 
move to expand access to credit market for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). This OTC stock board will be targeted by PE investors as the new exit 
channel in China.  
- After a 15-month halt, China restarted its new listing on the stock market in 2014. In 
this round of investment, PE investors not only have the stock market as the exit 
channel but also have the opportunity to work with state firms. The new proposed 
plan for SOE reform includes development of a mixed ownership economy, to 
introduce the entry of equity participation in helping with the integration, IPO listing, 
international mergers and acquisitions. This new policy has stimulated the 
enthusiasm of PE investors, some of them have established a special working group 
in coping with the opportunity to work with SOEs. 
- Following Lerner’s (2011) prediction, we expect the small and speculative PE 
                                                             
47 According to this new plan, companies with 200 or fewer shareholders that want to be quoted on the national equities 
exchange and quotation system will no longer face approval requirements prior to their quoting. Different from the 
existing stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen, the OTC exchange was designed specifically for non-public firms 
to seek capital and investors to trade equities over the counter. These non-public firms are too small to list and too risky 
for regular bank financing. Essentially, this new liberalizing reform of China’s OTC market may give small companies 
something to look forward to in the coming years. 
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investors are more likely to exit due to their weak competitive advantages in the 
current PE market. The pool will be left with large PE investors and investors who 
are working hard on adding value to their portfolio firms in the long run. Rather than 
using IPO as an exit channel, PE investors are looking to explore other exit channels, 
one of which is exit via M&A. The steadily expanding PE market provides large 
potential profit opportunities and will continue to attract both domestic and 
international PE investors.  
 
In sum, compared to the PE market which was largely IPO driven and where investors 
become speculative, the Chinese PE market has been further developed in the past few 
years. In the current wave, PE investors have become more mature and they tend to focus 
on operation adjustment, helping with quality management by providing more value 
added activities.  Based on the above analysis and predictions, we list several areas for 
future research topics in the following. First of all, it is worth examining how PE 
investment has been changed and development in terms of operating performance and 
corporate governance impact after 2011. It can also be fascinating to see whether Chinese 
PE investment and PE-backed firm performance outperform other BRIC countries such 
as India and Russia, to see whether speculation behaviour is a common characteristic in 
these fast developing economies. Based on the geographical dimension, the comparison 
can be carried out for variables such as exit channel, early stage versus late stage 
investment, different industry sectors and investors’ country of origin. These results can 
offer more useful information to international investors and investors who seek to invest 
globally.  
 
As the worst-performing stock market in Asia, the domestic IPO market as exit channel 
is becoming less attractive. Many large domestic firms have moved to listed/multi-listed 
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overseas. It would be an interesting topic to examine the motivation for overseas listing 
and aftermarket performance of these firms. The comparison can also be carried out 
between PE-backed overseas listed Chinese firms and PE-backed/non PE-backed listed 
firms from the same board. Moreover, how the overseas stock market setting helps to 
stimulate IPO and stock market performance can be further explored. For example, if the 
ChiNext board is regarded as NASDAQ in New York Stock Exchange and AIM in 
London Stock Exchange, how can listing rules and regulations be released to attract more 
entry of investors? Such information would benefit PE investors and provide insights for 
policy makers on how to build up the Chinese stock markets.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, PE investment will experience further expansion in 
the Chinese market. According to the general development stage of PE investment, 
buyout will play the leading role in the next stage of PE investment. In its early stage, 
buyout represents a back-door listing tool for big firms and speculation firms. Recently, 
Chinese buyout firms have started to focus on the real value of their portfolio firms. The 
largest challenge for PE investors is how to become the majority shareholder and to fulfill 
investor duties. Moreover, since getting buyout information is difficult, it is worth 
carrying out case studies to see how corporate governance is gradually improved in the 
target firm.  
 
Very few studies have focused on Chinese PE fund performance because the lack of 
disclosed information. With the development of the market, funding information should 
become more accessible. This is because a more formalized database will be set up and 
PE investors are keen to reveal better performance to attract LPs. To test fund 
performance, we can use the Public Market Equivalent (PME) to compare a PE 
investment to a public market index set up by Long and Nickles (1996) and improved by 
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Kaplan and Schoar (2005). It is also interesting to compare domestic investors to 
international investors, for example, do they spend more or less time processing a deal 
than their overseas competitors? Will the late stage PE investment help to stimulate 
innovation in both products and services? 
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Appendix 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 2.1 PE type summary 
Early stage 
 
Seed Financing that allows a business concept to be 
developed 
Start-up  Financing provided to companies for use in product 
development and initial marketing 
Expansion 
stage 
Growth capital Financing provided for the growth and expansion of 
an operating company which is trading profitably 
Bridge loan Financing made available to a company in the period 
of transition from being privately owned to being 
publicly quoted 
Franchise 
funding 
Financing provided to a company with franchise in a 
particular area for the further development 
Mezzanine 
stage 
 
Pre-IPO Financing provided to help a company go public. 
PIPE  Financing provided to entrepreneur-driven listed 
companies for rapid growth 
PE-backed IPO Financing involved into companies’ go listing 
process. 
Buyouts 
stage 
 
 
Buy-out Funds provided to enable current operating 
management and investors to acquire an existing 
product line or business 
Management 
buyout 
Funds provided by internal manager or group of 
managers to buyout a company; 
Secondary 
buyouts 
Purchase of a company from another private equity 
investment organisation. 
Late stage Turnaround Financing provided to re-establish a business which 
has encountered performance difficulties 
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Appendix 2.2 Academic and non-academic PE sources 
Academic research on the subject of PE investment has been increasingly specialized in 
recent years. Numerous articles on the subject of PE have been found in top finance 
journals, such as the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Review 
of Financial Studies, Business Venturing and the Journal of Corporate Finance. 
Moreover, there are two academic journals specializing in PE topics: Venture Capital: An 
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and the Journal of Private Equity, 
established in 1999 and 1997 respectively.  
In addition to academic journals, regional and/or national PE research associations have 
been set up around the world such as the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) 
in the US, The European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), the British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA), the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA) and 
the China Venture Capital Association (CVCA). These associations are intended  to 
facilitate dialogue and co-operation between the public sector and private investment 
community, to promote industry by holding international and/or domestic seminars and 
conferences, to act as a platform for limited partners, professional advisers and service 
providers to meet up, to unlock potential opportunities and to provide capital and 
expertise for  growing businesses. Most importantly, these associations collect 
information from their general partners and provide reliable PE performance data for 
investors and researchers.  
Because PE investment and performance information is not fully provided by government 
or the Statistics Bureau, private research institutions and publishers have started to 
publish industry data—most of the data are provided voluntarily by PE investors and 
portfolio firms. For instance, global PE information can be found in Preqin, S&P Capital 
IQ, Thomson Venture Economics and Securities Data Company (SDC) database and 
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Venture One Database. The Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR) 
provides UK and Europe PE transaction information and the Asian Venture Capital 
Journal (AVCJ) database provides Asian PE information. Apart from the above 
information channels for PE, internet websites specializing in the PE market have also 
become an important source in the last few years. The largest ones include the 
following: venturecapitalreporter.com, vcgates.com, ThisIsPEI.com and penews.com. 
The chinaventure.cn and pedaily.cn focus on Chinese PE information. 
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Appendix 2.3 A summary of PE investor types in China 
Government-backed PE firms National Council for Social Security Fund 
SDIC Innovation (Beijing) Investment Fund 
Management Co., Ltd. 
Hefei Hi-Tech Venture Capital Co., Ltd. Shenzhen 
Capital Group Co., Ltd.  
Shandong High-Tech Investment Corp. 
Guangdong Technology Venture Capital Co. Ltd. 
Shenzhen Capital Group Co., Ltd., 
Securities-backed PE firms 
 
 
 
Banks-backed PE firms 
Goldstone Investment under CITIC Securities 
Haitong Capital under Haitong Securities 
Guosen H&S investment company under GuoSen 
Securities 
BOC (Bank of China International) 
CCB (China Construction Bank) International 
ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) 
International. 
Other domestic PE firms University–backed PE firms: 
TusPark Capital Co., Ltd. 
Shenzhen Tsinghua Leaguer Venture Capital Co., 
Ltd. 
Zhejiang University Venture Capital Co., Ltd. 
 
Corporation-backed PE firms: 
Hony Capital under Legend Capital Ltd. 
Xiamen Torch Venture Capital Co., Ltd. under 
Xiamen Torch Group Ltd. 
Fosun Venture Capital under Shanghai Fosun Group 
 
Crown Prince Party-backed PE firms: 
New Horizon 
Boyu Capital Advisory CO., Ltd 
 
Overseas PE firms Blackstone, KKR, Carlyle, Bain Capital, Goldman 
Sachs PIA 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Appendix 4.1 The Propensity Score Matching method (PSM) 
The specific propensity score matching implementation we use is based on Abadie and 
Imben’s (2002) application of the idea from Rosebaum and Rubin (1983). PSM refers to 
pairing of treatment and control units with similar values on the propensity score. The use 
of the method helps to reduce a multidimensional matching problem to a one-dimensional 
problem.  
 
A propensity score is the probability of a unit being assigned to a specific treatment given 
a set of covariates. Propensity scores are employed to reduce selection bias by equating 
groups based on these covariates. Assuming a binary action (or treatment) S, and an 
arbitrary set X of measured covariates. Normally, propensity score p(x) should meet the 
following conditions: 
0 1( , ) ||Y Y D X                                               (4.7) 
0 Pr( 1|| ) 1D X                                        (4.8) 
Where X is a vector of covariates. Equation (3.7) says that, condition on X, the outcomes 
for both treatment and control groups should follow the same distribution. Condition (3.8) 
says that at each level of X, the probability of observing both the control and the treated 
groups is positive. P(X) is the propensity score, where 
( ) Pr( 1|| )p X D x                                           (4.9) 
P(X) is the probability that action D = 1 given that X = x. Rosenbaum and Rubin show 
that if the conditions in equations 3.7 and 3.8 are satisfied, then 
0 1( , ) || ( )Y Y D P X                                          (4.10) 
And  
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0 Pr( 1|| ( )) 1D P X                                         (4.11) 
There are two commonly used methods for selecting control groups: the nearest-neighbor 
method and caliper matching. The nearest-neighbor method selects the m comparison 
units whose propensity scores are closest to the treated unit in question.  Caliper matching 
uses all the comparison units within a predefined propensity score radius (or ‘caliper’). 
We use the nearest neighbor propensity score matching method to ensure that those 
matched samples are as comparable as possible. In our specifications, to control for the 
selection bias of PE-backed firms and non-PE-backed peers, we obtain a propensity score 
by using an alliance based on target firm characteristics. We calculate the absolute 
distance in propensity score between each PE portfolio firm and firm generated based on 
size. From the results of possible matching peers, we require the maximum difference 
between the matching firm and the portfolio firm does not exceed 5% in absolute value. 
After the excluded non-PE-backed firms without available accounting and corporate 
governance information from CSMAR database, a sample of 318 non-PE peers from 
2000-2011 is generated as our matching firms. 
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Appendix 4.2 Variable definitions  
Variables  Definitions  
Age  Age is the age of firm at the time of PE investment. 
Sales  Sales growth rate is the rate of change in sales. 
_Ave ROA  Agree ROA is the average return on assets the past three years. 
_State dum   State dummy variable indicates whether the firm is backed by state 
ownership. 
HI  The Herfindahl Index is the squared sum of share percentages held by 
top4 shareholders. 
argL est  The largest shareholder represents the ratio of shares controlled by the 
largest shareholder. 
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Chapter 5 
Appendix 5.1 Variable definitions  
Variables  Definitions  
ROA  ROA is calculated by net income/total assets to measure the profitability 
of the firm. 
Size  Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. 
Leverage  Leverage ratio, is measured by total debt over total assets. 
Sales  Sales growth rate, is calculated by (S ( 1) ( ))ales t Sales t   divided by Sa ( )les t   
where t is the year PE investment took place. 
amountPE  PE  amount is measured using the cumulated total amount of PE 
investment that have been received before IPO to divide firm’s total 
assets. 
dealPE  PE deal is the cumulated total shares controlled by P investors before 
IPO. 
Round _ dum  PE round dummy variable takes 1 if this is the first PE investment to the 
portfolio firm and 0 otherwise. 
_IPO dum  IPO dummy variable equals 1 if PE investment happened before IPO and 
0 if PE investment happened after IPO. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Appendix 6.1. IPO underwriter ranking from 2008-2011 
In western studies, underwriter reputation ranking normally follows Carter and 
Manaster’s ranking for 1980-1984 (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh’s ranking for 1985-
1991 (1998) in the US market. However, a similar Carter-Manaster underwriting does not 
exist in China because: a) the tombstone announcement of IPOs from the US is different 
from Chinese IPO announcement; b) the stock market history in China is not long enough 
compared to the US. Hence, we collect the annual report of Securities’ performance 
statistics realized by the Association of China (SAC). This report announces the top 20 
underwriters of the year based on the total amount of underwriting and the total number 
of IPOs undertaken. From the SAC website, we found the reports available from 2007-
2011. However, in the 2007 report, the ranking was a combination of stock and bond 
performance rather than stock performance only. Hence, we eliminate the 2007 report and 
use the reports from 2008-2011.  
 
To calculate the underwriter reputation, we use two kinds of information: Securities’ 
underwriting amount from 2008-2011 and Securities’ number of times as leading 
underwriter from 2008-2011. We then summarize the accumulated underwriting amount 
and the total number of times as underwriter for each firm. The underwriter ranking score 
for each firm is defined as:  
Underwriter ranking score= 
50%*(the total underwriting amount of funds for firm i/the total amount of underwriting funds)+ 
50%*(the number of times as leading underwriter for firm i/the total number of underwriting) 
 
We rank the underwriter according to the score and list the top 20 firms in the table below. 
In this table, we define the top 20 firms with high underwriter reputation as it was defined 
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in the original reports. As a result, if the underwriter firm comes from the top 20 list, the 
underwriter variable is defined as one and zero otherwise.  
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Appendix 6.2 IPO underwriter ranking from 2008-2011 
Reputation 
ranking 
Underwriter 
1 CITIC Securities 
2 CICC (China International Capital Corp) 
3 Ping An Securities 
4 Guotai Junan Securities 
5 Haitong Securities 
6 Guosen Securities 
7 Galaxy Securities 
8 Southwest securities 
9 China Merchants Securities 
10 Huatai Securities 
11 BOC (Bank of China) International 
Holdings Limited 
12 China Securities Co., Ltd (CSC) 
13 GF Securities 
14 Essence Securities 
15 Industrial securities 
16 Everbright Securities 
17 UBS investment bank 
18 Tiantong Securities 
19 Great Wall Securities 
20 Orient securities 
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Appendix 6.3 Variable definitions  
Variables  Definitions  
IR  IR is the initial IPO return measured using the formula 1 0
1
0
P P
i iIR
i P
i

 , where 
1
IR
i  is the return for stock i on its first trading day, 1Pi  is the closing price 
of stock i  on its first trading day and 0Pi  is the offering price of stock i . 
MAAR  MAAR   is the market-adjusted abnormal return using the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Composite A- share Index as a benchmark to obtain the adjusted 
abnormal stock returns for stock i  , i.e. 1 1 1MAAR IR Ri i m   , where 1Rm   is the 
benchmark stock market returns computed based on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Composite A-share Index on the first trading day of stock i .  
PE  Dummy variable PE  which takes the value of one if the IPO is PE-backed, 
otherwise it is zero. 
PEfund  PE  fund is measured using the cumulated total amount of PE investment 
that have been received before IPO to divide firm’s total assets. 
PEdeal  PE deal is the cumulated total shares controlled by P investors before IPO. 
PEreputation  PE reputation equals 1 if the PE investor is from the high reputation group 
and 0 otherwise. 
Newboard  Stock board dummy, which equals to 1 if the IPO is listed on new boards 
and equals to 0 if listed on main boards. 
Size  Firm size, which is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets of the 
firm in the year before IPO.  
Age  Firm age refers to firm age at the time of IPO, which is measured by using 
the IPO year minus the firm’s establishment year. 
Leverage  Leverage which is the ratio of total debt to total equity of the firm in the 
year before IPO. 
ROA  Return on Assets is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets of the 
firm in the year before IPO. 
Underwriter    Underwriter variable which takes the value of one if the underwriter 
involved in the IPO is among the group of highly ranked underwriters in 
China shown in Appendix 1 
Proceeds  IPO proceeds which is measured by the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds. 
PEratio  The price to earnings ratio, which is an element to be considered in pricing 
IPO. 
Lottery  The odds of winning the lottery. 
Delay  The difference between the IPO offering day and its first trading day. 
Volatility  The overall stock market volatility, which is measured by standard 
deviation of stock market returns in the past 90 days before IPO. 
State  State ownership, which is measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
State. 
Sales  Sales growth is measured by the sales growth rate at the time of IPOs 
TobinQ  The Tobin’s Q rate at the time of IPOs 
SEO  Seasonal Equity Offerings, which is a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the firm issued SEOs within two years after the IPO and zero 
otherwise. 
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Appendix 6.4 Top 30 Private Equity Investment Institutions in China  
This table summarizes the top 30 PE firm listed on China Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Annual Ranking from 2007 to 2011.  
Top 30 PE investors  Country of 
origin 
Baring Private Equity Asia HongKong 
CCBI (China Construction Bank Corporation Investment) China 
CDH Investments China 
China Merchants Technology Group Co.,Ltd China 
China Science & Merchants Capital Management Co, Ltd. China 
CITIC Private Equity Funds Management Co.,Ltd China 
Fortune Venture Capital Co., Ltd. China 
Fosun Capital Group China 
GoldStone Investment Co., Ltd. China 
Haitong-Fortis Private Equity Fund Managemetn Co., Ltd China 
Hony Capital (Beijing) Co., Ltd. China 
HOPU Investment Management Co. Ltd. China 
IDG Capital Partners China 
Jiangsu High-Tech Investment Group (Govtor capital) China 
Jiuding Capital China 
Kohlberg Kravis, Roberts & Co. US 
Kunwu Jiuding Capital Co., Ltd. China 
Legend Capital China 
Morgan Stanley Private Equity Asia HongKong 
New Horizon Capital China 
NewMargin Ventures China 
Ping An Caizhi Investment Management Co., China 
Qiming Weichuang Venture Capital Management (Shanghai) Co., 
Ltd 
China 
SAIF Partners HongKong 
Sequoia Capital China China 
Shenzhen Capital Group Co.,Ltd. China 
Shenzhen Co-win Venture Capital Investments Limited China 
The Carlyle Group LLC US 
The Goldman Sachs Group Principal investment area US 
Warburg Pincus LLC. US 
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